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Abstract
These lecture notes aim at a post-Bachelor audience with a background at an introductory level in Ap-
plied Mathematics and Applied Statistics. They discuss the logic and methodology of the Bayes–Laplace
approach to inductive statistical inference that places common sense and the guiding lines of the scientific
method at the heart of systematic analyses of quantitative–empirical data. Following an exposition of exactly
solvable cases of single- and two-parameter estimation, the main focus is laid onMarkov Chain Monte Carlo
(MCMC) simulations on the basis of Gibbs sampling and Hamiltonian Monte Carlo sampling of posterior
joint probability distributions for regression parameters occurring in generalised linear models. The mod-
elling of fixed as well as of varying effects (varying intercepts) is considered, and the simulation of posterior
predictive distributions is outlined. The issues of model comparison with Bayes factors and the assessment
of models’ relative posterior predictive accuracy with information entropy-based criteria DIC and WAIC
are addressed. Concluding, a conceptual link to the behavioural subjective expected utility representation
of a single decision-maker’s choice behaviour in static one-shot decision problems is established. Codes for
MCMC simulations of multi-dimensional posterior joint probability distributions with the JAGS and Stan
packages implemented in the statistical software R are provided. The lecture notes are fully hyperlinked.
They direct the reader to original scientific research papers and to pertinent biographical information.
Cite as: arXiv:yymm.numbervV [stat.AP]
These lecture notes were typeset in LATEX2ε.
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Introductory remarks
Contemporaries of the 21st Century find themselves exposed to flows of information of unprece-
dented current strengths. In an incredibly diverse spectrum of walks of life, the volumes of data
amassed as a consequence of the steadily progressing digital transformation have gradually at-
tained astronomically huge dimensions. Given this state of affairs, a legitimate question arising
to an enquiring mind is to whether or not, and, if answered in the affirmative, to what extent this
societal process ought to have any bearings on one’s aspired academic training?
Though in view of present-day global developments in, foremost, business and communication
it is quite plausible to question the future status of the English language as the world’s lingua
franca in, say, five decades from now, it is with near certainty that the minimum level of sta-
tistical literacy required to keep up with the demands and expectations in one’s professional life
will continue to rise. Moreover, the challenge of handling successfully the complexity of such
pressing issues of humanity as planet Earth’s attested climate change and the need to maintain
its habitability by practising a sustainable economic use of its natural resources makes systematic
processing of information a valuable and much-sought intellectual skill. Not disregarding com-
plementary methodological tools, conscientious and sense-inducing communal decision-making
in information-heavy managerial contexts is likely to benefit from a sound technical training in the
principles of statistical methods of data analysis of citizens aiming to assume positions with a
certain degree of responsibility attached to them.
In the course of social interactions experienced by the generations of people living during the last
few centuries and up to now, pursuing the scientific method has proven beyond doubt to be the
most reliable human approach to satisfactory problem-solving. That is, given at hand a practical
or theoretical problem of some urgency, forming one’s viewpoint on the basis of available factual
information, and re-evaluating it in the light of relevant new evidence in order to draw conclu-
sions as to reasonable subsequent action, defines a systematic inductive procedure of compelling
resilience. As this technique constitutes a valid operationalisation of a notion of acting by com-
mon sense, it has the potential to increase both idealistic as well as overall economic value for
the human community when transferred as a guiding principle for advancing matters to a wider
field of socially important domains. There surely exists an obligation to hedge against a currently
prevailing tendency of decision-making based on “alternative facts,” as the quality of the ensuing
consequences and outcomes for the vast majority of people affected is self-evident.
Coles (2006) [12, p 3] paraphrases the prime objective of the scientific endeavour by reminiscing:
“When I started doing research it gradually dawned on me that if science is about any-
thing at all, it is not about being certain but about dealing rigorously with uncertainty.”
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The immediate implication of this viewpoint is that the actual issue one finds oneself confronted
with when trying to make inferences from necessarily incomplete information is to have available
a coherent and logically consistent framework for capturing and systematically processing funda-
mental uncertainty, which is interpreted in a scientific setting as representing the researcher’s
state of knowledge concerning the problem of her/his interest.
It comes across as a somewhat irritating piece of historical irony in the evolution of the empiri-
cal sciences that the principles of such a calculus of “reasonable expectation” (according to Cox
(1946) [13]) had been fully worked out halfway through the 20th Century, but were largely ignored
by the majority of active empirical researchers until lately. Lasting contributions to its methodol-
ogy emerged from the predominantly data-driven scientific disciplines of Physics, Astronomy,
Anthropology, Biology, Economics, Psychology, Political Science and Statistics. For the sake
of the uninitiated reader, a few brief historical comments are in order.
Arguably the history of the development of a framework of inductive statistical inference from
past to present can be grouped into the following four periods:
• pioneering period: the foundations of the framework of inductive statistical infer-
ence were laid independently during the 18th Century by the English mathematician and
Presbyterian minister Thomas Bayes (1702–1761) and the French mathematician and as-
tronomer Marquis Pierre Simon de Laplace (1749–1827); see Bayes (1763) [6] and Laplace
(1774) [62]. The latter of these two is credited for giving a full mathematical formulation of
probability theory which presupposes prior information on the plausibilities of outcomes
in a set of different possibilities, and how to update these plausibilities in the light of relevant
new evidence.
• conceptual period: during the first half of the 20th Century the British economist
John Maynard Keynes CB FBA (1883–1946), the British mathematician, statistician, geo-
physicist, and astronomer Sir Harold Jeffreys FRS (1891–1989), and the Italian probabilist
statistician and actuary Bruno de Finetti (1906–1985) argued strongly that a concept of
probability can only be meaningful when it relates to the states of knowledge of indi-
viduals, and so inherently bears a certain dimension of subjectivity. Their views are con-
densed in the classical monographs by Keynes (1921) [55] and Jeffreys (1939) [50], and the
seminal paper by de Finetti (1937) [27] . The conceptual work of these authors was prop-
agated in particular by the US-American physicist Edwin Thompson Jaynes (1922–1998),
who supplemented it by a compelling interpretion of probability theory as extended logic;
cf. Jaynes (2003) [48].
• engineering period: this period, which roughly started during the mid-1980ies, is charac-
terised by the development of powerful algorithms for numerically simulating complicated
multi-dimensional distribution functions usingMarkov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) and
Hamiltonian Monte Carlo (HMC) techniques, and their stable and efficient implementa-
tion in standard statistical software; see, e.g., Geman and Geman (1984) [36], Duane et al
(1987) [18], Gelfand and Smith (1990) [31], Lunn et al (2000) [66], or Plummer (2017) [84].
• big data period: the present period, when it has become commonplace to process
large amounts of data, often in a machine learning context (see, e.g., Ng (2018) [76]).
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Data sets, high-speed algorithms and other supporting material are shared by online
communities such as the one active on the platform GitHub (github.com), or the
Stan Development Team (mc-stan.org). A central objective of many efforts in this area
is the performance of predictive analytics in a diverse field of applications. Associated with
this focus is a continued interest in the possibilities of artificial intelligence; cf., e.g., Penrose
(1989) [81].1
Until quite recently, the dominant methodological paradigm for quantitative–empirical research
work has been the frequentist approach to data analysis and statistical inference, the most
prominent proponent of which was the English statistician, evolutionary biologist, eugenicist and
geneticist Sir Ronald Aylmer Fisher FRS (1890–1962); cf. Fisher (1935) [28]. From the present
perspective it appears as though Fisher had a rather strong influence on the sociology of the aca-
demic community in Statistics for most of the first half of the 20th Century; see, e.g., the insight-
ful and revealing recount of statistics training in academic physics education by Jaynes(2003) [48,
Sec. 10.2]. Fisher, having been a fierce opponent to the inductive statistical inference framework
advocated by his contemporaries Jeffreys and Keynes, is generally assigned the authorship of the
(originally intended as derogatory) term “Bayesian Statistics.” At the time, the leading figures of
this framework referred to it instead as “inverse probability;” see Jeffreys (1939) [50, p 28] and
Stigler (1986) [96, p 101]. The frequentist approach was outlined in the lecture notes [22].
The realisation for a need of a systematic rethinking of standard practices in statistical methodology
has been heavily boosted during the last decade by recurrent problems of successfully reproducing
published results in the research literature, foremost in the Social Sciences. Explicit examples are
given, e.g., in Gill (1999) [38], who discusses the abundant but unreliable practice of null hypoth-
esis significance testing in Political Science, in an article published by The Economist (2013) [19],
in Nuzzo (2014) [77], and in some recent blog entries by, amongst others, Vasishth (2017) [104]
or by Papineau (2018) [78]. Also Kruschke and Liddell (2017) [60] and Briggs (2012) [9] address
this and other related conceptual difficulties with the frequentist approach. The worrisome fact of
regularly failing reproduction attempts of proclaimed empirical effects has come to be known by
the name of “replication crisis in science.”
In reflection of the massively increased interest in the Bayes–Laplace approach to data analysis
and statistical inference since the last turn of the centuries, and in recognition of its undeni-
able track record of successes in all areas of quantitative–empirical investigation over the last few
decades, there exists a plethora of recently published state-of-the-art textbooks. In chronologi-
cal order, these comprise Sivia and Skilling (2006) [92], who focus on applications in Physics,
Albert (2009) [2], Lee (2012) [63], Greenberg (2013) [41], who outlines uses in Econometrics,
Gelman et al (2014) [35], which the community of applied statisticians considers to be the au-
thoritative monograph in the field, Andreon and Weaver (2015) [4], giving explicit examples from
statistical modelling in Astrophysics, Gill (2015) [39], who presents applications in the Social and
Behavioural Sciences, Kruschke (2015) [58], with case studies from Biology, Psychology, Soci-
ology and Sports, and McElreath (2016) [68], who establishes a link to interesting quantitative
1In the context of recent developments in artificial intelligence, the video documentation of the conversion between
Sir Roger Penrose and the advanced robot Sophia on YouTube provides some interesting insight. URL (cited on June
22, 2018): www.youtube.com/watch?v=YUo1FzZQzZ0.
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research problems in Anthropology.2 Almost all of these textbooks provide an abundance of prac-
tical problems and exercises, generally in combination with fully operational codes implemented
in the shareware statistical software packages R, JAGS and/or Stan.
The methods presented in these lecture notes are rooted in Applied Statistics. They address an
audience at a post-Bachelor academic level, with a vested interest in acquainting themselves with
standard pratices of modern statistical methods of data analysis. The topics presented form a
selection of the most frequently employed tools for building data-based statistical models for
purposes of explanation and prediction of observable phenomena. These comprise in particular:
• single-parameter estimation,
• fitting multi-dimensional generalised linear models employing MCMC simulations.
• model comparison, and
• elementary decision-making under conditions of uncertainty.
As implicitly hinted at above, we here deliberately assume an interdisciplinary perspective, being
thoroughly convinced that the chances for successfully dealing with most kinds of modern-day
problems of societal relevance will not be reasonably improved by confining one’s efforts to a
possibly comfortable though narrow-minded intellectual niche.
There are not included in these lecture notes any explicit examples or exercises on the topics to be
discussed. These are reserved for the lectures given throughout term time.
The present lecture notes are designed to be dynamical in character. On the one-hand side, this
means that they will be updated on a regular basis. On the other, that its *.pdf version contains
interactive features such as fully hyperlinked references to original publications at the websites
doi.org, jstor.org, or elsewhere, and also many active links to biographical information
on scientists that have been influential in the historical development of probability theory and
the Bayes–Laplace approach to data analysis and statistical inference, hosted by the websites
The MacTutor History of Mathematics archive (www-history.mcs.st-and.ac.uk) and
en.wikipedia.org.
Opting for the application of the Bayes–Laplace approach to data analysis and statistical infer-
ence entails the frequent performance of a large number of computations and numerical simula-
tions, which, to ensure reliability, need to be meticulously checked for potential errors. However,
these computations are an integral part of the fun of the research activity, and they are enormously
facilitated by the provision of taylor-made software packages that are distributed as shareware on
the internet. A widespread computational tool that we, too, will refer to in the course of these
lecture notes is the statistical software package R. This can be obtained free of charge for many
different operating systems from cran.r-project.org. Useful and easily accessible intro-
ductory textbooks on the application ofR for purposes of statistical data analysis are, e.g., Dalgaard
(2008) [14], or Hatzinger et al (2014) [44]. Additional helpful information and assistance is avail-
able from the website www.r-tutor.com. We strongly recommend the use of the convenient
custom-made work environment R Studio provided at www.rstudio.com. Also, we point the
2Trotta’s (2008) [102] review discusses applications of the Bayes–Laplace approach in the cosmological context.
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reader to an overview of R tools made available for Bayes–Laplace statistical inference which is
maintained by Park; cf. Park (2018) [80]. Notation to be used follows the conventions of Refs. [22]
and [23].
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Chapter 1
Mathematical rules of probability theory
1.1 Probability and uncertainty
Jaynes (2003) [48], in his influential monograph, conceptualises probability theory as an ex-
tension of Aristotelian deductive logic.1 In the latter discipline, the objects of investigation are
propositions. Propositions can be verbal statements that relate to some observable real-world phe-
nomenon of a certain practical interest, or they can be suppositions in the context of an academic
discourse. For instance, the assertions
A: The average travel time for human space missions from planet Earth to a like planet in
the Andromeda Galaxy ranges between four and five hours.
B: Prince Rogers Nelson was a US-American musician.
C: The German team will win the next Cricket World Cup.
are representative of simple kinds of propositions. In Aristotelian deductive logic, the truth con-
tent of a proposition can be exclusively either true or false, and so in this respect this specific logic
is inherently two-valued in nature.
Employing Boolean algebra,2 two propositionsA and B can be combined to form a new proposi-
tion via
(i) the logical product (or mutual conjunction),
AB : “both of the propositions A and B are true” ; (1.1)
note that naturally AB = BA applies, i.e., commutativity is a property of the product oper-
ation, and
(ii) the logical sum (or mutual disjunction),
A+B : “at least one of the propositions A and B is true” ; (1.2)
again, naturally commutativity holds true for the sum operation, A+B = B + A. .
1Named after the ancient Greek philosopher and scientist Aristotle (384 BC–322 BC).
2Named after the English mathematician, educator, philosopher and logician George Boole (1815–1864).
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More complex propositions still can be constructed by combining different propositions with both
the logical product and the logical sum, and making use of bracketing sub-operations, i.e., inserting
(. . .) where intended or needed.
WithA denoting the logical complement of some propositionA (referred to as “notA”), it follows
that
AA is always false (a contradiction) (1.3)
A+ A is always true (a tautology) . (1.4)
Moreover, the logical identities
AA = A (1.5)
A+ A = A (1.6)
apply. Of particular practical use are De Morgan’s laws,3 which state that
AB = A+B (1.7)
A +B = AB . (1.8)
Negating the latter relation yields
A+B = AB , (1.9)
a result that is to be used later on.
Jaynes’ (2003) [48] notion of an extended logic comes into effect by relaxing the strict demand for
the binary truth content property of a proposition, but rather to assign to it a normalised degree of
plausibility4 which depends on a researcher’s individual state of knowledge on the current matter
of interest. This is to say that, subject to available background information collectively denoted
by I , a real number P (. . . |I) from the interval [0, 1] is assigned to a proposition which is referred
to as its probability.5 The I-proviso here serves to express the position that, by way of conception,
a probability is always conditional on some form of prior information, see Jaynes (2003) [48,
p 87] and Sivia and Skilling (2006) [92, p 5], or, as Keynes (1921) [55, p 102] puts it, “relative to
given premisses.”
To link back to the three example propositions introduced above, one may thus assign on the basis
of presently available understanding the (prior) probabilities
P (A|IA) = 0, expressing a logical resp. practical impossibility,
P (B|IB) = 1, expressing a logical resp. practical certainty, and
0 ≤ P (C|IC) ≤ 1, expressing a logical resp. practical possibility of which the attributed
degree of plausibility is considered limited.
3Named after the British mathematician and logician Augustus De Morgan (1806–1871).
4In decision theory, the “degree-of-belief” assigned by a rational agent to a certain outcome established itself as
standard terminology.
5The exploration of the psychological dimension underlying the assignment of probabilities to propositions was
pioneered by Kahneman and Tversky (1972) [52].
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In view of the interpretation of a probability as a researcher’s systematic way of handling practical
situations with incomplete information (which, typically, is more often the case than not), it
proves of little help to try to associate any physical reality with the corresponding numerical value
from the interval [0, 1]. Rather, it constitutes a specific proposal for dealing with uncertainty
within a logically consistent and coherent quantitative framework,6 the basic rules of which are to
be described in the following. Indeed, it comes as a bit of a surprise, and a veritable manifestation
of formal ellegance, that the probabilistic calculus for plausible reasoning originated by Bayes
and Laplace rests on the foundation of only a few rather simple first principles.
1.2 Sum and product rules
1.2.1 Sum rule
For probabilities assigned to a proposition A and its logical complement A, the sum rule states
that
P (A|I) + P (A|I) = 1 (1.10)
must always be true.
1.2.2 Product rule
To calculate the probability of the logical product of two propostions,AB, the product rule holds
that
P (AB|I) = P (A|BI)P (B|I) = P (B|AI)P (A|I) = P (BA|I) , (1.11)
taking into account commutativity of the product operation, AB = BA, in the second part of this
rule.
Re-arranging, and assuming that P (A|I) > 0 resp. P (B|I) > 0 apply, alternative representations
of the product rule are given by
P (A|BI) = P (AB|I)
P (B|I) , P (B|AI) =
P (BA|I)
P (A|I) . (1.12)
The first variant is generally referred to as the conditional probability of proposition A, given
propositionB is true and relevant background information I is available. Analogously, the second
variant expresses the conditional probability of proposition B, given proposition A is true and I
is known.
In preparation of concepts of importance in subsequent chapters, it is fitting at this stage to briefly
raise the following point. The quantity P (AB|I) [or P (BA|I)] occuring in the product rule (1.11)
represents the joint probability for propositions A and B, given background information I . It is
instructive to formally supplement A and B by their logical complements, A and B, and to repre-
sent the joint probabilities for all possible product combinations of these propositions, given I ,
6Philosophical viewpoints opposing the idea of uncertainty being amenable to treatment within a quantitative
framework have been put forward nearly a full century ago by Knight (1921) [56] and by Keynes (1921) [55].
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joint distribution (2-D) proposition B propositionB marginal distribution (1-D)
proposition A P (AB|I) P (AB|I) P (A|I)
proposition A P (AB|I) P (AB|I) P (A|I)
marginal distribution (1-D) P (B|I) P (B|I) 1
Table 1.1: Representation of a discrete (prior) joint probability distribution and corresponding
discrete marginal probability distributions for propositionsA andB and their logical complements
A and B, given background information I , in terms of a 2 × 2 contingency table. The marginal
cell entries are obtained by row-wise resp. column-wise summation over associated interior cell
entries while respecting the sum rule (1.10).
in the form of a 2 × 2 contingency table. By way of summation, separately across row and col-
umn entries, while respecting the sum rule (1.10), the concept of a marginal probability for a
proposition, given I , is introduced. The kind of 2 × 2 contingency table just outlined is depicted
in Tab. 1.1.
1.2.3 Generalised sum rule
Starting from the negation of the second De Morgan’s law which was noted in Eq. (1.9), the
derivation of a rule for calculating the probability of the logical sum of two propostions, A + B,
is calculated. A string of algebraic manipulations leads to7
P (A+B|I) Eq. (1.9)= P (AB|I) Eq. (1.10)= 1− P (AB|I)
Eq. (1.11)
= 1− P (B|AI)P (A|I) Eq. (1.10)= 1− [1− P (B|AI)]P (A|I)
Eqs. (1.10), (1.11)
= P (A|I) + P (AB|I) Eq. (1.11)= P (A|I) + P (A|BI)P (B|I)
Eq. (1.10)
= P (A|I) + [1− P (A|BI)]P (B|I) , (1.13)
so that with one final application of Eq. (1.11) one obtains the generalised sum rule given by8
P (A+B|I) = P (A|I) + P (B|I)− P (AB|I) . (1.14)
7There is a typo in the first line of Eq. (2.65) in Jaynes (2003) [48]. We here give the necessary correction in the
expression following the second equality sign in Eq. (1.13).
8Re-arranging Eq. (1.14), to solve for P (AB|I) instead, yields an alternative representation of the generalised sum
rule, or “conjunction rule,” Eq. (1.11). By means of their famous “Linda the bank teller” example (amongst others),
Tversky and Kahneman (1983) [103, p 297ff] were able to demonstrate the startling empirical fact that the conjunc-
tion rule is frequently violated in everyday (intuitive) decision-making. They termed this empirical phenomenon the
“conjunction fallacy.” In their view, it can be explained as a consequence of decision-makers often resorting to a
“representativeness heuristic” as an aid; see also Kahneman (2011) [51, Sec. 15].
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At to this point the list of elementary mathematical rules of probability theory has been com-
pleted. It comprises the sum rule (1.10), the product rule (1.11), and the generalised sum
rule (1.14). We next turn to highlight a few important extensions of these rules when dealing
with special kinds of sets of propositions.
1.2.4 Extensions to sets of propositions
Suppose given a finite set of k ∈ Nmutually exlusive and exhaustive propositions {A1, . . . , Ak},
conditioned on some background information I , so that
P (AiAj |I) = 0 for i 6= j (1.15)
is true. Then the sum rule (1.10) extends to the normalisation condition of probability theory,
namely
P (A1 + . . .+ Ak|I) = P (A1|I) + . . .+ P (Ak|I) =
k∑
i=1
P (Ai|I) = 1 . (1.16)
This states that, when assigning probabilities across a closed set of exclusive possibilities, for
reasons of overall consistency these must add up to 1.
Furthermore, on the basis of the normalisation condition (1.16) and the product rule (1.11), it
holds that
P (B|I) Eq. (1.16)=
k∑
i=1
P (BAi|I) Eq. (1.11)=
k∑
i=1
P (B|AiI)P (Ai|I) > 0 . (1.17)
This is generally referred to as themarginalisation rule (see, e.g., Saha (2002) [88, p 5], Sivia and
Skilling (2006) [92, p 7], or Andreon and Weaver [4, p 4]), and it possesses high practical value
in the context of numerical simulations of probability distributions, a major topic in inductive
statistical inference that is to be discussed later on. An immediate simple application of the
marginalisation rule was illustrated in Tab. 1.1 above.
1.3 Bayes’ theorem
The core of the plausible reasoning framework developed as an efficient and reliable practical
tool for inductive statistical inference is constituted by a result that is due to the English math-
ematician and Presbyterian minister Thomas Bayes (1702–1761); see the posthumous publication
Bayes (1763) [6]. It states that for two propositions A and B, given background information I , it
is always true that
P (A|BI) = P (B|AI)
P (B|I) P (A|I) , (1.18)
On the face of it, Bayes’ theorem, as it has come to be known for a long time, is just a convenient
re-arrangement of the product rule (1.11), providedP (B|I) > 0. However, its immense conceptual
significance for plausible reasoning and inductive statistical inference was already glimpsed at
by Bayes himself; cf. Stigler (1986) [96, pp 98–98].
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In qualitative terms Bayes’ theorem is saying:9
(prior knowledge on proposition A) combined with (empirical evidence B on proposition A)
yields
(updated knowledge on proposition A)
According to Jaynes (2003) [48, p 112]), in the clear-cut representation of Eq. (1.18),
the theorem was first formulated by the French mathematician and astronomer
Marquis Pierre Simon de Laplace (1749–1827); cf. Laplace (1774) [62].
To streamline communication, the different factors featuring in Bayes’ theorem (1.18) have been
given names in their own right. These are:
• P (A|I) is referred to as the prior probability for proposition A, subject to background
information I ,10
• P (B|AI) is the likelihood for a proposition B, providing potentially relevant information
for proposition A, given background information I ,
• P (A|BI) is called the posterior probability for proposition A in light of the information
pertaining to proposition B and background information I , and, lastly,
• P (B|I) > 0 is usually known as the evidence relating to proposition B.
By means of marginalisation, and on the basis of the sum rule (1.10) and the product rule (1.11),
the evidence P (B|I) can be re-expressed as
P (B|I) Eq. (1.10)= P (BA|I) + P (BA|I)
Eq. (1.11)
= P (B|AI)P (A|I) + P (B|AI)P (A|I) . (1.19)
In this form it is also referred to as the average likelihood ormarginal likelihood; cf. McElreath
(2016) [68, Sec. 2.3].
From Bayes’ theorem (1.18), one directly infers for the relation between the prior probability
for proposition A and its posterior probability that

if
P (B|AI)
P (B|I) < 1 ⇒ P (A|BI) < P (A|I)
if 0 <
P (B|AI)
P (B|I) > 1 ⇒ P (A|BI) > P (A|I)
; (1.20)
9Depicting the structure of Bayes’ theorem in this particular fashion ties in nicely with a famous quota-
tion by the British economist John Maynard Keynes CB FBA (1883–1946), who is said to have once remarked:
“When the facts change, I change my mind. What do you do, sir?” See URL (cited on July 8, 2018):
www-history.mcs.st-and.ac.uk/Quotations/Keynes.html.
10Kahneman (2011) [51, p 147], in his stimulating popular book, refers to P (A|I) as the “base rate” for proposi-
tion A.
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depending on the evidence available through proposition B, the probability for proposition A can
potentially either decrease or increase.
For simple practical applications with only two propositions A and B involved, as is typically the
case in situations analogous to drug testing, disease testing, or signal detection, it is helpful to
rewrite Bayes’ theorem (1.18) by making use of the marginalisation rule (1.19). One thus obtains
P (A|BI) = P (B|AI)
P (B|AI)P (A|I) + P (B|AI)P (A|I) P (A|I) . (1.21)
The posterior probability for a propositionA, in view of some evidence relating to a propositionB
and background information I , can then be easily computed provided the following three pieces of
information are available; cf. Silver (2012) [91, p 244]:
(i) the prior probability for proposition A in the absence of evidence, P (A|I),
(ii) the “true positive rate,” P (B|AI), and
(iii) the “false positive rate,” P (B|AI).
This last bit of discussion generalises to the case of a set of k ∈ Nmutually exlusive and exhaus-
tive propositions {A1, . . . , Ak} in a straightforward fashion. Given prior probabilities P (Ai|I)
for each propositionAi in the set, and with the marginalisation rule (1.17) employed to express the
average likelihood P (B|I) for some evidential proposition B, one calculates posterior probabili-
ties P (Ai|BI) for each proposition Ai in the set from Bayes’ theorem (1.18) according to
P (Ai|BI) = P (B|AiI)k∑
j=1
P (B|AjI)P (Aj|I)
P (Ai|I) , for i = 1, . . . , k . (1.22)
In this specific form, Bayes’ theorem has high practical value as a computational basis for discre-
tised numerical simulations of complicated high-dimensional probability distribution functions.
1.4 Outlook on inductive data analysis and model building
So why does the Bayes–Laplace approach to probability theory provide such a conceptually
compelling basis for plausible reasoning and inductive statistical inference?
One of a number of strong arguments in its favour is that scientific objectivity is ensured by strict
adherence to the requirements of logical consistency and fact-based reasoning. That is to say, on
the basis of the rules of probability theory outlined in Sec. 1.2, two researching individuals that
(i) hold the same relevant background information I on a specific proposition A of scientific
interest, and
(ii) have access to the same empirical evidence associated with a propositionB,
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must assign the same prior probability P (A|I) to proposition A, and calculate the same poste-
rior probability P (A|BI) for proposition A from the empirical evidence available. In practice,
of course, different individuals typically have access to differing amounts of relevant background
information and empirical evidence. The Bayes–Laplace approach, however, exposes itself de-
liberately to criticism in that it requires a researcher to state openly all of her/his assumptions that
went into an inductive statistical inference process. There are no hidden agendas, which certainly
facilitates to a novice the task of becoming acquainted with the specific rationale employed in this
framework.11
Formally, Bayes’ theorem, for example in its variant (1.22), represents the fundamental principle
according to which inductive statistical inference is to be performed, given prior information and
empirical data of relevance to an actual research question. To begin with, the following specific
substitutions need to be made:
proposition Ai ←− model(i) , or hypothesis(i) , or set of parameter values(i)
proposition B ←− data ;
here the concepts “model(i)” and “hypothesis(i)” can be interpreted as synomynous terms. In the
Bayes–Laplace approach, data is considered fixed incomplete information, while the model,
hypothesis, or set of parameter values of the researcher’s focus is the unknown entity about the
plausibility of which inferences are to be made in light of available evidence. The unknown en-
tity is to be described probabilistically by assigning a probability distribution to the range of
possibilities it involves. One thus obtains
P (model(i)|data, I)︸ ︷︷ ︸
posterior
=
likelihood︷ ︸︸ ︷
P (data|model(i), I)
P (data|I)︸ ︷︷ ︸
average likelihood
P (model(i)|I)︸ ︷︷ ︸
prior
. (1.23)
The nature of Bayes’ theorem hereby undergoes a qualitative change in that it transforms from a
statement concerning four probability values (non-negative real numbers) to a functional relation-
ship between entire probability distributions. The main statement is that the posterior probability
distribution for the unknown entity of interest amounts to the product between the likelihood
function for the data, given the unknown entity, and the prior probability distribution for the
unknown entity, divided by a normalising constant (a positive real number, as the data is consid-
ered fixed) referred to as the average likelihood. Within the Bayes–Laplace approach, the poste-
rior probability distribution is viewed as a “compromise” between the background information-
driven prior probability distribution and the data-driven likelihood function; see, e.g., Kruschke
(2015) [58, p 112].
11Jaynes (2003) [48, p 22] identifies as a dangerous pitfall for plausible reasoning what he refers to as the “mind
projection fallacy.” He depicts this as the error of confusing epistemological statements (statements of knowledge of
things) with ontological statements (statements of existence of things), and vice versa. Put differently, this describes a
case where an individual confuses what they personally think exists with what actually (and, therefore, testably) does
exist in reality.
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At the heart of the activity of inductive statistical inference is the proposition of a statistical
model, derived from comprehensible theoretical considerations. The general purpose of a sci-
entific theory is to describe, explain and predict observable phenomena in its particular field of
application. A statistical model is formulated in the concise language ofmathematics. It typically
comprises a certain finite number of unobservable continuous parameters, the values of which are
to be estimated probabilistically via calculating a posterior joint probability distribution from
(i) a discrete set of measured data for a finite number of relevant statistical variables, and (ii) a
sensible prior joint probability distribution reflecting a given state of knowledge. In some rather
special lower-dimensional cases it is possible to obtain posterior joint probability distributions as
closed-form analytical solutions. In general, however, posterior joint probability distributions are
in non-standard form due to inherent complexity, which often features already at the two-parameter
level. The aim of Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulations is to generate discretised
approximations to the continuous high-dimensional, multi-parameter posterior joint probability
distributions to an accurary that is reasonable for practical inference. Simulated posterior joint
probability distributions, and even more so their associated posterior marginal probability dis-
tributions, can then be summarised by standard methods such as five number summaries, means,
standard deviations and standard errors, skewnesses, kurtoses, and further taylor-made statistics of
convenience.
To be recognised as meaningful and valuable by the scientific community, a proposed statisti-
cal model must cope well with two major challenges: (i) retrodiction of observed (and, there-
fore, known to the researcher) data, and (ii) prediction of new (and, therefore, unknown to the
researcher) data. From a technical point of view this means engineering an acceptable balance
between under-fitting and over-fitting when adapting a proposed statistical model to available
empirical data. In this process, a researcher can resort to methods ofmodel comparison by means
of information criteria, and checks of a model’s posterior predictive accuracy. These tech-
niques are to be addressed in these lecture notes in later chapters.
Input into the statistical model building process for explaining the variation of a statistical vari-
able Y in dependence on a set of k ∈ N predicting independent variables {X1, . . . , Xk}, given
background information I , is a prior joint probability distribution P (θ0, . . . , θk|I) for a set of
typically k + 1 unknown model parameters {θ0, . . . , θk}. On the basis of relevant measured
data {yi}i=1,...,n of sample size n (which is thus given and fixed, and inherently amounts to in-
complete information), the fundmental objective is to deduce a posterior joint probability distri-
bution P (θ0, . . . , θk|{yi}i=1,...,n, I) for these model parameters, employing the logic of plausible
reasoning according to the Bayes–Laplace approach. This activity leads to12
P (θ0, . . . , θk|{yi}i=1,...,n, I) = P ({yi}i=1,...,n|θ0, . . . , θk, I)
P ({yi}i=1,...,n|I) P (θ0, . . . , θk|I) , (1.24)
and is referred to as the updating process; subject-specific information available to a researcher is
being enlarged by learning from relevant empirical data. It is from the posterior joint probability
distribution that the researcher draws all relevant inferences concerning her/his research question,
while, in parallel, acknowledging overall uncertainty due to incomplete information.
12To avoid cluttering of notation, here and in the following we suppress conditioning on the (fixed) data for the
k independent variables {X1, . . . , Xk}.
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Multiple application of the product rule (1.11) transforms the prior joint probability distribution
for the k + 1 unknown model parameters {θ0, . . . , θk} to the practically more convenient form
P (θ0, . . . , θk|I) = P (θ0|θ1, . . . , θk, I)× P (θ1|θ2, . . . , θk, I)× . . .× P (θk|I) . (1.25)
Frequently, in fact in particular in the context of numerical simulations, the simplifying assumption
of separability is introduced for the prior joint probability distribution (reflecting the assumption
of prior mutual logical independence of the model parameters), i.e., the product structure
P (θ0, . . . , θk|I) = P (θ0|I)× . . .× P (θk|I) (1.26)
is employed. Such a choice, however, disregards potential non-zero bivariate correlations between
the model parameters which arise in generic situations. It can be justified, though, as expressing a
researcher’s complete ignorance as to the existence and strengths of such interrelationships. The
idea is that exactly the empirical data to be analysed will provide the clues necessary to make
progress on the answer to this specific question.
We conclude this section by briefly reviewing two concepts that are used for assessing the quality
of fit and the predictive accuracy of a statistical model. The so-called prior predictive prob-
ability distribution for a single datum y, given a prior joint probability distribution for a set of
continuous model parameters {θ0, . . . , θk} and the relevant single-datum likelihood function, is
defined by (see, e.g., Gelman et al (2014) [35, Sec. 1.3], Andreon and Weaver [4, Sec. 8.10], or
Gill (2015) [39, Sec. 6.4])
P (y|I) :=
∫
· · ·
∫
θj ranges
P (y, θ0, . . . , θk|I) dθ0 · · ·dθk
=
∫
· · ·
∫
θj ranges
P (y|θ0, . . . , θk, I)︸ ︷︷ ︸
likelihood
P (θ0, . . . , θk|I)︸ ︷︷ ︸
prior
dθ0 · · ·dθk . (1.27)
Here, the single-datum likelihood function is weighted by the prior joint probability distribution for
the model parameters and then integrated over the entire range of the various θj-spectra. This op-
eration amounts to averaging the single-datum likelihood function with the prior joint probability
distribution over the (k + 1)-dimensional parameter space.
The so-called posterior predictive probability distribution for a new datum ynew, given a poste-
rior joint probability distribution for a set of continuous model parameters {θ0, . . . , θk} and the rel-
evant single-datum likelihood function, is defined by (see, e.g., Gelman et al (2014) [35, Sec. 1.3],
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Andreon and Weaver [4, Sec. 8.10], or Gill (2015) [39, Sec. 6.4])
P (ynew|{yi}i=1,...,n}, I) :=
∫
· · ·
∫
θj ranges
P (ynew, θ0, . . . , θk|{yi}i=1,...,n}, I) dθ0 · · ·dθk
=
∫
· · ·
∫
θj ranges
P (ynew|θ0, . . . , θk, {yi}i=1,...,n}, I)
×P (θ0, . . . , θk|{yi}i=1,...,n, I) dθ0 · · ·dθk
=
∫
· · ·
∫
θj ranges
P (ynew|θ0, . . . , θk, I)︸ ︷︷ ︸
likelihood
(1.28)
×P (θ0, . . . , θk|{yi}i=1,...,n}, I)︸ ︷︷ ︸
posterior
dθ0 · · ·dθk ,
assuming in the final step conditional logical independence of the new datum ynew from the previ-
ous sample {yi}i=1,...,n, given values for the model parameters. Here, the single-datum likelihood
function is weighted by the posterior joint probability distribution for the model parameters and
then integrated over the entire range of the various θj-spectra. It thus represents the expectation
of the conditional probability P (ynew|θ0, . . . , θk, I) over the posterior joint probability distribution
for {θ0, . . . , θk}. Alternatively, this operation is viewed as averaging the single-datum likelihood
function with the posterior joint probability distribution over the (k + 1)-dimensional parameter
space. Note that the posterior predictive probability distribution possesses a larger standard devia-
tion than the posterior joint probability distribution, because it joins uncertainty inherent in both
the empirical data and the model parameter estimation.
We now turn to describe ways of capturing in formal language different kinds of data-generating
processes that are of importance for many practical applications.
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Chapter 2
Likelihood functions and sampling
distributions
In statistical modelling a first fundamental assumption is to suppose that every single mea-
sured datum yi for a particular statistical variable Y of interest originates from a definite data-
generating process. This data-generating process is to be described parametrically by means of a
single-datum likelihood function, the specific form of which depends on the actual nature of the
statistical variable Y in question, e.g., its scale level of measurement. Conceptually, this single-
datum likelihood function amounts to a probability distribution for the single measured datum yi,
given fixed values for the parameters of the data-generating process. A second fundamental as-
sumption comprises the view that when taking measurements with respect to Y from a total of
n sample units, then the order in which this data was obtained would not matter. This second
assumption represents de Finetti’s (1930) [26] concept of exchangeability. This assumption is
valid, if no particular chronological order is to be respected in the measurement process as, for
instance, needs to be taken care of when gathering time series data. In technical language this is
the requirement that the likelihood function for the entire data set for Y be invariant under any
permutation (re-ordering) of the measured values for Y . In practice, however, in most cases an
even stronger assumption is built upon, namely that obtaining one value yi for Y from some data-
generating process may be considered logically independent from obtaining a second value yj
from the same data-generating process, and vice versa, so that in consequence (as it is referred
to) independently and identically distributed (iid) data arises; cf. Jaynes (2003) [48, p 62],
Gilboa (2009) [37, p 42f], Greenberg (2013) [41, p 52f], Gelman et al (2014) [35, p 104f], and
Gill (2015) [39, Sec. 12.4]. The iid assumption, which is practically convenient, may be justified
as reflecting prior ignorance on the part of the researcher as regards potential autocorrelations
amongst the different measured values of Y ;1 see McElreath (2016) [68, p 81].
We denote the single-datum likelihood function2 for a statistical variable Y in a statistical model
comprising k + 1 parameters {θ0, . . . , θk} by f(yi|θ0, . . . , θk, I). As it happens, assuming fixed
values for the set {θ0, . . . , θk}, for discretely varying yi this represents a normalised probability
function, while for continuously varying yi this represents a normalised probability density func-
1Generally, data from convenience samples is plagued with a high degree of autocorrelation.
2Alternatively: single-case likelihood function.
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tion (pdf). Viewed from this particular angle, f(yi|θ0, . . . , θk, I) is referred to as a “sampling distri-
bution.” From the perspective of the Bayes–Laplace approach, however, it is the set {θ0, . . . , θk}
that is considered variable, while the value of yi is regarded fixed. As f(yi|θ0, . . . , θk, I) is typically
not normalised with respect to the {θ0, . . . , θk}, it is then referred to as a “likelihood function;” cf.
Jaynes (2003) [48, p 89], Sivia and Skilling (2006) [92, p 80], or Lee (2012) [63, p 37].
When the iid assumption appears sensible for describing a particular data-generating process
for Y , then given a total sample of measured values {yi}i=1,...,n of size n, an immediate conse-
quence for the total-data likelihood function is proportionality to the product of n single-datum
likelihood functions f(yi|θ0, . . . , θk, I), i.e.,
P ({yi}i=1,...,n |θ0, . . . , θk, I) ∝
n∏
i=1
f(yi|θ0, . . . , θk, I) . (2.1)
In the following we will review some of the standard uni- and multivariate single-datum likeli-
hood functions for both discretely and continuously varying statistical variables Y . Most of the
examples presented belong to the class of maximum entropy distributions that reflect for a spe-
cific context, and conditional on some set of definite constraints, maximum ignorance on the part
of the researcher as to the unknown actual data-generating process; see, e.g., McElreath (2016) [68,
p 282].
2.1 Univariate discrete data
The single-datum likelihood functions introduced in this section apply to univariate data yi from
a discrete one-dimensional statistical variable Y . They depend on an unobservable and therefore
unknown continuously varying parameter θ.
2.1.1 Bernoulli distributions
The one-parameter family of univariate Bernoulli distributions,
yi| θ, I ∼ Bern(θ) , (2.2)
was put forward by the Swiss mathematician Jakob Bernoulli (1654–1705). It can be used to
model data-generating processes in which, in a single observation, yi has two possible outcomes:
“failure” (0) or “success” (1). This could be, for example,
• whether or not a student gets accepted for the degree programme she/he had applied for,
• whether or not a bank customer is granted the mortgage loan she/he had asked for,
• whether or not it will rain tomorrow at your present location, or
• whether or not your favourite football team will win their next league match.
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yi here is a dimensionless quantity. Properties of Bernoulli distributions are (see, e.g., Rinne
(2008) [86, Subsec. 3.8.2]):
Spectrum of values:
yi ∈ {0, 1} . (2.3)
Probability function:
P (yi|θ, I) = θyi (1− θ)1−yi , with 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 , (2.4)
where the dimensionless parameter θ quantifies the probability for “success,” (1). The graph of a
Bernoulli probability function is shown in Fig. 2.1 below for four different values of θ.
Expectation value and variance:
E(yi) = θ (2.5)
Var(yi) = θ(1− θ) . (2.6)
Note that under an exchange θ ↔ (1− θ) one obtains a qualitatively identical distribution.
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Figure 2.1: Some examples of Bernoulli sampling distributions for an uncertain dichotomous dis-
crete quantity y.
R: dbinom(yi, 1, θ), pbinom(yi, 1, θ), qbinom(p, 1, θ), rbinom(nsimulations, 1, θ)
JAGS: dbern(θ) (sampling)
Stan: bernoulli(θ) (sampling)
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2.1.2 Binomial distributions
The natural extension of Bernoulli distributions to situations with a finite number of repetitions
under iid conditions of the underlying binary decision process was discussed by Bernoulli himself.
He thus introduced the two-parameter family of univariate binomial distributions,
y|n, θ, I ∼ Bin(n, θ) , (2.7)
where n ∈ N is the number of iid-repetitions, and θ again denotes the probability for “suc-
cess,” (1). The dimensionless non-negative integer quantity y is by its very nature varying dis-
cretely and represents a pure count with a known finite maximum. It could measure, for example,
• how many out of n students get accepted for the degree programme they had applied for,
• how many out of n bank customers are granted the mortgage loan they had asked for,
• on how many out of the next n days it will rain at your present location, or
• how many out of n upcoming matches in the league your favourite football team will win.
Binomial distributions are described by (see, e.g., Rinne (2008) [86, Subsec. 3.8.3]):
Spectrum of values:
y ∈ N0 . (2.8)
Probability function:
P (y|n, θ, I) =
(
n
y
)
θy (1− θ)n−y , with 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 , (2.9)
wherein the binomial coefficient is defined by(
n
y
)
:=
n!
y!(n− y)! , (2.10)
for n ∈ N and y ≤ n. Note that the binomial probability function is normalised with respect to
the discrete variable y but not with respect to the continuous parameter θ. Its graph is shown in
Fig. 2.2 below for four different values of θ and n = 20.3
Expectation value and variance:
E(y) = nθ (2.11)
Var(y) = nθ(1− θ) . (2.12)
A qualitatively identical distribution is obtained under the exchange θ↔ (1− θ).
R: dbinom(y, n, θ), pbinom(y, n, θ), qbinom(p, n, θ), rbinom(nsimulations, n, θ)
JAGS: dbin(θ, n) (sampling)
Stan: binomial(n, θ) (sampling)
It is of some practical interest that, by means of the logistic transformation θ = exp(u)/(1 +
exp(u)), binomial sampling distributions according to Eq. (2.9) can explicitly be shown to be
members of the so-called exponential family of sampling distributions; see Sec. 2.4 below.
3We plot the graphs of probability functions with connecting lines to highlight shapes of envelopes. The probability
functions are, of course, discrete by nature.
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Figure 2.2: Some examples of binomial sampling distributions for an uncertain discrete quantity y.
2.1.3 Poisson distributions
The one-parameter family of univariate Poisson distributions,
yi| θ, I ∼ Pois(θ) , (2.13)
named after the French mathematician, engineer, and physicist
Baron Sime´on Denis Poisson FRSFor HFRSE MIF (1781–1840), is the most important tool
in all of the empirical scientific disciplines for modelling count data. They can be considered to
arise as special cases of binomial distributions when n is very large (n ≫ 1) and θ is very small
(0 < θ ≪ 1) (cf. Sivia and Skilling (2006) [92, Sec. 5.4]), and so typically describe instances
of data-generating proccesses associated with (relatively) rare events. Examples for yi as a pure
count (i.e., a dimensionless non-negative integer) are
• the number of automobiles sold by a car vendor,
• the number of goals scored by a football team,
• the number of elephants living in certain parts of eastern or southern Africa, or
• the number of photons received from a faint distant luminous source by an astronomical
telescope.
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Poisson distributions have the properties (see, e.g., Rinne (2008) [86, Subsec. 3.9.2]):
Spectrum of values:
yi ∈ N0 . (2.14)
Probability function:
P (yi|θ, I) = θ
yi
yi!
exp (−θ) , with θ ∈ R≥0 , (2.15)
and θ is the dimensionless rate parameter (also referred to as the intensity parameter). The
Poisson probability function is normalised with respect to the discrete variable yi but not with
respect to the continuous parameter θ. Its graph is shown in Fig. 2.3 for four different values of θ.
Expectation value and variance:
E(yi) = θ (2.16)
Var(yi) = θ . (2.17)
Note that for Poisson distributions the (dimensionless) expectation value and variance coincide.
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Figure 2.3: Some examples of Poisson sampling distributions for an uncertain discrete quantity y.
R: dpois(yi, θ), ppois(yi, θ), qpois(p, θ), rpois(nsimulations, θ)
JAGS: dpois(θ) (sampling)
Stan: poisson(θ) (sampling)
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In many applications one finds the counts yi decomposed into a product of two dimensionful quan-
tities,
count = exposure× rate ⇒ θ = τ × λ , (2.18)
so that the rate parameter θ amounts to the product “length/size of interval/domain of observation,
τ , times number of events per unit interval/domain, λ.” In temporal contexts λ represents counts
per unit time, while in spatial contexts is stands for counts per unit length, counts per unit area, or
counts per unit volume. In this view, the parameter τ is referred to as the exposure (of a sample unit
to some data-generating influence) and carries the physical dimension of [time], [length], [area], or
[volume]. The corresponding rate parameter λ could represent, for example,
• the average number of automobiles sold by a car vendor per working day,
• the average number of goals scored by a football team per match,
• the average number of elephants living per ten-kilometres-squared of area in the
Kruger National Park, or
• the average number of elliptical galaxies observed per megaparsec-cubed of comoving vol-
ume of space at a redshift of z = 0.5.
2.2 Univariate continuous data
The single-datum likelihood functions introduced in this section apply to univariate data yi from
a continuous one-dimensional statistical variable Y . They depend on a certain number of unob-
servable and therefore unknown continuously varying parameters.
2.2.1 Gauß distributions
The two-parameter family of univariateGauß distributions (or normal distributions),
yi| θ1, θ2, I ∼ N(θ1, θ22) , (2.19)
has gained its status as ranking amongst the best-known and most frequently applied con-
tinuous distributions foremost by the work of the German mathematician and astronomer
Carl Friedrich Gauß (1777–1855); cf. Gauß (1809) [30]. Examples for the usually dimension-
ful continuous metrical quantity yi that can be described as arising from a Gauß process are
• the price of a 1 kg loaf of bread in a medium-sized town of your home country,
• the average monthly waiting time in minutes spent by car users in traffic jams during the
morning rush hour near an industrial centre,
• the IQ of an adult female or male individual, or
• the wavelength in nanometres of the red line in the visible hydrogen emission spectrum.
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Often one finds the natural logarithm of a strictly positive metrical statistical variable Y , after
properly normalising the latter via division by a convenient reference quantity of the same phys-
ical dimension, to be describable as approximately originating from a Gauß process. Note that
departures of Gauß-distributed data from their common mean by more than three standard devia-
tions are very rare, and by more than six standard deviations are practically impossible.
Gauß distributions have the properties (see, e.g., Rinne (2008) [86, Subsec. 3.10.1]):
Spectrum of values:
yi ∈ R . (2.20)
Probability density function (pdf):
f(yi|θ1, θ2, I) = 1√
2π θ2
exp
[
−1
2
(
yi − θ1
θ2
)2 ]
, with θ1 ∈ R , θ2 ∈ R>0 ; (2.21)
θ1 constitutes a location parameter and θ2 a scale parameter, both of which share the physical
dimension of yi itself. The reciprocal of the squared scale parameter, 1/θ
2
2, is conventionally
referred to as the precision. Note that the Gauß probability density function is normalised with
respect to the continuous variable yi but not with respect to the continuous parameters θ1 and θ2.
Its graph is shown in Fig. 2.4 for four different combinations of values of θ1 and θ2.
Expectation value and variance:
E(yi) = θ1 (2.22)
Var(yi) = θ
2
2 . (2.23)
R: dnorm(yi, θ1, θ2), pnorm(yi, θ1, θ2), qnorm(p, θ1, θ2), rnorm(nsimulations, θ1, θ2)
JAGS: dnorm(θ1, 1/θ
2
2) (sampling)
Stan: normal(θ1, θ2) (sampling)
2.2.2 Non-central t–distributions
The three-parameter family of non-central t–distributions,
yi| θ1, θ2, ν, I ∼ t(θ1, θ2, ν) , (2.24)
constitutes a generalisation of a well-known family of continuous probability distributions discov-
ered by the English statistician William Sealy Gosset (1876–1937). Profoundly confusing for the
scientific community, he published his findings under the pseudonym of “Student;” cf. Student
(1908) [97]. While being qualitatively similar to Gauß distributions, their main characteristic is
the larger propability weight contained in the “tails” of the distributions. Therefore, non-central
t–distributions are being employed to model data-generating processes for usually dimension-
ful continuous metrical quantities yi which regularly produce outliers. Specific features of non-
central t–distributions are (see, e.g., Rinne (2008) [86, Subsec. 3.10.6]):
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Figure 2.4: Some examples of Gauß sampling distributions for an uncertain continuous quantity y.
Spectrum of values:
yi ∈ R . (2.25)
Probability density function (pdf):
f(yi|θ1, θ2, ν, I) = Γ [(ν + 1)/2]
Γ (ν/2)
√
πν θ2
[
1 +
1
ν
(
yi − θ1
θ2
)2 ]−(ν+1)/2
, with ν ∈ R≥1 ;
(2.26)
θ1 ∈ R represents a location parameter and θ2 ∈ R>0 a scale parameter, both of which share the
physical dimension of yi, and ν ≥ 1 is the dimensionless positive degrees of freedom parameter.
All three parameters are continuous. The Gamma function used above is defined via an Euler
integral of the second kind by (see, e.g., Rinne (2008) [86, p 168])
Γ(x) :=
∫ ∞
0
tx−1 exp(−t) dt , with x ∈ R≥0 . (2.27)
For later application it is important to note that for positive integer values of x, i.e., x = n ∈ N, it
holds true that
Γ(n+ 1) = n! . (2.28)
The graph of the non-central t–probability density function is shown in Fig. 2.5 for four different
combinations of values of θ1, θ2 and ν. Gosset’s one-parameter family of standard t–distributions
is contained in Eq. (2.26) for the special parameter choices θ1 = 0 and θ2 = 1.
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Expectation value and variance (cf. Greenberg (2013) [41, p 230]):
E(yi) = θ1 , if ν > 1 (2.29)
Var(yi) =
ν
ν − 2 θ
2
2 , if ν > 2 . (2.30)
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Figure 2.5: Some examples of non-central t–sampling distributions for an uncertain continuous
quantity y.
R: (1/θ2) ∗ dt((yi + θ1)/θ2, ν), (1/θ2) ∗ pt((yi + θ1)/θ2, ν)
JAGS: dt(θ1, 1/θ
2
2, ν) (sampling)
Stan: student t(ν, θ1, θ2) (sampling)
In the limit ν → +∞, non-central t–distributions asymptote towards Gauß distributions. In actual
practical situations, differences between the two kinds of distributions become effectively irrele-
vant when ν ≥ 50, in which case Gauß distributions may be used to simplify computations.
2.2.3 Exponential distributions
The one-parameter family of exponential distributions,
yi| θ, I ∼ Exp(θ) , (2.31)
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is regularly employed in modelling distributions for waiting times or spatial distances. For exam-
ple, the generically dimensionful continuous metrical quantity yi may represent
• the lifetime in months of a fashion hype,
• the distance in kilometres a commutor travels from their home to their workplace near an
industrial centre,
• the time in minutes until the next incoming telephone call in a call centre, or
• the lifetime in seconds of a rainbow.
Main properties of exponential distributions are (see, e.g., Rinne (2008) [86, Subsec. 3.9.3]):
Spectrum of values:
yi ∈ R≥0 . (2.32)
Probability density function (pdf):
f(yi|θ, I) = θ exp (−θyi) , with θ ∈ R>0 , (2.33)
and θ represents a rate parameter of physical dimension inverse to yi. Note that the exponential
probability density function is normalised with respect to the continuous variable yi but not with
respect to the continuous parameter θ. Its graph is shown in Fig. 2.6 for four different values of θ.
Expectation value and variance:
E(yi) =
1
θ
(2.34)
Var(yi) =
1
θ2
. (2.35)
R: dexp(yi, θ), pexp(yi, θ), qexp(p, θ), rexp(nsimulations, θ)
JAGS: dexp(θ) (sampling)
Stan: exponential(θ) (sampling)
Exponential distributions constitute a special case of the two-parameter family of Gamma dis-
tributions (cf. Greenberg (2013) [41, p 225]), which will be introduced in Subsec. 3.4.2 below.
We remark in passing that, in hierarchical models (see Ch. 8), exponential distributions, which
represent a certain type of maximum entropy distribution, may also serve as (weakly or strongly
regularising) prior distributions for scale parameters θ2 of Gauß likelihood functions, or of degree-
of-freedom parameters ν of t–likelihood functions; cf. McElreath (2016) [68, p 364], and Krusch-
ke (2015) [58, p 462].
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Figure 2.6: Some examples of exponential sampling distributions for an uncertain continuous
quantity y.
2.2.4 Pareto distributions
The two-parameter family of univariate Pareto distributions,
yi| θ, ymin, I ∼ Par(θ, ymin) , (2.36)
was introduced, to Economics in the first place, by the Italian engineer, sociologist, economist,
political scientist and philosopher Vilfredo Federico Damaso Pareto (1848–1923); cf. Pareto
(1896) [79]. The usually dimensionful continuous positive quantity yi could represent, for ex-
ample,
• the annual revenue of a company listed at the New York Stock Exchange,
• the number of clicks attracted by a video on YouTube that was watched at least once,
• the number of books sold by a writer in a given year, or
• the mass of a galaxy cluster.
Pareto distributions possess the features (see, e.g., Rinne (2008) [86, Subsec. 3.11.7]):
Spectrum of values:
ymin ≤ yi ∈ R>0 . (2.37)
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Probability density function (pdf):
f(yi|θ, ymin, I) = θ
ymin
(
ymin
yi
)θ+1
, with θ ∈ R>0 ; (2.38)
θ constitutes a dimensionless scale parameter and ymin a location parameter of the same physical
dimension as yi. Note that the Pareto probability density function is normalised with respect to the
continuous variable yi but not with respect to the continuous parameters θ and ymin. Its graph is
shown in Fig. 2.7 for four different combinations of values of θ and ymin.
Expectation value and variance:
E(yi) =
θ
θ − 1 ymin for θ > 1 (2.39)
Var(yi) =
θ
(θ − 1)2(θ − 2) y
2
min for θ > 2 . (2.40)
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Figure 2.7: Some examples of Pareto sampling distributions for an uncertain continuous quantity y.
R: dpareto(yi, θ, ymin), ppareto(yi, θ, ymin), qpareto(p, θ, ymin), rpareto(nsimulations, θ, ymin)
(extraDistr package)
JAGS: dpar(θ, ymin) (sampling)
Stan: pareto(ymin, θ) (sampling)
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2.3 Multivariate data
The single-datum likelihood functions introduced in this section apply to multivariate data y from
a continuous vector-valued,m-dimensional statistical variable Y . They depend on unobservable
and therefore unknown continuously varying scalar-, vector- and matrix-valued parameters. We
will here briefly review only the two most frequently used multivariate single-datum likelihood
functions for vector-valued continuously varying data.
2.3.1 Multivariate Gauß distributions
Multivariate Gauß processes are described by a single-datum likelihood function for a vector-
valued y ∈ Rm×1 given by (see, e.g., Rinne (2008) [86, Subsec. 3.10.4], Gelman et al (2014) [35,
Sec. 3.5], or Gill (2015) [39, Sec. 3.5])
f(y|µ,Σ, I) = 1√
(2π)m det(Σ)
exp
[
−1
2
(y − µ)TΣ−1(y − µ)
]
, (2.41)
wherein µ ∈ Rm×1 represents amean vector, andΣ ∈ Rm×m a regular covariance matrix which
is always symmetric and positive semi-definite.
R: dmvnorm(y,µ,Σ), rmvnorm(nsimulations,µ,Σ) (mvtnorm package)
JAGS: dmnorm(mu[1 : m], Omega[1 : m, 1 : m]) (precision matrix: Omega) (sampling)
Stan: multi normal(mu, Sigma) (sampling)
2.3.2 Multivariate non-central t–distributions
The generalisation of the three-parameter non-central t–distribution discussed in Subsec. 2.2.2 to
the multivariate case is given by the single-datum likelihood function for a vector-valued y ∈ Rm×1
(see, e.g., Gelman et al (2014) [35, Tab. A.1])
f(y|µ,Σ, ν, I) = Γ [(ν +m)/2]
Γ (ν/2) (πν)m/2
√
det(Σ)
[
1 +
1
ν
(y − µ)TΣ−1(y − µ)
]−(ν+m)/2
,
(2.42)
where µ ∈ Rm×1 is a mean vector, Σ ∈ Rm×m is a regular symmetric and positive semi-definite
covariance matrix, and ν ≥ 1 is the positive dimensionless degrees of freedom parameter.
R: dmvt((data vector), (ncp vector), (scale matrix), ν),
rmvt(nsimulations, (ncp vector), (scale matrix), ν) (mvtnorm package)
JAGS: dmt(mu[1 : m], Omega[1 : m, 1 : m], nu) (precision matrix: Omega) (sampling)
Stan: multi student t(nu,mu, Sigma) (sampling)
2.4 Exponential family
It is of some practical interest to realise that each of the binomial, Poisson, Gauß and exponen-
tial distributions belong to a larger class of probability distributions referred to as the exponential
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family, first discussed by Fisher (1935) [28]. These are particularly important as they can be used
to quantitatively model data-generating processes for a wide spectrum of observable natural phe-
nomena in a comprehensive fashion. It can be shown that each member of this family constitutes
a maximum entropy probability distribution, given specific constraints corresponding to avail-
able information in the different contexts where they appear; cf. McElreath (2016) [68, p 7], and
Sec. 3.3 below.
In a statistical model which aims to capture the distributional features of a statistical variable Y by
employing a set of k+1 parameters {θ0, . . . , θk} , the total-data likelihood function for members
of the exponential family exhibits the general structure (cf. Lee (2012) [63, Sec. 2.11], Gelman
et al (2014) [35, Sec. 2.4], Gill (2015) [39, Subsec. 4.3.2], or McElreath (2016) [68, Sec. 9.2.])
P ({yi}i=1,...,n|θ0, . . . , θk, I) =
[
n∏
i=1
r(yi)
]
sn(θ0, . . . , θk)
× exp
[
uT (θ0, . . . , θk) ·
n∑
i=1
t(yi)
]
, (2.43)
with, in general, vector-valued factors u ∈ R(k+1)×1 and t ∈ R(k+1)×1. In the special one-
parameter case, k = 0, both of these reduce to scalars. The vector-valued quantity
n∑
i=1
t(yi) ∈
R
(k+1)×1 is referred to as a sufficient statistic for the set of parameters {θ0, . . . , θk}, as in the
total-data likelihood function the latter interact with the data {yi}i=1,...,n only via the former. If a
prior probability distribution possesses the same structure as the total-data likelihood function
given in Eq. (2.43), then it will be of the conjugate type; cf. Sec. 3.4 below.
We now turn to discuss in the next chapter prior probability distributions, which serve to model
initial states of knowledge of a researcher concerning the range of plausible values of a single
parameter in specific empirical situations of enquiry.
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Chapter 3
Prior probability distributions
It lies at the very heart of the methodological philosophy of the Bayes–Laplace approach to
data analysis and statistical inference that unknown quantities such as parameters in statistical
models are treated probabilistically by assigning to them probability distributions that represent
a state of knowledge on the part of the researcher. Therefore, there is an immediate necessity
in statistical modelling to specify a prior joint probability distribution for all unknown model
parameters. This mode of action is to be viewed as a mathematical formalisation of including
all available background information I on a matter of interest, such as obtained from related past
data analyses, scientific discourse, or even from personal prejudices; cf. Coles (2006) [12, p 61].
The latter option provides the psychological basis for many people to associate with the Bayes–
Laplace approach the notion of “subjective probabilities,” although such a view neglects some
deep epistemological issues.
Prior probability distributions represent a researcher’s state of knowledge before gaining access
to relevant observational data on the problem under investigation. They can be broadly classified
into one of three qualitative categories, ranked according to information content:
• uninformative prior probability distributions,
• weakly informative prior probability distributions, and
• sceptical prior probability distributions, resp. regularising prior probability distributions.
For practical reasons, and as an expression of ignorance of a researcher of parameter correlations
prior to data analysis, it is often assumed that a prior joint probability distribution for multiple
model parameters factorises into a product of single-parameter prior probability distributions;1
cf. the remarks made in Sec. 1.4.
In the following we will review the cases of single-parameter prior probability distributions
that are most important for actual practical model-building, and how some of them can be moti-
vated conceptually. The different options that will be outlined offer a sufficient amount of flex-
ibility in that they let a researcher express a diverse range of prior states of knowledge, from
1Single-parameter prior probability distributions treat a single parameter in a model-building process probabilisti-
cally prior to data analysis. These distributions themselves depend generically on further parameters, which may be
specified as fixed, or as adaptive to additional information input.
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uninformed to sceptical, by tuning accordingly the free parameters in the various probability dis-
tributions employed. We will begin by addressing formal ways of specifying a state of complete
ignorance as a reference point for prior probability distributions.
3.1 Principle of indifference
Suppose given a set of k ∈ N mutually exclusive and exhaustive propositions {A1, . . . , Ak},
conditioned on background information I , so that P (AiAj |I) = 0 for i 6= j. If I provides no
reason to assign a higher plausibility to any one proposition in the set than to any other, thus
expressing a state of complete ignorance, then Keynes (1921) [55, p 41] suggested the only
consequential probability assignment to be
P (Ai|I) = 1
k
, i = 1, . . . , k . (3.1)
Originally, this approach was introduced by the Swiss mathematician
Jakob Bernoulli (1654–1705), who referred to it as the “principle of non-sufficient reason;”
Keynes (1921) [55, p 41] himself preferred to call it the principle of indifference, which is the
term that spread in the literature.
The assignment (3.1) yields univariate discrete uniform distributions for sets of proposi-
tions {A1, . . . , Ak} that are properly normalised, in line with Eq. (1.16). The graph of the proba-
bility function is shown in Fig. 3.1 below for four different values of k.
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Figure 3.1: Some examples of discrete uniform distributions for an uncertain integer quantity x.
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3.2 Transformation invariance
A different method for establishing in mathematical terms a state of complete ignorance has
been elucidated by Jaynes (2003) [48, Subsec. 12.4.1], and by Sivia and Skilling (2006) [92, Sub-
sec. 5.1.2]. Here the requirement imposed on probability distributions for model parameters is
that they remain invariant under transformations of the parameters. We will now address the two
simplest examples of transformation-invariant single-parameter distributions:
(i) Let ρ ∈ R be a continuous location parameter. When invariance is demanded under a shift
of the parameter’s origin, i.e., a translation ρ 7→ ρ + a, for a constant a ∈ R, then the
condition
P (ρ|I) dρ != P (ρ+ a|I) d(ρ+ a) ⇒ P (ρ|I) dρ != P (ρ+ a|I) dρ (3.2)
needs to be solved to determine an adequate form for P (ρ|I). The general solution is given
by
P (ρ|I) = constant , (3.3)
which expresses uniformity of P (ρ|I), irrespective of the value of ρ. To obtain a properly
normalised continuous uniform distribution satisfying Eq. (3.16) below, additional infor-
mation as to the range of ρ ∈ [a, b] ⊂ R needs to be injected, provided it is available. In that
case one obtains
ρ| a, b, I ∼ U(a, b) , P (ρ|a, b, I) = 1
(b− a) . (3.4)
The graph of this probability density function is shown in Fig. 3.2 for four different combi-
nations of values of a and b.
(ii) Let ℓ ∈ R>0 be a continuous positive scale parameter. When invariance is demanded under
a change of the parameter’s size, i.e., a re-scaling ℓ 7→ βℓ, for a positive constant β ∈ R>0,
then the condition
P (ℓ|I) dℓ != P (βℓ|I) d(βℓ) ⇒ P (ℓ|I) dℓ != P (βℓ|I) βdℓ (3.5)
needs to be solved to determine an adequate form for P (ℓ|I). The general solution is given
by
P (ℓ|I) = constant
ℓ
, (3.6)
which is generally referred to as a Jeffreys prior; cf. Jeffreys (1939) [50], Sivia and Skilling
(2006 [92, p 109], or Gill (2015) [39, Subsec. 4.4.2]. To obtain a properly normalised
probability distribution satisfying Eq. (3.16) below, additional information as to the range of
ℓ ∈ [a, b] ⊂ R>0 needs to be injected, provided it is available. In that case one obtains a
truncated Jeffreys distribution given by
ℓ| a, b, I ∼ Jeff(a, b) , P (ℓ|a, b, I) = 1
ln(b/a)
(
1
ℓ
)
. (3.7)
The graph of this probability density function is shown in Fig. 3.3 for four different combi-
nations of values of a and b.
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3.3 Principle of maximum entropy
The most sophisticated technical procedure for systematically converting relevant background in-
formation I into usable specific prior probability distributions, while still striving to maintain
a practical and profoundly modest state of ignorance, has been proposed by Jaynes (1957) [47]
through his principle of maximum entropy; see also Jaynes (2003) [48, Ch. 11].
In this procedure he employs the notion of an information entropy associated with
a specific probability distribution for a set of k ∈ N mutually exclusive and ex-
haustive propositions {A1, . . . , Ak}, conditioned on background information I , that was
developed by the US-American mathematician, electrical engineer, and cryptographer
Claude Elwood Shannon (1916–2001); see Shannon (1948) [90]. This is defined by2
S := −
k∑
i=1
P (Ai|I) ln
(
P (Ai|I)
mi
)
. (3.8)
As Jaynes (2003) [48, p 358] suggests, it may be interpreted as a measure of the “amount of
uncertainty” represented by a probability distribution. His modification of the information en-
tropy formula (3.8) by a normalised Lebesgue measure3 mi, i = 1, . . . , k, keeps this non-negative
quantity invariant under re-parametrisations of the set of propositions {A1, . . . , Ak}; cf. Jaynes
(2003) [48, Sec. 12.3] and Sivia and Skilling (2006) [92, p 116].
To maximise the information entropy of the probability assignment for a given set of proposi-
tions {A1, . . . , Ak} and pertinent background information I , Jaynes devises a variational prin-
ciple for a scalar-valued Lagrange function4 that is a linear combination of the information en-
tropy (3.8) itself, the normalisation condition (1.16), and a set of l ∈ N further constraints 0 = Ci,
i = 1, . . . , l, each of which represents testable pertinent information I . These constraints usually
depend on the unknown probabilities P (Ai|I). Setting pi := P (Ai|I) to simplify notation, the
Lagrange function is given by5
L = −
k∑
i=1
pi ln
(
pi
mi
)
− λ0
(
k∑
i=1
pi − 1
)
−
l∑
i=1
λi Ci ; (3.9)
the unknown coefficients λ0 and λi are referred to as Lagrange multipliers.
To attain a maximum for the information entropy (3.8), the unknowns pi, λ0 and λi must neces-
2The minus sign preceding the expression on the right-hand side of Eq. (3.8) ensures for the information entropy S
a spectrum of non-negative values.
3Named after the French mathematician Henri Le´on Lebesgue (1875–1941).
4Named after the an Italian mathematician and astronomer Joseph–Louis Lagrange (1736–1813).
5Here the signs of the second and third terms are motivated by computational convenience.
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sarily satisfy the system of k + l + 1 non-linear algebraic equations given by
0
!
=
∂L
∂pj
= − 1− ln
(
pj
mj
)
− λ0 −
l∑
i=1
λi
∂Ci
∂pj
, j = 1, . . . , k , (3.10)
0
!
=
∂L
∂λ
=
k∑
i=1
pi − 1 (3.11)
0
!
=
∂L
∂λj
= Cj , j = 1, . . . , l . (3.12)
The general solution to condition (3.10) is given by
pj = mj e
−(1+λ0) exp
[
−
l∑
i=1
λi
∂Ci
∂pj
]
, j = 1, . . . , k , (3.13)
while Eqs. (3.11) and (3.12) serve to enforce the normalisation condition and the l constraints on
the pi. Viewed from a qualitative perspective, it turns out that, amongst all competitors, those
probability distributions attain maximum information entropy which spread out probability as
evenly as possible between the given propositions, while fully incorporating the available back-
ground information by respecting all the given constraints. The extremisation procedure outlined
aims at rendering a probability distribution as uniform as possible, in the sense of the principle
of indifference. However, the more testable information is available, the more non-uniform the
resultant probability distribution will become.
We point the interested reader to Sivia and Skilling (2006) [92, Sec. 5.3] for specific applications
of the principle of maximum entropy. Representing for a discrete resp. continuous statistical
variable Y its expectation value and variance as constraints by
0 = C1 =
k∑
i=1
yipi − µ , resp. 0 = C1 =
∫ +∞
−∞
yf(y) dy − µ , (3.14)
0 = C2 =
k∑
i=1
(yi − µ)2pi − σ2 , resp. 0 = C2 =
∫ +∞
−∞
(y − µ)2f(y) dy − σ2 , (3.15)
and giving the normalisation condition and the information entropy for the continuous case as
0 =
∫ +∞
−∞
f(y) dy − 1 (3.16)
S = −
∫ +∞
−∞
f(y) ln
(
f(y)
m(y)
)
dy , (3.17)
these authors demonstrate how some standard probability distributions for discrete and con-
tinuous Y arise as maximum entropy distributions. In particular, combining the information
entropy (3.8) or (3.17) with
(i) the normalisation conditions (1.16) or (3.16) and a uniform Lebesgue measure, the discrete
or continuous uniform distributions discussed in Subsecs. 3.1 and 3.2 can be derived;
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(ii) the normalisation condition (3.16), the expectation value constraint (3.14) and a uniform
Lebesgue measure, while restricting the range of Y to [0,+∞), the exponential distribu-
tions discussed in Subsec. 2.2.3 are obtained;
(iii) the normalisation condition (3.16), the expectation value constraint (3.14), the variance con-
straint (3.15) and a uniform Lebesgue measure, for a range of Y given by (−∞,+∞), the
Gauß distributions discussed in Subsec. 2.2.1 arise; and, lastly,
(iv) the binomial and Poisson distributions discussed in Subsecs. (2.1.2) and (2.1.3) can be
obtained when employing non-uniform Lebesgue measures.
3.4 Conjugate prior probability distributions
In the first place, conjugate prior probability distributions for single unknownmodel parameters
constitute a welcome computational convenience. But the choice of a conjugate prior in actual
data analysis is by no means compulsory. The ultimate selection depends on the quality of the
information I available to a researcher prior to gaining access to relevant empirical data.
Conjugate prior probability distributions are characterised by their property that, in combina-
tion with total-data likelihood functions, they generate posterior probability distributions that
belong to the very same family of distributions as the priors one started from. In particular, for
total-data likelihood functions from the exponential family, discussed in Sec. 2.4 before, it is
straightforward to specify related conjugate prior probability distributions; see, e.g., Gelman et
al (2014) [35, Sec. 2.4], or Gill (2015) [39, Sec. 4.3] and Tab. 4.1 therein.
In the following, we will discuss the most frequently encountered conjugate prior probability
distributions used to describe single unknown model parameters probabilistically.
3.4.1 Beta distributions
The two-parameter family of univariate Beta distributions,
x|α, β, I ∼ Be(α, β) , (3.18)
is signified by the properties (see, e.g., Greenberg (2013) [41, p 226]):
Spectrum of values:
x ∈ [0, 1] . (3.19)
Probability density function (pdf):
f(x|α, β, I) = 1
B(α, β)
xα−1 (1− x)β−1 , with α, β ∈ R>0 , (3.20)
where α and β are dimensionless shape parameters. The pdf-normalising Beta function is
defined via an Euler integral of the first kind by (see, e.g., Rinne (2008) [86, p 340])
B(α, β) :=
∫ 1
0
xα−1 (1− x)β−1 dx = Γ(α) Γ(β)
Γ(α + β)
; (3.21)
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the definition of the Gamma function was given in Eq. (2.27). The graph of the probability density
function is shown in Fig. 3.4 for four different combinations of values of α and β. Note that the
continuous uniform distribution on [0, 1] is contained as the special case Be(1, 1) = U(0, 1).
Expectation value and variance:
E(x) =
α
α + β
(3.22)
Var(x) =
αβ
(α + β)2(α+ β + 1)
. (3.23)
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Figure 3.4: Some examples of pdfs of Beta distributions for an uncertain quantity x.
R: dbeta(x, α, β), pbeta(x, α, β), qbeta(p, α, β), rbeta(nsimulations, α, β)
JAGS: dbeta(α, β) (sampling)
Stan: beta(α, β) (sampling)
Prior Beta distributions for a probability for “success” parameter lead to posterior Beta distribu-
tions for a probability for “success”when they are combined with the binomial likelihood functions
introduced in Subsec. 2.1.2.
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3.4.2 Gamma distributions
The two-parameter family of univariateGamma distributions,
x|α, β, I ∼ Ga(α, β) , (3.24)
has characteristic features (see, e.g., Greenberg (2013) [41, p 225]):
Spectrum of values:
x ∈ R≥0 . (3.25)
Probability density function (pdf):
f(x|α, β, I) = β
α
Γ(α)
xα−1 exp (−βx) , with α, β ∈ R>0 ; (3.26)
α constitutes a dimensionless shape parameter, while β is a rate parameter of physical dimen-
sion inverse to x. The Gamma function was defined in Eq. (2.27). The graph of the probability
density function is shown in Fig. 3.5 for four different combinations of values of α and β.
Expectation value and variance:
E(x) =
α
β
(3.27)
Var(x) =
α
β2
. (3.28)
R: dgamma(x, α, β), pgamma(x, α, β), qgamma(p, α, β), rgamma(nsimulations, α, β)
JAGS: dgamma(α, β) (sampling)
Stan: gamma(α, β) (sampling)
Notice that for the particular choice of parameters α = ν/2, β = 1/2, Gamma distributions con-
tain the one-parameter family of χ2–distributions with ν degrees of freedom as a special case.
Similarly, for α = 1, β = β, one obtains the one-parameter family of exponential distributions
considered in Subsec. 2.2.3; cf. Greenberg (2013) [41, p 225].
Prior Gamma distributions for a precision parameter lead to posterior Gamma distributions for
a precision parameter when they are combined with the Gauß likelihood functions introduced
in Subsec. 2.2.1. Also, prior Gamma distributions for a rate parameter lead to posterior Gamma
distributions for a rate parameter when, for discrete count data, they are combined with the Poisson
likelihood functions introduced in Subsec. 2.1.3, or, for continuous interval data, when they are
combined with the exponential likelihood functions discussed in Subsec. 2.2.3.
3.4.3 Inverse Gamma distributions
The two-parameter family of univariate inverse Gamma distributions,
x|α, β, I ∼ IG(α, β) , (3.29)
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Figure 3.5: Some examples of pdfs of Gamma distributions for an uncertain quantity x.
is related to Gamma distribution by a simple inversion transformation of the independent variable,
namely x→ 1/x; see, e.g., Greenberg (2013) [41, p 225f]. They have the properties:
Spectrum of values:
x ∈ R>0 . (3.30)
Probability density function (pdf):
f(x|α, β, I) = β
α
Γ(α)
1
xα+1
exp (−β/x) , with α, β ∈ R>0 , (3.31)
where α is a dimensionless shape parameter and β a rate parameter of the same physical di-
mension asX . The graph of the probability density function is shown in Fig. 3.6 for four different
combinations of values of α and β.
Expectation value and variance:
E(x) =
β
α− 1 , if α > 1 (3.32)
Var(x) =
β2
(α− 1)2(α− 2) , if α > 2 . (3.33)
R: dinvgamma(x, α, β), pinvgamma(x, α, β), qinvgamma(p, α, β), rinvgamma(nsimulations, α, β)
(invgamma package)
Stan: inv gamma(α, β) (sampling)
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Figure 3.6: Some examples of pdfs of inverse Gamma distributions for an uncertain quantity x.
Prior inverse Gamma distributions for a scale parameter lead to posterior inverse Gamma distribu-
tions for a scale parameter when they are combined with the Gauß likelihood functions introduced
in Subsec. 2.2.1.
3.4.4 Gauß distributions
For the two-parameter family of Gauß distributions,
f(x|m0, τ0, I) = 1√
2π τ0
exp
[
−1
2
(
x−m0
τ0
)2 ]
, with m0 ∈ R , τ0 ∈ R>0 , (3.34)
the location parameter m0 and the scale parameter τ0 both have the physical dimension of x.
Prior Gauß distributions for a location parameter lead to posterior Gauß distributions for a location
parameter when they are combined with the Gauß likelihood functions introduced in Subsec. 2.2.1;
in that particular case this family is conjugate to itself.
3.5 Other prior probability distributions
Lastly, we introduce two more families of probability distributions that are also often used as prior
probability distributions for certain kinds of single unknown model parameters.
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3.5.1 Cauchy distributions
The two-parameter family of univariate Cauchy distributions,
x| x0, γ, I ∼ Ca(x0, γ) , (3.35)
put forward by the French mathematician, engineer and physicist
Augustin–Louis Cauchy (1789–1857), is given by (see, e.g., Rinne (2008) [86, Subsec. 3.11.2]):
Spectrum of values:
x ∈ R . (3.36)
Probability density function (pdf):
f(x|x0, γ, I) = 1
πγ
1
1 +
(
x− x0
γ
)2 , with x0 ∈ R , γ ∈ R>0, ; (3.37)
the location parameter x0 and the scale parameter γ both carry the physical dimension of x.
The graph of the probability density function is shown in Fig. 3.7 for four different combinations
of values of x0 and γ. Formally, as follows from Eq. (2.26), Cauchy distributions correspond to
non-central t–distributions with one degree of freedom, ν = 1.
Expectation value and variance:
E(x) = does NOT exist due to a diverging integral (3.38)
Var(x) = does NOT exist due to a diverging integral . (3.39)
R: dcauchy(x, x0, γ), pcauchy(x, x0, γ), qcauchy(p, x0, γ), rcauchy(nsimulations, x0, γ)
JAGS: dt(x0, 1/γ
2, 1) (sampling)
Stan: cauchy(x0, γ) (sampling)
Half-Cauchy distributions (meaning the half to the right of the mode) have become a standard
in modern data analysis as weakly regularising prior probability distributions for unknown scale
parameters such as standard deviations: in fixed-prior models and, in particular, in adaptive-prior,
hierarchical models, in which they control the degree of shrinkage of model parameters for data ob-
tained from different but related groups; cf. Gelman (2006) [33], Gill (2015) [39, p 178], Kruschke
(2015) [58, p 558], and McElreath (2016) [68, pp 260, 363].
3.5.2 Laplace distributions
The two-parameter family of univariate Laplace distributions,
x|µ, b, I ∼ Laplace(µ, b) , (3.40)
has the properties (see, e.g., Rinne (2008) [86, Subsec. 3.11.5]):
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Figure 3.7: Some examples of pdfs of Cauchy distributions for an uncertain quantity x.
Spectrum of values:
x ∈ D ⊆ R . (3.41)
Probability density function (pdf):
f(x|µ, b, I) = 1
2b
exp
[
−|x− µ|
b
]
, with µ ∈ R , b ∈ R>0 ; (3.42)
µ constitutes a location parameter, b a scale parameter, and both carry the physical dimension
of x. The graph of the probability density function is shown in Fig. 3.8 for four different combina-
tions of values of µ and b.
Expectation value and variance:
E(x) = µ (3.43)
Var(x) = 2b2 . (3.44)
R: dlaplace(x, µ, b), plaplace(x, γ, b), qlaplace(p, γ, b), rlaplace(nsimulations, µ, b)
(extraDistr package)
JAGS: ddexp(µ, 1/b) (sampling)
Stan: double exponential(µ, b) (sampling)
We will now turn to highlight in the next two chapters a few of those prominent rare cases of
single- and two-parameter estimations which can be solved analytically.
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Chapter 4
Single-parameter estimation
In the special case of single-parameter estimation in inductive statistical inference, a few ana-
lytical solutions for the posterior probability distribution for the unknown parameter in question
are available, and well-known. Typically this is possible in those cases where either uniform or
conjugate prior probability distributions are employed to express a researcher’s state of knowl-
edge as to the range of values of the unobservable model parameter of interest, before seeing
relevant empirical data.
In the single-parameter instance, Bayes’ theorem, in its model-building variant of Eq. (1.24),
reduces to
P (θ|{yi}i=1,...,n, I) = P ({yi}i=1,...,n|θ, I)
P ({yi}i=1,...,n|I) P (θ|I) . (4.1)
This is the relationship, for which some exact solutions can be derived.
The known analytical solutions for single-parameter posterior probability distributions possess
a certain pedagogical merit. Therefore, some prominent examples will be reviewed in the next few
sections.
4.1 Binomial-distributed univariate discrete data
Suppose given n exchangeable and logically independent repetitions of a Bernoulli experiment,
with unknown but constant probability for “success,” 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1. Let the observed total number of
“successes” in this experiment be
y :=
n∑
i=1
yi , (4.2)
with 0 ≤ y ≤ n. Then, as discussed in Subsec. (2.1.2), the full data-generating process is described
by
y| θ, n, I ∼ Bin(n, y) , (4.3)
with total-data likelihood function
P (y|n, θ, I) =
(
n
y
)
θy (1− θ)n−y . (4.4)
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This is to be viewed as a function of θ, for fixed data n and y. Note that, by Eq. (2.43), y =: ny¯,
where the sample mean of a univariate metrically scaled data set is defined by
y¯ :=
1
n
n∑
i=1
yi , (4.5)
constitutes a sufficient statistic for θ.
4.1.1 Uniform prior
Adopting for θ a uniform prior probability distribution [cf. Eq. (3.4)],
θ|n, I ∼ U(0, 1) , (4.6)
and forming the product with (4.4), then, after some algebra that involves the definition of the
binomial coefficient in Eq. (2.10) and the Gamma function identity of Eq. (2.28), one is led to the
normalised posterior probability distribution for θ given by
P (θ|y, n, I) = Γ(n+ 2)
Γ(y + 1) Γ(n− y + 1) θ
y (1− θ)n−y , (4.7)
i.e., a Beta distribution
θ| y, n, I ∼ Be(y + 1, n− y + 1) . (4.8)
In the present case, it is also easy to obtain the prior predictive probability distribution for y, when
no observations have yet been made. With Eq. (1.27) one finds that
P (y|n, I) =
∫ 1
0
P (y|n, θ, I)P (θ|n, I) dθ
=
∫ 1
0
(
n
y
)
θy (1− θ)n−y︸ ︷︷ ︸
likelihood
× 1︸︷︷︸
prior
dθ
=
1
n + 1
×
∫ 1
0
(n+ 1)!
y!(n− y)! θ
y (1− θ)n−y dθ
=
1
n + 1
×
∫ 1
0
Γ(n+ 2)
Γ(y + 1) Γ(n− y + 1) θ
y (1− θ)n−y dθ︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1, by Eq. (3.21)
=
1
n + 1
, (4.9)
where, in the final step, the normalisation condition for Beta distributions according to Eq. (3.21)
was used. Clearly, this result represents an initial discrete uniform probability distribution over the
set of possible outcomes, y ∈ {0, . . . , n}.
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Similarly, starting from Eq. (1.28) to calculate the posterior predictive probability distribution for
a new observation ynew to be a “success,” given the information that y “successes” were observed
in n previous iid-repetitions of the Bernoulli experiment, one arrives at
P (ynew = 1|y, n, I) =
∫ 1
0
P (ynew = 1|y, n, θ, I)P (θ|y, n, I) dθ
=
∫ 1
0
θ︸︷︷︸
likelihood
× Γ(n+ 2)
Γ(y + 1) Γ(n− y + 1) θ
y(1− θ)n−y︸ ︷︷ ︸
posterior
dθ
=
y + 1
n + 2
×
∫ 1
0
Γ(n+ 3)
Γ(y + 2) Γ(n− y + 1) θ
y+1(1− θ)n−y dθ︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1, by Eq. (3.21)
=
y + 1
n + 2
; (4.10)
again, use was made of the normalisation condition for Beta distributions given in Eq. (3.21). This
last result constitutes Laplace’s famous “rule of succession;” cf. Keynes (1921) [55, p 372], Cox
(1946) [13, p 11], Jaynes (2003) [48, pp 155, 165], and Gelman et al (2014) [35, p 32]. In the
present context, this may actually be interpreted as the posterior expectation value for θ, viz.
y + 1
n+ 2
=
2
n + 2
× 1
2︸︷︷︸
prior mean
+
n
n + 2
× y
n︸︷︷︸
sample mean
= E(θ|y, n, I) . (4.11)
It exemplifies the notion of the posterior probability distribution being a “compromise” between
the prior probability distribution and the likelihood function; see, e.g., Gill (2015) [39, p 42] or
Kruschke (2015) [58, p 112]. In particular, in this representation it becomes apparent that with
increasing sample size n the weight is being pushed away from prior information towards data
information, which is a very compelling and elegant feature.
From Eq. (3.23), the posterior variance for θ amounts to
Var(θ|y, n, I) = (y + 1)(n− y + 1)
(n + 2)2(n+ 3)
. (4.12)
Further summary statistics can be easily computed with pre-programmed R-functions.
4.1.2 Conjugate prior
Alternatively, selecting for θ instead a conjugate Beta prior probability distribution [cf. Eq. (3.20)],
θ|α, β, n, I ∼ Be(α, β) (4.13)
and forming the product with (4.4), then, again, algebra involving Eqs. (2.10) and (2.28) yields a
normalised posterior probability distribution for θ given by
P (θ|y, α, β, n, I) = Γ(α + β + n)
Γ(α + y) Γ(β + n− y) θ
α+y−1 (1− θ)β+n−y−1 , (4.14)
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i.e., a Beta distribution
θ| y, α, β, n, I ∼ Be(α + y, β + n− y) ; (4.15)
see, e.g., Lee (2012) [63, Subsec. 3.1.1], Gelman et al (2014) [35, Sec. 2.4], Gill (2015) [39,
Subsec. 2.3.4], or Kruschke (2015) [58, Sec. 6.3]. By means of re-arranging, one finds from
Eq. (3.22) that the posterior expectation value for θ is given by
E(θ|y, α, β, n, I) = α + y
α + y + β + n− y =
α + β
α+ β + n
× α
α + β︸ ︷︷ ︸
prior mean
+
n
α + β + n
× y
n︸︷︷︸
sample mean
; (4.16)
it thus can be interpreted as weighted average of the prior mean and the sample mean, where the
numerators of the respective weighting factors represent a prior effective sample size (α + β)
and the actual data sample size (n), respectively. Note that for n ≫ α + β the sample mean will
dominate.
From Eq. (3.23), the posterior variance for θ amounts to
Var(θ|y, α, β, n, I) = (α + y)(β + n− y)
(α + β + n)2(α+ β + n+ 1)
. (4.17)
Sampling from the single-parameter posterior distribution (4.15) and calculating further summary
statistics can be easily accomplished by use of pre-programmed R-functions.
4.2 Poisson-distributed univariate discrete data
Suppose given from a Poisson process measurements of n exchangeable and logically independent
counts yi,
{yi}i=1,...,n| θ, I iid∼ Pois(θ) , (4.18)
so that the total-data likelihood function is
P ({yi}i=1,...,n|θ, I) = θ
∑n
i=1 yi∏n
i=1 yi!
exp (−nθ) , (4.19)
with unknown rate parameter θ ∈ R>0. By Eq. (2.43),
∑n
i=1 yi = ny¯ is a sufficient statistic for θ.
Assuming for θ a conjugate Gamma prior probability distribution [cf. Eq. (3.26)],
θ|α, β, I ∼ Ga(α, β) , (4.20)
and forming the product with (4.19), then a few simple algebraic manipulations yield a posterior
probability distribution for θ proportional to
P (θ|{yi}i=1,...,n, α, β, I) ∝ θ(α+
∑n
i=1 yi)−1 exp [−(β + n)θ ] , (4.21)
i.e., upon normalisation, a Gamma distribution
θ| {yi}i=1,...,n, α, β, I ∼ Ga(α +
n∑
i=1
yi, β + n) ; (4.22)
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cf. Lee (2012) [63, Subsec. 3.4.1], or Gelman et al (2014) [35, Sec. 2.6]. From Eq. (3.27), the
decomposed posterior expectation value for θ is
E(θ|{yi}i=1,...,n, α, β, I) = α +
∑n
i=1 yi
β + n
=
β
β + n
× α
β︸︷︷︸
prior mean
+
n
β + n
×
∑n
i=1 yi
n︸ ︷︷ ︸
sample mean
; (4.23)
the prior effective sample size thus amounts to β. For n≫ β the sample mean will dominate.
From Eq. (3.28), the posterior variance for θ amounts to
Var(θ|{yi}i=1,...,n, α, β, I) = α +
∑n
i=1 yi
(β + n)2
. (4.24)
Sampling from the single-parameter posterior distribution (4.22) and calculating further summary
statistics can be easily accomplished by use of pre-programmed R-functions.
4.3 Gauß-distributed univariate continuous data
In this section we will suppose given n exchangeable and logically independent measurements yi
from a Gauß process,
{yi}i=1,...,n| θ1, θ2, I iid∼ N(θ1, θ22) . (4.25)
To simplify entailing algebra for demonstrational purposes, an assumption that is usually unre-
alistic in practice will be imposed, viz. that one of the two parameters in the Gauß total-data
likelihood (2.21) is known and, therefore, fixed.
4.3.1 Known variance
When the scale parameter θ2 = σ0 is fixed, the total-data likelihood function is given by
P ({yi}i=1,...,n|θ1, σ0, I) =
(
1√
2π σ0
)n
exp
[
− 1
2σ20
n∑
i=1
(yi − θ1)2
]
, (4.26)
which is to be viewed as a function of an unknown location parameter θ1. Upon evaluating the
(yi−θ1)2-term in the exponent, one finds that
∑n
i=1 yi = ny¯ is a sufficient statistic for θ1 according
to Eq. (2.43).
Choosing for θ1 a conjugate Gauß prior probability distribution [cf. Eq. (3.34)],
θ1|m0, s0, I ∼ N(m0, s20) , (4.27)
and forming the product with (4.26), then a few algebraic steps lead to a posterior probability
distribution for θ1 proportional to
P (θ1|{yi}i=1,...,n, m0, s0, σ0, I) ∝ exp
[
−1
2
(
θ1 − µ1
σ1
)2 ]
, (4.28)
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with posterior expectation value and posterior variance for θ1 given by
µ1 :=
(
1
s20
+
n
σ20
)−1
×
(
1
s20
m0 +
n
σ20
y¯
)
, σ21 :=
(
1
s20
+
n
σ20
)−1
. (4.29)
Upon normalisation, this yields a Gauß distribution
θ1| {yi}i=1,...,n, m0, s0, σ0, I ∼ N(µ1, σ21) ; (4.30)
see, e.g., Lee (2012) [63, Subsec. 2.3.1], Gelman et al (2014) [35, Sec. 2.5], or Gill (2015) [39,
Sec. 3.2]. In a fashion identical to previous cases, the posterior expectation value may be decom-
posed so that
E(θ1|{yi}i=1,...,n, m0, s0, σ0, I) = µ1 = 1/s
2
0
1/s20 + n/σ
2
0
× m0︸︷︷︸
prior mean
+
n/σ20
1/s20 + n/σ
2
0
× y¯︸︷︷︸
sample mean
;
(4.31)
the prior effective sample size, 1, and the actual sample size, n, are weighted by the precisions
1/s20 and 1/σ
2
0 , respectively. Depending on the values of these two precisions, the sample mean
will usually dominate for n≫ 1. Sampling from the single-parameter posterior distribution (4.30)
and calculating further summary statistics can be easily accomplished by use of pre-programmed
R-functions.
4.3.2 Known mean
When the location parameter θ1 = µ0 is fixed, the total-data likelihood function is given by
P ({yi}i=1,...,n|µ0, θ22, I) =
1
(
√
2π)n
1
(θ22)
n/2
exp
[
− 1
2θ22
n∑
i=1
(yi − µ0)2
]
, (4.32)
which is to be viewed as a function of an unknown squared scale parameter θ22 . By inspection, one
finds that
∑n
i=1(yi − µ0)2 =: nv is a sufficient statistic for θ22 according to Eq. (2.43).
Now choosing for θ22 a conjugate inverse Gamma prior probability distribution [cf. Eq. (3.31)],
θ22
∣∣α0, β0, I ∼ IG(α0, β0) , (4.33)
and forming the product with (4.32), then a little algebra yields a posterior probability distribution
for θ22 proportional to
P (θ22|{yi}i=1,...,n, µ0, α0, β0, I) ∝
1
(θ22)
α0+(n/2)+1
exp
[
−
(
β0 +
n
2
v
)
/θ22
]
, (4.34)
i.e., upon normalisation, an inverse Gamma distribution
θ22
∣∣ {yi}i=1,...,n, µ0, α0, β0, I ∼ IG(α0 + n
2
, β0 +
n
2
v
)
; (4.35)
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see, e.g., Lee (2012) [63, Subsec. 2.7.1], Gelman et al (2014) [35, Sec. 2.6], or Gill (2015) [39,
Sec. 3.2]. The posterior expectation value and posterior variance for θ22 are given by
E(θ22|{yi}i=1,...,n, µ0, α0, β0, I) =
β0 +
n
2
v
α0 +
n
2
− 1 (4.36)
Var(θ22|{yi}i=1,...,n, µ0, α0, β0, I) =
(
β0 +
n
2
v
)2(
α0 +
n
2
− 1)2 (α0 + n2 − 2) , (4.37)
respectively, both of which are well-defined for α0 + (n/2) − 2 > 0. Sampling from the single-
parameter posterior distribution (4.35) and calculating further summary statistics can be easily
accomplished by use of pre-programmed R-functions.
4.4 Exponentially distributed univariate continuous data
Lastly, when there are given from an exponential process measurements of n exchangeable and
logically independent interval lengths yi,
{yi}i=1,...,n| θ, I iid∼ Exp(θ) , (4.38)
then the total-data likelihood function is
P ({yi}i=1,...,n|θ, I) = θn exp
(
− θ
n∑
i=1
yi
)
, (4.39)
with unknown rate parameter θ ∈ R>0. By Eq. (2.43),
∑n
i=1 yi = ny¯ is a sufficient statistic for θ.
Introducing for θ a conjugate Gamma prior probability distribution [cf. Eq. (3.26)],
θ|α, β, I ∼ Ga(α, β) , (4.40)
and forming the product with (4.39), then a few re-arrangements lead to a posterior probability
distribution for θ proportional to
P (θ|{yi}i=1,...,n, α, β, I) ∝ θ(α+n)−1 exp
[
−
(
β +
n∑
i=1
yi
)
θ
]
, (4.41)
i.e., upon normalisation, a Gamma distribution
θ| {yi}i=1,...,n, α, β, I ∼ Ga(α + n, β +
n∑
i=1
yi) ; (4.42)
cf. Gelman et al (2014) [35, Sec. 2.6]. From Eq. (3.27), the decomposed posterior expectation
value for θ is
E(θ|{yi}i=1,...,n, α, β, I) = α + n
β +
∑n
i=1 yi
=
β
β +
∑n
i=1 yi
× α
β︸︷︷︸
prior mean
+
∑n
i=1 yi
β +
∑n
i=1 yi
× n∑n
i=1 yi︸ ︷︷ ︸
sample mean
.
(4.43)
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For
∑n
i=1 yi ≫ β, the sample mean for θ, which is n/
∑n
i=1 yi = 1/y¯, will dominate over its prior
mean, α/β.
From Eq. (3.28), the posterior variance for θ amounts to
Var(θ|{yi}i=1,...,n, α, β, I) = α+ n
(β +
∑n
i=1 yi)
2
. (4.44)
Sampling from the single-parameter posterior distribution (4.42) and calculating further summary
statistics can be easily accomplished by use of pre-programmed R-functions.
We now turn to discuss some exactly solvable two-parameter estimation problems in the next
chapter.
Chapter 5
Joint two-parameter estimation for
univariate Gauß processes
The principles remain the same, but the entailing computations become considerably more com-
plex quite quickly, when the posterior joint probability distribution for two or more unknown
parameters in a model-building project is to be estimated from background information and avail-
able empirical data. In fact, there are not many cases in which this goal can be achieved by means
of closed-form analytical solutions after all. To provide a taste of the technical complexities in-
volved in the model-building process in higher dimensions, we will outline in this chapter the
derivation of the posterior joint probability distribution and its associated posterior marginal
probability distributions in two dimensions for univariate continuous data originating from a
Gauß process. In consequence, the discussion to follow proves a wee bit formula-(integration)-
heavy, though this should not deter the favourably inclined reader from continuing the exciting
journey through modern techniques of inductive statistical inference.
Suppose given a sample of size n of iid-measurements {yi}i=1,...,n gained from a univariate Gauß
process. Then the total-data likelihood function is constructed as the product of n copies of the
single-datum likelihood function given in Eq. (2.21). In the following we will employ standard
notation for the model parameters in a Gauß process context and set θ1 = µ for the location
parameter and θ22 = σ
2 for the scale parameter. The starting point is thus given by
P ({yi}i=1,...,n|µ, σ2, I) =
(
1√
2π σ
)n
exp
[
− 1
2σ2
n∑
i=1
(yi − µ)2
]
. (5.1)
Then, evaluating first the squared term in the exponent of the exponential function, re-ordering
resultant terms, and compactifying again by completing two convenient squares upon adding in a
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zero via the identity 0 = ny¯ − ny¯ that involves the sample mean, one arrives at
P ({yi}i=1,...,n|µ, σ2, I) = 1
(
√
2π)n
1
(σ2)n/2
× exp
[
− 1
2σ2
(
n∑
i=1
y2i − 2µ
n∑
i=1
yi + µ
2
n∑
i=1
1
)]
=
1
(
√
2π)n
1
(σ2)n/2
exp
[
− 1
2σ2
(
n∑
i=1
y2i − 2ny¯µ+ nµ2
)]
0=ny¯−ny¯
=
1
(
√
2π)n
1
(σ2)1/2
exp
[
−1
2
(
µ− y¯
σ/
√
n
)2 ]
× 1
(σ2)(n−1)/2
exp
[
−1
2
n∑
i=1
(yi − y¯)2 /σ2
]
. (5.2)
Altogether, we recognise in this result the product between the kernels of a univariate Gauß distri-
bution on the one-hand side, and of a univariate inverse Gamma distribution on the other, viz.,
P ({yi}i=1,...,n|µ, σ2, I) = 1
(
√
2π)n
1
(σ2)1/2
exp
[
−1
2
(
µ− y¯
σ/
√
n
)2 ]
× 1
(σ2)(n−1)/2
exp
(
−1
2
TSS/σ2
)
. (5.3)
In this last expression we defined a total sum of squared deviations of the univariate data from
their common sample mean by
TSS :=
n∑
i=1
(yi − y¯)2 . (5.4)
By inspection, it becomes apparent that, according to Eq. (2.43), the quantity
∑n
i=1 yi = ny¯, which
is proportional to the sample mean, constitutes a sufficient statistic for the location parameter µ.
Likewise, the quantity TSS, in terms of which one defines the sample variance, is a sufficient
statistic for the scale parameter σ2.
Let us now supply the total-data likelihood function (5.3) with a bivariate prior joint probability
distribution for the model parameters µ and σ2. We will factorise it by making use of the product
rule (1.11), so that
P (µ, σ2|I) = P (µ|σ2, I)× P (σ2|I) (5.5)
obtains. In the next two sections we will consider specific choices for P (µ, σ2|I) that are motivated
by computational convenience and the fact that they lead to closed form solutions for the bivari-
ate posterior joint probability distribution. Of course, both examples possess high practical
relevance, too.
5.1. UNIFORM JOINT PRIOR 59
5.1 Uniform joint prior
The simplest choice is that of an improper, non-normalised but transformation-invariant uniform
prior joint probability distribution for µ and σ2 according to Eqs. (3.3) and (3.6), which takes
the form
P (µ, σ2|I) = c1︸︷︷︸
∝ P (µ|σ2,I)
× c2
σ2︸︷︷︸
∝ P (σ2|I)
, (5.6)
with c1 > 0, c2 > 0. This choice expresses the assumption of initial logical independence be-
tween µ and σ2.
Presently the derivation of the posterior joint probability distribution for µ and σ2, which is
obtained from multiplying the total-data likelihood function by the prior joint probability distribu-
tion, does not require a lot of computational effort. The result exhibits the product structure (see,
e.g., Lee (2012) [63, Sec. 2.12], or Gelman et al (2014) [35, Sec. 3.2])
P (µ, σ2|{yi}i=1,...,n, I) ∝ 1
(σ2)1/2
exp
[
−1
2
(
µ− y¯
σ/
√
n
)2 ]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
∝ N(y¯,σ2/n)
× 1
(σ2)(n−1)/2+1
exp
(
−1
2
TSS/σ2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
∝ IG((n−1)/2,TSS/2)
. (5.7)
Upon normalisation, this gives a bivariate Gauß–inverse Gamma model to describe the uncer-
tainty inherent in the joint estimation of µ and σ2, i.e.,1
µ, σ2
∣∣ {yi}i=1,...,n, I ∼ N(y¯, σ2/n)× IG((n− 1)/2,TSS/2) . (5.8)
In practice, one is often primarily interested in the posterior probability distribution for a single
model parameter, which can be derived from the posterior joint probability distribution by way
of marginalisation. That is, averaging the posterior joint probability distribution over the full
range of the scale parameter σ2, and applying the substitution method to compactify the exponent
of the exponential function, one finds that the posterior marginal probability distribution for µ
1Sivia and Skilling (2006) [92, Sec. 3.3] discuss the case of estimating µ and σ2 for a univariate Gauß process with
improper prior probability distributions that are constants for both parameters.
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is proportional to
P (µ|{yi}i=1,...,n, I) =
∫ ∞
0
P (µ, σ2|{yi}i=1,...,n, I) dσ2
∝
∫ ∞
0
1
(σ2)(n−1)/2+3/2
exp
[
− 1
2σ2
(
TSS+ n (µ− y¯)2)] dσ2
substitution∝ [TSS+ n (µ− y¯)2 ]−n/2 × ∫ ∞
0
t(n/2)−1 e−t dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
constant
∝ [TSS+ n (µ− y¯)2 ]−n/2
∝

 1 + 1
n− 1
(
µ− y¯√
TSS/(n− 1)n
)2 −n/2 , (5.9)
so that, upon proper normalisation, this yields a univariate non-central t–distribution,
µ| {yi}i=1,...,n, I ∼ t(y¯,
√
TSS/(n− 1)n, n− 1) . (5.10)
Analogously, averaging the posterior joint probability distribution over the full range of the loca-
tion parameter µ leads to the posterior marginal probability distribution for σ2 being propor-
tional to
P (σ2|{yi}i=1,...,n, I) =
∫ +∞
−∞
P (µ, σ2|{yi}i=1,...,n, I) dµ
∝ 1
(σ2)(n−1)/2+1
exp
(
−1
2
TSS/σ2
)
×
∫ +∞
−∞
1
(σ2)1/2
exp
[
−1
2
(
µ− y¯
σ/
√
n
)2 ]
dµ︸ ︷︷ ︸
constant
∝ 1
(σ2)(n−1)/2+1
exp
(
−1
2
TSS/σ2
)
. (5.11)
Normalisation gives a univariate inverse Gamma distribution,
σ2
∣∣ {yi}i=1,...,n, I ∼ IG((n− 1)/2,TSS/2) . (5.12)
5.2 Conditionally conjugate joint prior
More flexibility for practical applications offers the choice of a conditionally conjugate prior joint
probability distribution for µ and σ2. This is expressed by
P (µ, σ2|I) ∝ 1
(σ2)1/2
exp
[
−1
2
(
µ−m0
σ
)2 ]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
∝ P (µ|σ2,I): Gauß
× 1
(σ2)α0+1
exp
(−β0/σ2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∝ P (σ2|I): inverse Gamma
; (5.13)
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the prior probability distribution for µ here is conditioned on the value of σ2.
Next, a number of algebraic manipulations that involve the completion of squares in the exponents
of the exponential functions yield the posterior joint probability distribution for µ and σ2 in the
product structure given by (see, e.g., Lee (2012) [63, Sec. 2.13], Greenberg (2013) [41, Sec. 4.3],
Gelman et al (2014) [35, Sec. 3.3], or Gill (2015) [39, Sec. 3.4])
P (µ, σ2|{yi}i=1,...,n, I) ∝ 1
(σ2)1/2
exp
[
−1
2
(
µ− µn
σ/
√
n+ 1
)2 ]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
∝ N(µn,σ2/(n+1))
× 1
(σ2)αn+1
exp
(−βn/σ2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∝ IG(αn,βn)
, (5.14)
where we defined
µn :=
1
n+ 1
m0 +
n
n + 1
y¯ (5.15)
αn := α0 +
n
2
(5.16)
βn := β0 +
TSS
2
+
1
2
n
n + 1
(m0 − y¯)2 . (5.17)
Note that the parameter µn is a weighted average of the prior mean, m0, and the sample mean, y¯.
Normalisation again obtains a bivariateGauß–inverse Gammamodel for the joint estimation of µ
and σ2, viz.,
µ, σ2
∣∣ {yi}i=1,...,n, I ∼ N(µn, σ2/(n+ 1))× IG(αn, βn) . (5.18)
Marginalisation to find the corresponding univariate posterior probability distributions for µ
and σ2 proceeds along the same lines as outlined in the previous section. Hence, averaging the
posterior joint probability distribution over the full range of the scale parameter σ2, and applying
the substitution method to compactify the exponent of the exponential function, the posterior
marginal probability distribution for µ is proportional to
P (µ|{yi}i=1,...,n, I) =
∫ ∞
0
P (µ, σ2|{yi}i=1,...,n, I) dσ2
∝
∫ ∞
0
1
(σ2)αn+3/2
exp
[
− 1
2σ2
(
2βn + (n+ 1) (µ− µn)2
)]
dσ2
substitution∝ [ 2βn + (n + 1) (µ− µn)2 ]−(αn+1/2) × ∫ ∞
0
t(αn+1/2)−1 e−t dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
constant
∝ [ 2βn + (n + 1) (µ− µn)2 ]−(αn+1/2)
∝

 1 + 1
2αn
(
µ− µn√
(βn/αn)/(n+ 1)
)2 −(2αn+1)/2 , (5.19)
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so that, after normalisation, a non-central t–distribution arises,
µ| {yi}i=1,...,n, I ∼ t(µn,
√
(βn/αn)/(n+ 1), 2αn) . (5.20)
Lastly, averaging the posterior joint probability distribution over the full range of the location
parameter µ, the kernel of the posterior marginal probability distribution for σ2 is given by
P (σ2|{yi}i=1,...,n, I) =
∫ +∞
−∞
P (µ, σ2|{yi}i=1,...,n, I) dµ
∝ 1
(σ2)αn+1
exp
(−βn/σ2)
×
∫ +∞
−∞
1
(σ2)1/2
exp
[
−1
2
(
µ− µn
σ/
√
n+ 1
)2 ]
dµ︸ ︷︷ ︸
constant
∝ 1
(σ2)αn+1
exp
(−βn/σ2) , (5.21)
and normalisation converts this into a univariate inverse Gamma distribution,
σ2
∣∣ {yi}i=1,...,n, I ∼ IG(αn, βn) . (5.22)
Sampling from all four of the exact posterior marginal probability distributions given above,
and calculating further summary statistics, can be easily accomplished by use of pre-programmed
R-functions.
The extension of the parameter estimation procedure discussed in this section to cases of data
from Gauß processes with more than two model parameters is conceptually (though not compu-
tationally) straightforward. In the next chapter we will describe in some detail how multivariate
posterior joint probability distributions and their marginal accomplices over multi-dimensional pa-
rameter spaces can be simulated numerically by resorting to techniques that make use of Markov
Chain Monte Carlo iteration codes, so they can be used in inductive statistical inference.
Chapter 6
Fitting and assessing generalised linear
models
So how, in the context of a research problem of interest, does one pursue the building of a concrete
statistical model from relevant background information and direct observational or experimental
evidence, when the related model parameter space becomes high-dimensional due to problem-
inherent complexity, and closed-form analytical solutions are no longer possible?
Regression analysis of quantitative–empirical data has long been the workhorse of inductive sta-
tistical inference. Its prime objective is the construction of an empirically validated statistical
model which is to be viewed as a representation of a specific scientific theory in the realm of
one’s research activities. In the Bayes–Laplace approach the construction of a statistical model
means foremost determining a posterior joint probability distribution for a certain finite num-
ber of unknown model parameters from a suitable joint prior probability distribution for these
model parameters and the sample measurements for the different statistical variables the researcher
included in her/his portfolio on the grounds of intensive theoretical considerations. Making valu-
able progress in the task of finding the sought-after posterior joint probability distribution has,
by now, been possible for a few decades via employing one of the many well-distributed powerful
and efficient numerical algorithms for simulation that yield discrete approximations of an accuracy
sufficient for reliable inference. For example, in this way hitherto unknown bivariate correlations
between essential model parameters can be learned, and also the posterior marginal probability
distributions for single model parameters that are of central interest can be captured. Any statis-
tical model, whether obtained by analytical means or via simulation, needs to be checked for its
sensitivity to the prior assumptions injected in the model-building process, and it also has to be
assessed for its posterior predictive accuracy.
We will outline in the following the main steps of regression analysis within the Bayes–Laplace
approach for different types of quantitative–empirical data in the context of generalised linear
models (see Nelder andWedderburn (1972) [74]). We will describe how the numerical approxima-
tion of high-dimensional posterior joint probability distributions can be activated within some
of the many freely available software implementations in R of the most reliable and widespread
simulation algorithms. To keep matters simple, we will be working in this chapter exclusively with
fixed prior probability distributions for each of the unknownmodel parameters.
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6.1 Generalised linear models
Let us first introduce some compact notation that is to be used in the applications presented in
subsequent sections. The empirical data, {xij}j=1,...,ki=1,...,n , from a sample of size n for a set of k ∈ N
independent variables, is to be collected in a design matrix,
X :=


1 x11 x12 . . . x1k
1 x21 x22 . . . x2k
...
...
...
. . .
...
1 xn1 xn2 . . . xnk

 ∈ Rn×(k+1) , (6.1)
and is conventionally augmented by a column of ones, xi0 = 1, for reasons that will soon become
apparent. The data contained in the design matrixX can be eithermetrically scaled, or of a binary
nature as arising from indicator variables that take values in the set {0, 1}.
In the model-building process, the data for the independent variables will be employed as predic-
tors, and, typically, no assumptions are made concerning their distributional origin, or as to the
accuracy of their measurement. Potential problems are associated with the metrical data in the de-
sign matrixX . When multicollinearity abounds, the posterior predictive accuracy of a statistical
model is weakened from the outset; see, e.g., McElreath (2016) [68, Sec. 5.3.]. Multicollinearity
amounts to redundant information in theX-data that is due to strong bivariate correlations between
some of the metrically scaled “independent variables.” It has the effect that posterior probability
distributions for model parameters become unnecessarily spread out more strongly, and so uncer-
tainty will increase. The inclusion of redundant information in the model-building process should
thus be avoided. In the following we will assume that bivariate correlations in the metrical part of
theX-data are negligibly small.
Next, a vector of k + 1 real-valued regression coefficients is introduced by
β :=


β0
β1
...
βk

 ∈ R(k+1)×1 , (6.2)
so that arbitrary linear combinations of the data for the independent variables can be represented
by the matrix product
Xβ . (6.3)
The n measured values {yi}i=1,...,n for the single dependent variable are assembled in a vector
y :=


y1
y2
...
yn

 ∈ Rn×1 . (6.4)
The y-data may be discrete or continuous, it may be binary by nature, represent counts, or take
any real value from a pre-specified range. The data for the dependent variable y is to be predicted
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from the data for the independent variables contained inX via the statistical model one seeks to
construct. In describing the model-building process, we will limit considerations to the discussion
of additivemain effects of the independent variables, and point to the literature for the numerous
possibilities of including non-additive interaction effects. The latter are to be seen as an option
for devising statistical models of a higher degree of flexibility, though at the price of being more
difficult to interpret.
In generalised linear models (GLM), the relationship between the dependent variable y and the
independent variables contained inX need no longer be linear, nor does the dispersion of the data
have to be of the Gaußian type; see Nelder and Wedderburn (1972) [74], Lee (2012) [63, Sec. 6.7],
Gelman et al (2014) [35, Ch. 16], Kruschke (2015) [58, Sec. 15.4], Gill (2015) [39, App. A], or
McElreath (2016) [68, Sec. 9.2.]. GLM exhibit a generic two-level structure, comprising both a
deterministic and a probabilistic component. These are given by
E(y|X,β, dispersion parameter(s), I) = f−1 (Xβ) =: µ (6.5)
y|X,β, dispersion parameter(s), I ind∼ pdf (µ, dispersion parameter(s)) ; (6.6)
Eq. (6.5) relates the expectation value µ for y to the deterministic linear form Xβ via a con-
tinuously differentiable and invertible scalar-valued inverse link function, f−1, while Eq. (6.6)
represents a suitable total-data likelihood function for the y-data-generating process, which, be-
sides µ, may also depend on some dispersion parameter(s).
In preparation of the subsequent discussion on the application of iterative numerical simulations
for advancing the building of a statistical model, we draw the reader’s attention to the empirical
fact that standardisation of the metrically scaled components in the y- and X-data, and, con-
sequently, of the related regression coefficients β, renders iterative numerical simulations more
efficient by reducing autocorrelation in the sampling outcomes. This immediately improves the
mixing properties of the sampling outcomes, and, ultimately, the overall numerical stability
of the approximative solutions for posterior probability distributions; cf. Kruschke (2015) [58,
Sec. 17.2] and McElreath (2016) [68, p 226]. Standardisation amounts to a homogenisation of
scales. It proves to be a straightforward algebraical exercise to transform back variables and model
parameters from standardised scales to original scales, once simulations have been completed.
6.2 Monte Carlo sampling algorithms
The Polish–US-American mathematician and nuclear physicist
Stanislaw Marcin Ulam (1909–1984) and the Hungarian–US-American mathematician, physicist
and computer scientist John von Neumann (1903–1957) pioneered the development of a family
of algorithmic techniques that have come to be known across the empirical scientific disciplines
as Monte Carlo simulations. For their numerical experiments these researchers employed the
first generation of computers. The specific term “Monte Carlo” (MC) was coined as a code name
for undisclosed activities in a joint paper by Metropolis and Ulam (1949) [70]. It is a historical
fact that the first powerful simulation algorithms were a spin-off of intense conceptual research
work at Los Alamos National Laboratory, NM, USA during the 1940ies and 1950ies which was
invested with the aim of acquiring nuclear fission and fusion bombs.
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The developments on the algorithmic front were followed from the 1990ies onwards by revolu-
tionising technological advances in the hardware sector that triggered an incredible boost of com-
puting power on standard household notebooks and similar computing devices.1 With boundary
conditions so hospitable to transformation, the ensuing Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
simulation techniques and their integration into the Bayes–Laplace approach to data analysis
and statistical inference were offered a real chance to excel. The term “Markov Chain” refers to
the property of the algorithms driving the simulations that an iteration step in a multi-dimensional
parameter space to a new position depends only on the present position, and not on any earlier po-
sitions. The targeted high-dimensional, stationary posterior joint probability distribution used
in inductive statistical inference is gradually built over typically thousands of iteration steps.
There are three types of MCMC sampling algorithms that find widespread use in statistical model-
building:
1. The Metropolis–Hastings (MH) sampling algorithm was originally put forward in the
paper by Metropolis et al (1953) [71], and significantly upgraded by Hastings (1970) [43]
nearly two decades later. The basic principles of MH sampling are nicely explained and
motivated with simple simulations by Kruschke (2015) [58, Sec. 7.2] and by McElreath
(2016) [68, Sec. 8.2.]. Full details of the MH sampling algorithm are given by Greenberg
(2013) [41, Sec. 7.2] and by Gill (2015) [39, Sec. 10.4].
Some MH routines are contained in the R package MCMCpack by Martin et al (2011) [67].
Given how the core proposal distribution, the acceptance ratio and the decision rule are
designed to operate, the MH sampling algorithm does not necessarily update simulated pa-
rameter values and their associated posterior joint probability distribution in every iteration
step; it so proves computationally less efficient.
2. The Gibbs sampling algorithm,2 a special case of the MH sampling algorithm, was de-
veloped by Geman and Geman (1984) [36], and popularised through an influential review
paper by Gelfand and Smith (1990) [31]. This method requires as input a complete set of
analytically expressible full conditional probability distributions for all the model parame-
ters involved. The simulated parameter values and their associated conditional probability
distributions are being updated in cyclical order, one in every iteration step, while holding
the remaining ones fixed. Consequently, the targeted posterior joint probability distribution
is improved in every iteration step and no computing time is squandered. The Gibbs sam-
pling algorithm is up to now the most frequently employed MCMC simulation method. Full
details of its structure are given by Greenberg (2013) [41, Sec. 7.1] and by Gill (2015) [39,
Sec. 10.3].
The MRC Biostatistics Unit at the University of Cambridge, UK spearheaded the dis-
semination of the Gibbs sampling algorithm with their BUGS (“Bayesian inference Us-
ing Gibbs Sampling”) project. The BUGS code is freely available from the website
1To put this into perspective: today, for example, every average mobile telephone outperforms by a
few orders of magnitude the gigantic computing machines that were available to NASA when landing hu-
man beings on the Moon during the late 1960ies and early 1970ies. See URL (cited on August 7, 2018):
www.zmescience.com/research/technology/smartphone-power-compared-to-apollo-432/.
2Named after the US-American scientist Josiah Willard Gibbs (1839–1903).
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www.mrc-bsu.cam.ac.uk/software/bugs/, and its use is described by Lunn et
al (2000) [66]. A closely related product is the GNU-licensed software package JAGS (“Just
Another Gibbs Sampler”) developed by Martyn Plummer that is available from the web-
site mcmc-jags.sourceforge.net; see Plummer (2016, 2017) [83, 84]. JAGS can
be operated in an R environment upon loading the packages rjags and coda; cf. Plum-
mer (2016) [83] and Plummer et al (2006) [85]. The R package runjags by Denwood
(2016) [17] offers the possibility for parallel MCMC generation with JAGS by activating
more than one processor on the computing device one uses for the simulation.
3. The Hamiltonian Monte Carlo (HMC) sampling algorithm was devised by Duane et al
(1987) [18] for simulating the quantum dynamic motion of nuclear particles that are sub-
jected to the strong nuclear force. In broad terms, the method models a trapped massive
quantum point particle that is moving under the influence of an external attractive potential.
The acceleration experienced by such a particle is proportional to the local spatial gradient
(“slope”) of the external potential. When adapted to the type of simulations needed in sta-
tistical modelling, one finds that the HMC sampling algorithm traverses a high-dimensional
parameter space and scales a posterior joint probability distribution much more efficiently
than either of the HM and Gibbs variants. This is of great advantage especially when simulat-
ing very complex, multi-level hierarchical models. Qualitative details of the HMC sampling
algorithm are described by Kruschke (2015) [58, Sec. 14.1] and by McElreath (2016) [68,
Sec. 8.2.].
The leading implementation of the HMC sampling algorithm is the Stan code distributed
freely by the Stan Development Team (mc-stan.org); cf. Stan Development Team
(2017) [94]. Its operation in an R environment requires installation of the package rstan,
also programmed by the Stan Development Team (2018) [95].
On the technical side it is worthwhile pointing out that in order to maintain numerical stability and
accuracy the implementations of all three types of MCMC sampling algorithms operate with the
natural logarithms of likelihood functions and prior and posterior probability distributions. In this
way it is possible to handle successfully extremely tiny probability values as they are commonplace
when probability needs to be spread out across multiple directions in a high-dimensional parameter
space.
The application of one of the MC sampling algorithms in this list, e.g., when operating their im-
plementation in an R environment, yields a discretised approximation to the targeted posterior
joint probability distribution for a usually large set of unknown model parameters. Concep-
tually these discretised approximations to a posterior joint probability distribution, determined by
Eq. (1.24), constitute higher-dimensional generalisations of the very structure of the contingency
table displayed in Tab. 1.1.
6.3 MCMC simulations with JAGS
In this section we will now describe how to construct some standard GLMs from empirical data
and relevant background information by means of MCMC simulations in JAGS, when operated
from R. We give the corresponding commands for HMC simulations in Stan in App. B.
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The process of building a statistical model from MCMC simulations comprises four main steps:
1. model specification
2. model fitting
3. model assessing
4. model application
We will here focus on the first three.
Before looking into the details, we briefly comment on the way continuously varying quantities
of interest can be numerically approximated using the output of MCMC simulations. Probability-
weighted integrals of continuous functions f of a single model parameter θ are approximated by
(see Gill (2015) [39, Eq. (9.3)] or Kruschke (2015) [58, Eq. (10.7)])
∫
θ range
f(θ)P (θ|I) dθ ≈ 1
n
n∑
θi∼P (θ|I)
f(θi) , (6.7)
where n denotes the total number of values θi sampled from the numerically simulated distribution
P (θ|I). The principle of approximation underlying this relation can be transferred to obtaining
from the output of MCMC simulations discretised versions of the higher-dimensional integrals
over the multivariateposterior joint probability distribution that express the univariate posterior
marginal probability distributions for each of the k + 1 model parameters βi ∈ {β0, . . . , βk}.
This is given by
P (βi|y,X, I) =
∫
· · ·
∫
βj 6=βi
P (β0, . . . , βk|y,X, I) dβ0 · · ·dβk︸ ︷︷ ︸
k β−integrations over posterior joint distribution, excluding βi
(6.8)
≈
n∑
β0∼P (β|y,X,I)
. . .
n∑
βk∼P (β|y,X,I)
P (β0, . . . , βk|y,X, I)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
k β−summations over posterior joint distribution, excluding βi
, (6.9)
which, conceptually, corresponds to a direct application of the marginalisation rule that was
illustrated in Tab. 1.1 of Ch. 1. P (β0, . . . , βk|y,X, I) denotes the numerically simulated posterior
joint probability distribution.
So now let us address the main elements of MCMC simulations of posterior probability distri-
butions with JAGS, and how the output so obtained can be checked for reliability.3 Comment lines
in JAGS code are to be preceded by a hashtag symbol “#,” in full analogy to comment lines in R
code. Please refer to the JAGS user manual by Plummer (2017) [84, Sec. 4] for further information
on running JAGS from R.
3For HMC simulations with Stan from R, McElreath makes available an easy to use routine called map2stan,
which is contained in his package rethinking; see McElreath (2016) [69].
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6.3.1 Specification of empirical data
We begin by loading into R the empirical data to be analysed, assuming that it does
not contain missing values and that it is available in a data file of the *.csv-format. If
the data file is in a different format, the R Data Import/Export manual at the website
cran.r-project.org/doc/manuals/r-release/R-data.html advises the reader
on how to proceed. The empirical data typically comprises measurements for a single dependent
variable y and for k ∈ N independent variables which have been gathered in a matrixX(here, for
simplicity, without a first column worth of ones!). The sample size be n ∈ N. For the performance
of MCMC simulations with JAGS, we also have to load the R package rjags. All of this infor-
mation is communicated to R via the code below, as well as specifying the number of independent
groups from which data was obtain, should this option apply to the case at hand.
Listing 6.1: Gibbs sampling with JAGS in R: specification of empirical data.
# Load R package rjags
library("rjags")
# Load a specific data set from a *.csv file, creating a R data.frame
dataSet = read.csv( "<filename.csv>" , header = TRUE )
# Identify dependent and independent variables, sample size,
# number of independent variables, number of groups
y = dataSet[,"yVarName"]
X = as.matrix( dataSet[,c("xVarName1", ..., "xVarNamek")] , ncol = k )
nSample = length(y)
nIndVars = ncol(X)
gp = as.numeric( dataSet[,"groupVarName"] ) # if relevant
nGroups = length( unique(gp) ) # if relevant
# Specify data list for JAGS simulations
dataList = list(
nSample = nSample ,
nIndVars = nIndVars ,
nGroups = nGroups , # if relevant
y = y ,
X = X , # capital X!
gp = gp # if relevant
)
6.3.2 Standardisation and specification of single-datum likelihood function
and of prior probability distributions
In the next block of JAGS code in R, the metrically scaled and binary indicator data in the y-
and X-input is subjected to standardisation for reasons given in Sec. 6.1. Foremost, the next
block specifies for a statistical model to be fitted to the empirical data the single-datum likelihood
function and the prior probability distribution for every single model parameter. Note that the
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prior probability distributions enter the MCMC simulations of the multivariate posterior joint
probability distribution only once, while the empirical data as a whole enters via the single-
datum likelihood function a total of n times. The data and model blocks together need to be
enclosed in an R string command as shown below.
Listing 6.2: Gibbs sampling with JAGS in R: standardisation of metrically scaled empirical data
and specification of single-datum likelihood function and of prior probability distributions for
model parameters.
# JAGS data transformation and model: use a string command in R
modelString = "<following specifications to be inserted here>"
data {
# Standardisation of dependent variable data
...
# Standardisation of independent variables data
...
}
model {
for ( i in 1:nSample ) {
# Specify single-datum likelihood function
y[i] ˜ likelihoodFunction( parameter 1 , ... ,
parameter k+1 )
# Specify inverse link function, when applicable
mu[i] <- ...
# Specify prior distributions for k+1 model parameters
parameter 1 ˜ priorDistribution 1
...
parameter k+1 ˜ priorDistribution k+1
}
}
6.3.3 Initialisation of MCMC simulations
The user may specify for theMCMC simulations with JAGS initial values for all model parameters.
This option is optional. It can be a useful corrective tool, e.g., when one finds that the MCMC
simulations have difficulties in locating the maximum of a unimodal posterior joint probability
distribution. Most importantly, however, in this block the user specifies the number of Markov
chains to be simulated.
Listing 6.3: Gibbs sampling with JAGS in R: specifying initial values for model parameters and
initialisation of MCMC simulations.
# Set initial values for k+1 model parameters (optional)
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initList = function() {
list(
"parameter 1" = <value> , # parameter names in quotation marks
... ,
"parameter k+1" = <value>
)
}
# Initialise random number generator so simulations can be
# reproduced (optional)
set.seed(<positiveInteger>)
# Initialisation of JAGS simulations
modelJAGS = jags.model(
textConnection(modelString) ,
data = dataList ,
inits = initList , # (optional)
n.chains = <number of Markov chains to be generated>
)
6.3.4 Gibbs MCMC sampling
Now the core of the MCMC simulations with JAGS follows. When the MCMC simulations have
successfully initialised in the previous step, first a burn-in period with on the order of one thou-
sand iterations or more is activated. This gives the Gibbs sampler in JAGS the chance to find the
stationary distribution that is to approximate the multivariate posterior joint probability distri-
bution of interest. The data generated in this run is being discarded. The actual simulated data
to be used for inference is then generated and stored in a subsequent step. In particular, the user
specifies explicitly by name those model parameters for which she/he wants to obtain a MCMC
sample representation of the associated univariate posterior marginal probability distribution.
They also specify the number of iterations per Markov chain to be generated. The thin option
provides a tool for reacting to simulations that show a high degree of autocorrelation in the gener-
ated Markov chains. Finally, it is of some practical use to merge the simulated data from multiple
Markov chains in a single output in a matrix-valued MCMC object.
Listing 6.4: Gibbs sampling with JAGS in R: performance of burn-in and MCMC sampling.
# Burn-in period
update( modelJAGS , n.iter = <number of burn-in iterations> )
# Execution of JAGS simulations: saving simulated posterior samples;
# names of sampled parameters to be enclosed in quotation marks
modSim = coda.samples(
model = modelJAGS ,
variable.names = c( "parameter 1" , ... , "parameter k+1" ) ,
n.iter = <number of iterations> ,
thin = <step size for thinning> # default: 1
72 CHAPTER 6. FITTING AND ASSESSING GENERALISED LINEAR MODELS
)
# Merging JAGS simulated posterior samples from different runs
modCsim = as.mcmc( do.call( rbind , modSim ) )
6.3.5 Analysis of convergence properties of Markov chains
Tools for the analysis of the convergence properties of the MCMC simulations with JAGS are
contained in the R package coda by Plummer et al (2006) [85], which is automatically loaded
when calling the package rjags. These tools comprise a visualisation of the convergence and
mixing properties of the Markov chains for each model parameter by means of trace plots, the
calculation of the value of the benchmark Gelman–Rubin convergence diagnostic (which should
be as close to the value 1 as possible), the determination of the degree of autocorrelation in the
Markov chains for each model parameter, and the related effective MC sample size.
Listing 6.5: Gibbs sampling with JAGS in R: convergence diagnostics.
# Trace plots of MC chains for each parameter simulation
plot( modSim , ask = TRUE )
# Gelman-Rubin diagnostic for each parameter simulation
# (should be very close to 1)
gelman.diag(modSim)
# Autocorrelation of MC chains for each parameter simulation
# (should decline rapidly)
autocorr.diag(modSim)
autocorr.plot(modSim)
# Effective MC sample size for each parameter simulation
# (the larger, the better)
effectiveSize(modSim)
6.3.6 Description of posterior probability distributions
In the last block of JAGS code in R to be described here, properties of the MCMC sample represen-
tation of the univariate posterior marginal probability distribution for each model parameter,
and of the bivariate correlations between the latter are made explicit. This comprises information
on the values of the mean, standard deviation, and some selected quantiles, the plotting of the
graph of the pdf, and the determination of the limits of highest posterior density intervals, the
default setting for the probability enclosed of which is 95%. In addition, the bivariate correlation
matrix for the simulated model parameters is calculated, and mutual dependencies visualised via a
scatter plot matrix.
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Listing 6.6: Gibbs sampling with JAGS in R: description of posterior marginal probability distri-
butions and of bivariate correlations.
# Summary of simulated posterior marginal for each parameter
summary(modSim)
# Scanning merged JAGS simulated posterior samples
head( as.matrix(modCsim) )
tail( as.matrix(modCsim) )
# Plotting simulated posterior marginal for each parameter
densplot( modCsim[,"parameter 1"] )
...
densplot( modCsim[,"parameter k+1"] )
# Highest posterior density interval for each parameter; default: 95%
HPDinterval(modCsim)
# Bivariate correlation matrix for parameter simulations
cor( as.matrix(modCsim) )
# Bivariate scatter plot matrix for parameter simulations
pairs( as.matrix(modCsim) )
We will leave the MCMC simulations with JAGS of posterior predictive distributions until later.
6.4 Linear regression
As a first specific application of MCMC simulations with JAGS in R, we turn to address linear
regression. This serves to model a linear relationship between data y for a single metrically scaled
dependent variable, and data for k ∈ N independent variables contained inX , which may either be
metrically scaled, or binary indicators. Many examples with one or more independent variables can
be found in the discussions given by Sivia and Skilling (2006) [92, Subsec. 3.5.1], Albert (2009) [2,
Sec. 9.2], Kruschke et al (2012) [59], Lee (2012) [63, Sec. 6.3], Greenberg [41, Sec. 8.1], Gelman
et al (2014) [35, Ch. 14], Andreon and Weaver (2015) [4, Ch. 8], Kruschke (2015) [58, Ch. 18], or
McElreath (2016) [68, Sec. 4.4.].
One of the most frequently encountered approaches to devising a linear regression model is to start
from a maximum entropy perspective and choose a Gauß single-datum likelihood function accord-
ing to Eq. (2.21), with a homogeneous variance, and supplement it with a conditionally conjugate
Gauß–inverse Gamma prior joint probability distribution for the unknown model parameters β
and σ2, in analogy to the application discussed in Sec. 5.2. The assumption of homogeneous
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variance is commonly known as homoscedasticity. We thus obtain
likelihood: y|X,β, σ2, I ind∼ N (µ, σ2) (6.10)
inverse link function: µ = Xβ (6.11)
priors: β0|σ2 ∼ N
(
µ0, σ
2
0
)
(for intercept) (6.12)
β|σ2 ∼ N (0, τ 20 ) (6.13)
σ2 ∼ IG (α0, δ0) , (6.14)
where µ0, σ
2
0 , τ
2
0 , α0 and δ0 denote fixed hyperparameters of the conditionally conjugate Gauß–
inverse Gamma prior joint probability distribution. Note that in Eq. (6.13) zero-centred Gauß prior
probability distributions were specified for the unknown regression coefficients β, apart from β0.
This choice is to represent scepticism as to the presence of any of these regression coefficients in a
best-fit model.
Presently the identity map
y = z (6.15)
is selected as inverse link function according to Eq. (6.5), i.e., f−1 (Xβ) = Xβ.4 This map is
depicted in Fig. 6.1.
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Figure 6.1: Plot of the identity map (6.15).
In the following we give the code for the specification in JAGS of a linear regression model,
employing standardised metrically scaled variables, and a homogeneous variance and fixed prior
4Of course, the link function itself is likewise an identity map: Xβ = f(µ) = µ.
6.4. LINEAR REGRESSION 75
probability distributions for the model parameters. Note that in JAGS Gauß distributions are
parametrised in terms of the precision, which is the inverse of the variance. Hence, a Gamma
prior probability distribution will be fixed for this parameter. We confine our consideration to the
inclusion of additivemain effects of the independent variables, but point to the numerous possibil-
ities of rendering the model more flexible by including also multiplicative interaction terms for
the independent variables.
Listing 6.7: Gibbs sampling with JAGS in R: model specification for linear regression.
# JAGS model: all of the following code needs to be embedded in a
# modelString = "..." command in R
data {
# Standardisation of dependent variable data
yMean <- mean(y)
yStdev <- sd(y)
for ( i in 1:nSample ) {
zy[i] <- ( y[i] - yMean ) / yStdev
}
# Standardisation of independent variables data
for ( j in 1:nIndVars ) {
xMean[j] <- mean(X[,j]) # capital X!
xStdev[j] <- sd(X[,j])
for ( i in 1:nSample ) {
zX[i,j] <- ( X[i,j] - xMean[j] ) / xStdev[j]
}
}
}
model {
# likelihood (w/ homoscedasticity assumption)
for ( i in 1:nSample ) {
zy[i] ˜ dnorm( zmu[i] , zprec ) # precison parameter!
# inverse link function
zmu[i] <- zb0 + sum( zb[1:nIndVars] * zX[i,1:nIndVars] )
}
# priors
zb0 ˜ dnorm( 0 , 1/1ˆ2 ) # regularising
for ( j in 1:nIndVars ) {
zb[j] ˜ dnorm( 0 , 1/1ˆ2 ) # regularising
}
zprec ˜ dgamma( <alpha0> , <delta0> )
zsigma <- sqrt( 1 / zprec )
# De-standardisation of model parameters
b[1:nIndVars] <- ( zb[1:nIndVars] / xStdev[1:nIndVars] )
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* yStdev # take care of linebreak!
b0 <- zb0 * yStdev + yMean
- sum( zb[1:nIndVars] * xMean[1:nIndVars] / xStdev[1:nIndVars] )
* yStdev # take care of linebreak!
sigma <- zsigma * yStdev
}
The corresponding code for the specification of a linear regression model in Stan when intending
to perform HMC sampling is given in App. B.1.
When there is a need to deal with outliers in the y-data, one might resort to a non-central t–
single-datum likelihood function according to Eq. (2.26), and then specify an additional fixed
prior probability distribution for the degrees of freedom parameter ν ≥ 1; e.g., an exponential
distribution from the family defined by Eq. (2.33).
6.5 ANOVA-like regression
Now we describe coding MCMC simulations with JAGS in R for ANOVA-like regression. This
serves to model a linear relationship between data y for a single metrically scaled dependent vari-
able, and data g for a qualitative variable which can take values in k ∈ N non-ordered cate-
gories. This method is useful when the researcher’s objective is to compare distributional features
of one and the same metrically scaled variable between several independent groups. Examples can
be found in the discussions given, e.g., by Lee (2012) [63, Sec. 6.5], Gelman et al (2014) [35,
Sec. 15.6], and Kruschke (2015) [58, Ch. 19].
Again, taking the maximum entropy perspective, one chooses a Gauß single-datum likelihood
function according to Eq. (2.21), with a homogeneous variance, and specifies a conditionally con-
jugate Gauß–inverse Gamma prior joint probability distribution for the unknown location parame-
ters µg and the scale parameter σ
2. Adopting the cell means view of ANOVA-like regression, this
gives
likelihood: y| g, µg, σ2, I ind∼ N
(
µg, σ
2
)
(6.16)
priors: µg| g, σ2, I ∼ N
(
0, σ20
)
(6.17)
σ2
∣∣ g, I ∼ IG (α0, β0) , (6.18)
where σ20 , α0 and β0 denote fixed hyperparameters of the conditionally conjugate Gauß–inverse
Gamma prior joint probability distribution. Note that in Eq. (6.17) zero-centred Gauß prior proba-
bility distributions were specified for the unknown regression coefficients µg.
In the code for the specification in JAGS of an ANOVA-like regression model in the cell means
view, we employ the homoscedasticity assumption and fixed prior probability distributions for the
model parameters. Note that in JAGSGauß distributions are parametrised in terms of the precision.
Hence, a Gamma prior probability distribution will be fixed for this parameter. Experience shows
that for the present kind of statistical models the Markov chains generated by the Gibbs algorithm
are usually not plagued with autocorrelation, so there is no need for standardising the metrically
scaled y-data.
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Listing 6.8: Gibbs sampling with JAGS in R: model specification for ANOVA-like regression in
the cell means view.
# JAGS model: the following code needs to be embedded in a
# modelString = "..." command in R
model {
# likelihood (cell means model w/ homoscedasticity assumption)
for ( i in 1:nSample ) {
y[i] ˜ dnorm( mu[gp[i]] , prec )
}
# priors
for ( j in 1:nGroups ) {
mu[j] ˜ dnorm( 0 , 1/<sigma0>ˆ2 )
}
prec ˜ dgamma( <alpha0> , <beta0> )
sigma <- sqrt( 1 / prec )
}
The corresponding code for the specification of an ANOVA-like regression model in Stan when
intending to perform HMC sampling is given in App. B.2.
If the group-specific y-data contains outliers, the single-datum likelihood function may be re-
placed by a non-central t–distribution according to Eq. (2.26). Also, the available y-data may
suggest that an assumption of heteroscedasticity is more realistic. In this case, one specifies an
adaptive prior probability distribution for the scale parameter σ2. This case will be addressed in
Sec. 8.2.
As this fits the present discussion, we remark that the Bayes–Laplace analogue of the frequentist
Student’s independent samples t–test has been developed by Go¨nen et al (2005) [40]. Further ap-
plications and implementations in R are given by Kruschke (2013) [57] and Kruschke (2015) [58,
Sec. 16.3].
6.6 Logistic regression
When the research objective is to explain the dependency of count data with a known finite maxi-
mum of n ∈ N on a set of k ∈ N either metrically scaled or binary indicator independent variables,
logistic regression is the standard tool for model-building. We will here sketch the way of in-
tegrating this technique into MCMC simulations with JAGS in R. Many interesting examples of
applications can be found in Albert (2009) [2, Sec. 4.4], Lee (2012) [63, Subec. 9.8.1], Green-
berg [41, Subsec. 8.2.3], Gelman et al (2014) [35, Sec.16.3], Kruschke (2015) [58, Ch. 21], or
McElreath (2016) [68, Sec. 10.1.].
The maximum entropy perspective suggests to capture the individual instant of whether a count
was observed or not by a Bernoulli single-datum likelihood function according to Eq. (2.4), so
that, overall, a binomial total-data likelihood function according to Eq. (2.9) abounds as describ-
ing the data-generating process for the total count. Contrary to linear regression and ANOVA-like
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regression discussed in Secs. 6.4 and 6.5 above, these likelihood functions have no explicit depen-
dence on a dispersion parameter. In addition, it is meaningful to assign zero-centred Gauß prior
probability distributions for the unknown regression coefficients β, a choice we will comment on
shortly. The standard set-up for logistic regression is given by
likelihood: y|X,β, I ind∼ Bin (θ) (6.19)
inverse link function: θ = logistic (Xβ) (6.20)
priors: β ∼ N (0, σ20) , (6.21)
where σ20 denotes a fixed hyperparameter of the Gauß prior probability distributions.
In logistic regression the standard logistic function
y = logistic(z) =
1
1 + e−z
(6.22)
serves as the inverse link function according to Eq. (6.5), i.e., f−1 (Xβ) = logistic (Xβ).5 This
map is depicted in Fig. 6.2. The standard logistic function maps the unbounded real-valued linear
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Figure 6.2: Plot of the standard logistic function (6.22).
formXβ to the interval [0, 1]. With the ranges of possible values now coinciding, the transformed
linear form, logistic (Xβ), can be related directly to the (dimensionless) probability for “success”
5The link function itself is given by the logit function:Xβ = f(θ) = ln
(
θ
1− θ
)
.
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parameter θ. A particular feature of logistic regression is the general choice of a “zero log-odds”
reference baseline,
0
!
= ln
(
θ
1− θ
)
=Xβ ⇔ θ = 1
2
, (6.23)
i.e., equal probabilities for the binary outcomes “failure” or “success” according to Bernoulli’s
“principle of non-sufficient reason” of Sec. 3.1. For non-zero data, X 6= 0, the implication is
β = 0, explaining the zero-centring of the Gauß prior probability distributions.
The code for the specification in JAGS of a logistic regression model with fixed prior probability
distributions for the model parameters is given in the following.
Listing 6.9: Gibbs sampling with JAGS in R: model specification for logistic regression.
# JAGS model: all of the following code needs to be embedded in a
# modelString = "..." command in R
data {
# Standardisation of independent variables data
for ( j in 1:nIndVars ) {
xMean[j] <- mean(X[,j]) # capital X!
xStdev[j] <- sd(X[,j])
for ( i in 1:nSample ) {
zX[i,j] <- ( X[i,j] - xMean[j] ) / xStdev[j]
}
}
}
model {
# likelihood: Bernoulli single-datum
for ( i in 1:nSample ) {
y[i] ˜ dbern( theta[i] )
# inverse link function
theta[i] <- ilogit( zb0
+ sum( zb[1:nIndVars] * zX[i,1:nIndVars] ) )
# take care of linebreak!
}
# priors: zero-centred
zb0 ˜ dnorm( 0 , 1/1ˆ2 ) # regularising
for ( j in 1:nIndVars ) {
zb[j] ˜ dnorm( 0 , 1/1ˆ2 ) # regularising
}
# De-standardisation of model parameters
b[1:nIndVars] <- zb[1:nIndVars] / xStdev[1:nIndVars]
b0 <- zb0
- sum( zb[1:nIndVars] * xMean[1:nIndVars] / xStdev[1:nIndVars] )
# take care of linebreak!
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}
The corresponding code for the specification of a logistic regression model in Stan when intending
to perform HMC sampling is given in App. B.3.
6.7 Poisson regression
Qualitatively different to the previous case is the situation when the empirical data to be explained
is count data with an unknown maximum. To model the respective data-generating process in
dependence of a set of k ∈ N either metrically scaled or binary indicator independent variables,
it is best practice to employ Poisson regression. The implementation of corresponding MCMC
simulations with JAGS in R will be the topic of this section. Many practical applications of this
technique to interesting research problems are outlined by Sivia and Skilling (2006) [92, Sec. 3.1],
Albert (2009) [2, Sec. 11.4], Gelman et al (2014) [35, Sec. 16.4], Andreon and Weaver (2015) [4,
Subsec. 6.1.2], or McElreath (2016) [68, Sec. 10.2.]. Kruschke (2015) [58, Ch. 24] discusses a
count data case with two nominally scaled independent variables, which amounts to the analysis of
data from a contingency table. Methodologically, this case can be broadly likened to a frequentist
χ2–test of independence.
Like all the methods of regression analysis discussed in this chapter, Poisson regression takes
a prime motivation from a maximum entropy perspective. Hence the choice of a Poisson single-
datum likelihood function according to Eq. (2.15), which represents a particular state of ignorance.
It has no explicit dependence on a dispersion parameter. Again, we select zero-centred Gauß prior
probability distributions for the unknown regression coefficients β to express scepticism as to their
presence in a best-fit model. A resultant common set-up for Poisson regression is given by
likelihood: θ|X,β, I ind∼ Pois (θ) (6.24)
inverse link function: θ = exp (Xβ) (6.25)
priors: β ∼ N (0, σ20) , (6.26)
where σ20 is a fixed hyperparameter of the Gauß prior probability distributions.
In Poisson regression the natural exponential function
y = exp (z) (6.27)
serves as the inverse link function according to Eq. (6.5), i.e., f−1 (Xβ) = exp (Xβ).6 This map
is depicted in Fig. 6.3. The natural exponential function maps the unbounded real-valued linear
form Xβ to the interval (0,∞). The transformed linear form, exp (Xβ), can thus be directly
related to the non-negative dimensionless rate parameter θ. The choice of zero-centred Gauß prior
probability distributions for the β implies via the link function:
β = 0 , X 6= 0 ⇔ ln(θ) = 0 ⇒ θ = 1 ; (6.28)
6The link function itself is given by the natural logarithmic function:Xβ = f(θ) = ln (θ).
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Figure 6.3: Plot of the natural exponential function (6.27).
the order-of-magnitute of θ is the information that is most relevant in Poisson data-generating
processes.
Often in practical applications this parameter is given a product structure θ = τλ, with the un-
derstanding that the dimensionful exposure τ amounts to available empirical data, while λ is the
unknown dimensionful rate parameter. The inverse link function then becomes λ =
1
τ
exp (Xβ).
The code for the specification in JAGS of a Poisson regression model with fixed prior probabil-
ity distributions for the model parameters is to follow. Note that we have included (but currently
commented out) the alternative model specification for operating with exposures τ and a rate pa-
rameter λ.
Listing 6.10: Gibbs sampling with JAGS in R: model specification for Poisson regression.
# JAGS model: all of the following code needs to be embedded in a
# modelString = "..." command in R
data {
# Standardisation of independent variables data
for ( j in 1:nIndVars ) {
xMean[j] <- mean(X[,j]) # capital X!
xStdev[j] <- sd(X[,j])
for ( i in 1:nSample ) {
zX[i,j] <- ( X[i,j] - xMean[j] ) / xStdev[j]
}
}
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}
model {
# likelihood
for ( i in 1:nSample ) {
y[i] ˜ dpois( theta[i] )
#y[i] ˜ dpois( lambda[i] )
# inverse link function
theta[i] <- exp( zb0
+ sum( zb[1:nIndVars] * zX[i,1:nIndVars] ) )
# take care of linebreak!
#lambda[i] <- (1/tau[i]) * exp( zb0
#+ sum( zb[1:nIndVars] * zX[i,1:nIndVars] ) )
## take care of linebreak!
}
# priors
zb0 ˜ dnorm( 0 , 1/1ˆ2 ) # regularising
for ( j in 1:nIndVars ) {
zb[j] ˜ dnorm( 0 , 1/1ˆ2 ) # regularising
}
# De-standardisation of model parameters
b[1:nIndVars] <- zb[1:nIndVars] / xStdev[1:nIndVars]
b0 <- zb0
- sum( zb[1:nIndVars] * xMean[1:nIndVars] / xStdev[1:nIndVars] )
# take care of linebreak!
}
The corresponding code for the specification of a Poisson regression model in Stan when intending
to perform HMC sampling is given in App. B.4.
Should one find that the empirical count data that one analysed is over-dispersed, which manifests
itself by the property E(y|X,β, I)≪ Var(y|X,β, I) (when near equality was expected initially),
then a Gamma–Poisson mixture model is suggested as a viable alternative; cf., e.g., Gelman et
al (2014) [35, p 437f], or McElreath (2016) [68, p 350f]. The Gamma–Poisson probability
distribution is also referred to as negative binomial distribution.
R: dnbinom(yi, n, θ), pnbinom(yi, n, θ), qnbinom(p, n, θ), rnbinom(nsimulations, n, θ)
JAGS: dnegbin(θ, n) (sampling)
Stan: neg binomial(n, θ/(1− θ)) (sampling)
6.8 Exponential regression
The last type of regression analysis we want to introduce in this chapter is exponential regression.
This can be employed to explain data y for the lengths of temporal or spatial intervals, i.e., waiting
times or spatial distances, in terms of a set of k ∈ N either metrically scaled or binary indicator
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independent variables contained in X . Exponential regression is a rather “exotic type of regres-
sion” for reasons to be explained shortly, and is thus much less frequently encountered in practical
applications discussed in the literature. An example, nevertheless, can be found in Gill (2015) [39,
Sec. 12.4].
As outlined before in Sec. 3.3, also the exponential single-datum likelihood function is of a certain
maximum entropy kind, thus expressing a corresponding specific state of ignorance. It, too, fea-
tures no explicit dependence on a dispersion parameter. What complicates matters in the present
case is the choice of a reasonable inverse link function. The so-called canonical choice is guided
by the formal appearance of sufficient statistics in the total-data likelihood function (2.43) of mem-
bers of the exponential family; cf. Gelman et al (2014) [35, p 407]. This procedure, supplemented
by dimensional considerations for the positive rate parameter θ, leads to a negative inverse map,
i.e.,
y = − 1
z
, for z ∈ R\{0} , (6.29)
as the appropriate inverse link function. Excluding the singular argument of zero, the negative
inverse map sends the unbounded real-valued linear form Xβ to the split interval (−∞, 0) ∪
(0,+∞). Upon confinement to the negative regime of Xβ, it is thus possible to relate the trans-
formed linear form, −1/ (Xβ), directly to the dimensionful positive rate parameter θ. However,
as this imposes a very strong constraint on the range of values ofXβ, the number of applications
for this type of regression is rather small. The canonical inverse link function confined to its pos-
itive branch is depicted in Fig. 6.4.7 It should be stated that the canonical choice of inverse link
function is by no means mandatory.
Selecting truncated fixed Gauß prior probability distributions for the regression parameters β, and
assuming β ∈ R<0 andX ∈ R>0 so thatXβ ∈ R<0, the present set-up for exponential regression
is given by
likelihood: θ|X,β, I ind∼ Exp (θ) (6.30)
inverse link function: θ = − 1
Xβ
, with Xβ ∈ R<0 (6.31)
priors: β0|σ2 ∼ N
(
µ0, σ
2
0
)
, with µ0 ∈ R<0 (for intercept) (6.32)
β|σ2 ∼ N (0, τ 20 ) , with β ∈ R<0 , (6.33)
where µ0, σ
2
0 and τ
2
0 are fixed hyperparameters of the Gauß prior probability distributions.
We now give the code for the specification in JAGS of an exponential regression modelwith fixed
prior probability distributions for the model parameters. A special feature here is the truncation of
all Gauß prior probability distributions at their mode so that an upper limit for the range of allowed
parameter values is imposed.
Listing 6.11: Gibbs sampling with JAGS in R: model specification for exponential regression.
# JAGS model: the following code needs to be embedded in a
# modelString = "..." command in R
7The canonical link function itself is also given by a negative inverse map: Xβ = f(θ) = − 1
θ
.
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Figure 6.4: Plot of the negative inverse map (6.29) for z < 0.
model {
# likelihood
for ( i in 1:nSample ) {
y[i] ˜ dexp( theta[i] )
# inverse link function
theta[i] <- - 1 / ( b0 + sum( b[1:nIndVars]
* X[i,1:nIndVars] ) ) # take care of linebreak!
}
# priors
b0 ˜ dnorm( mu0 , 1/(sigma0)ˆ2 ) T(,mu0)
for ( j in 1:nIndVars ) {
b[j] ˜ dnorm( 0 , 1/(tau0)ˆ2 ) T(,0)
}
}
6.9 Simulating posterior predictive probability distributions
The researcher’s actual inferential work begins only when the model fitting process described in
the previous sections has been finalised and the outcome of this activity sufficiently validated. At
the centre of attention at this stage of inductive statistical inference are the posterior predictive
probability distributions for a dependent variable Y according to Eq. (1.28). Their special status
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arises out of the dual role a single-datum likelihood function takes from operating in two directions:
from an empirical datum to unknown model parameter values, and from known (simulated) model
parameter values back to a yet unobserved empirical datum; cf. McElreath (2016) [68, p 62]. In or-
der to evaluate the multi-dimensional integral of the single-datum likelihood function of a specific
data-generating process, weighted by the posterior joint probability distribution of the pro-
posed statistical model, over a (k+1)-dimensional parameter space on the basis of approximative
MCMC simulations, direct application of the discretised integration over a continuous parameter
according to Eq. (6.7) is imminent. By taking this action one averages the single-datum likelihood
function over the parameter space after relevant information from available empirical data has been
accounted for. Posterior predictive probability distributions combine observation uncertainty
with parameter uncertainty and so provide a fairly conservative representation of a researcher’s
state of knowledge on the given problem they subjected to statistical data analysis.
The main steps to be taken to gain MCMC simulations of posterior predictive probability dis-
tributions are as follows:
1. Evaluate the linear form Xβ from a researcher-specified design matrix Xnew for m cases
on k independent variables and the MCMC simulated regression parameters β.
2. Apply the inverse link function f−1 to the linear form Xnewβ to obtain the expectation
value µnew according to Eq. (6.5).
3. Sample repeatedly new values ynew for Y from the single-datum likelihood function with
the MCMC posterior settings for µnew and possible further dispersion parameters to obtain
simulated dependent data according to Eq. (6.6).
4. Visualise and summarise specific features of the MCMC simulated posterior predictive prob-
ability distributions for Y .
R code that can be employed for simulating and visualising in a histogram representation posterior
predictive probability distributions from user-specified input for k independent variables and the
MCMC data for k + 1 model parameters is provided next. Here we assume that the MCMC data
for the intercept parameter β0 is contained in the first column of the MCMC object “modCsim.”
In practice this could be different. Note that, as an important posterior predictive check, the code
also super-imposes the original y-data and their common sample mean on the histogram represen-
tation, so that potential inconsistencies of the model-fitting process such as problems related to
under-fitting or over-fitting become directly apparent.
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Listing 6.12: Gibbs sampling with JAGS in R: simulation of posterior predictive probability dis-
tributions.
# Record number of iterations performed in Gibbs MCMC sampling
(nIter <- nrow( modCsim))
# Specify values for m new cases on k independent variables
x1 <- c(<value 11>, <value 12>, ..., <value 1k>)
x2 <- c(<value 21>, <value 22>, ..., <value 2k>)
...
xm <- c(<value m1>, <value m2>, ..., <value mk>)
Xproxy <- cbind(x1, x2, ..., xm)
# Construct new design matrix
Xnew <- t( rbind( rep(1, nrow(Xproxy)) , Xproxy ) )
(nCases <- nrow(Xnew))
# Evaluate linear form from new design matrix and MCMC samples
# (i) Example: linear regression
mu <- Xnew %*% t( modCsim ) # intercept in modCsim[,1]
# (ii) Example: other GLM
linkmu <- Xnew %*% t( modCsim ) # intercept in modCsim[,1]
# Apply inverse link function to obtain mu
# Example: Poisson regression
mu <- exp( linkmu )
# Initialise matrix for simulated data for m cases on k variables
yNew <- matrix( rep( 0 , nIter*nCases ) , nrow = nIter ,
ncol = nCases , byrow = TRUE )
# Sample from likelihood function
# (i) Example: linear regression
for ( j in 1:nCases ) {
yNew[,j] <- rnorm( n = nIter , mean = mu[,j] , sd = modCsim[,"sig"] )
}
# (ii) Example: Poisson regression
for ( j in 1:nCases ) {
yNew[,j] <- rpois( n = nIter , lambda = mu[,j] )
}
# Scan, plot and summarise posterior predictive samples
head( yNew )
hist( yNew[,1] , freq = FALSE )
points( y , rep(0, nSample) , pch = 1 )
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points( mean(y) , 0 , pch = 19 )
hist( yNew[,2] , freq = FALSE )
points( y , rep(0, nSample) , pch = 1 )
points( mean(y) , 0 , pch = 19 )
...
hist( yNew[,m] , freq = FALSE )
points( y , rep(0, nSample) , pch = 1 )
points( mean(y) , 0 , pch = 19 )
summary( yNew[,1] , freq = FALSE )
summary( yNew[,2] , freq = FALSE )
...
summary( yNew[,m] , freq = FALSE )
An example of a histogram representation of a posterior predictive probability distributions for
the case of a main-effects linear regression model with fixed prior probability distributions for five
model parameters is displayed in Fig. 6.5.
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Figure 6.5: Example of the histogram representation of a simulated posterior predictive probability
distribution for a single new datum ynew in the case of a five-parameter, main-effects linear regres-
sion model. The underlying MCMC simulation of the posterior joint probability distribution for
the model parameters comprised 15,000 iterations. The original y-data points from a sample of
size n = 27, as well as their common sample mean, have been super-imposed on this histogram.
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If the data set available to the researcher is sufficiently large in size, it might be an option for
improving the quality of the model fit to follow the standard practice of supervised machine learn-
ing and split it into a training set (ca. 60%), a cross-validation set (ca. 20%), and a test set (ca.
20%). Here, parameter estimation is performed with the training set, while posterior predictive
accuracy is gauged with the remaining two sets. We point the reader to Gill (2015) [39, Sec. 6.4],
Kruschke (2015) [58, Sec. 17.5] and McElreath (2016) [68, Sec. 3.3] for further information on
simulating and interpreting posterior predictive probability distributions.
In the next chapter we will look at ways of discriminating between competing statistical models as
regards their performance in fitting empirical data and predicting yet unobserved new data.
Chapter 7
Model comparison and hypothesis testing
The comparison of statistical models that compete for an optimal fit to the same given set of
quantitative–empirical data is an essential issue of reliability assessment which needs to be ad-
dressed in inductive statistical inference. Concerning their main objectives, some parallels can
be drawn betweenmodel comparison in the Bayes–Laplace approach on the one-hand side, and
frequentist null hypothesis significance testing on the other, but the former operation is based on a
conceptually sound and transparent methodology, as we intend to sketch in this chapter.
In the Bayes–Laplace approach there have been developed two different kinds of frameworks to
capture the relative performance of two or more competing statistical models as regards quality of
model-fit attained, and their ensuing posterior predictive accuracy. The aim is to reduce poten-
tial over- and under-fitting of the data as much as possible. As, for a given research problem, no
statistical model that was built from relevant prior information and available empirical evidence
will ever be “correct” in the ontological sense, it is worthwhile considering the option of ultimately
drawing inferences from a model that was obtained from averaging over two or more of the com-
peting statistical models, should the fit of any of the models involved in the averaging process not
be entirely unacceptable. The weight factors necessary for model averaging are obtained from
normalising the differences in the quantified relative posterior predictive accuracy of the models
which were taken into account.
A widely accepted guiding principle in statistical model-building is parameter parsimony. This
is motivated by a particular view that dates back to the Middle Ages and proved highly influential
in the history of Science. It was voiced by the English Franciscan friar, scholastic philosopher and
theologian William of Ockham (1288–1348), who asserted:
“Frustra fit per plura, quod potest fieri per pauciora.”1
In the various scientific communities of these modern days, this heuristic principle is known as
Ockham’s razor, and it is often used as a justification for preferring one specific model as repre-
senting a proposed theoretical framework in place of an available competing model of compara-
ble performance properties which, however, contains a larger number of model parameters.
1English translation: “It is vain to do with more, what can be done with less.” See URL (cited on August 17, 2018):
www-history.mcs.st-and.ac.uk/Quotations/Ockham.html, and Sivia and Skilling (2006) [92, p 81].
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7.1 Bayes factors
The idea behind the concept of Bayes factors as a practical tool formodel comparison is a simple
one. Start from Bayes’ theorem in its variant of Eq. (1.23) given in Ch. 1, and apply it, for a given
fixed set of empirical data, to both a “model(i)” and a “model(j).” Upon forming the posterior
odds, i.e., the ratio of the posterior probability for “model(i)” and the posterior probability for
“model(j),” one obtains2
P (model(i)|data, I)
P (model(j)|data, I)︸ ︷︷ ︸
posterior odds
=
P (data|model(i), I)
P (data|model(j), I) ×
P (model(i)|I)
P (model(j)|I)︸ ︷︷ ︸
prior odds
, (7.1)
where a common divisor of P (data|I) cancelled out along the way. Conventionally one defines the
ratio multiplying the prior odds on the right-hand side of Eq. (7.1), i.e.,
Bij :=
P (data|model(i), I)
P (data|model(j), I) (7.2)
as the Bayes factor. In this form it gives the ratio of the average likelihoods for “model(i)” and
“model(j).” By re-arranging Eq. (7.1), one find that this is equal to
Bij =
P (model(i)|data, I)
P (model(j)|data, I)
P (model(i)|I)
P (model(j)|I)
, (7.3)
i.e., the ratio of posterior odds and prior odds for “model(i)” and “model(j).” The Bayes factor
provides an immediate manifestation of the very fact that within the Bayes–Laplace approach
only the values of relative measures contain tangible information. In this framework it is often not
possible to define absolute values in any sensible way.
Suppose “model(i)” contains a set of k+1 parameters, {θ(i)0 , . . . , θ(i)k }. Then its associated average
likelihood is calculated by averaging the total-data likelihood function in (k + 1)-dimensional
parameter space with the prior joint probability distribution,
P (data|model(i), I) =
∫
· · ·
∫
θ
(i)
j ranges
P (data|θ(i)0 , . . . , θ(i)k ,model(i), I)︸ ︷︷ ︸
likelihood
×P (θ(i)0 , . . . , θ(i)k |model(i), I)︸ ︷︷ ︸
prior
dθ
(i)
0 · · ·dθ(i)k . (7.4)
This calculation is to be repeated in an analogous fashion for “model(j),” which, however, usually
contains a number of parameters different from k + 1. The point is that statistical models with a
higher number of parameters need to spread out prior joint probability density (which, of course,
2In the present formulation of the posterior odds and their relation to the prior odds, the terms “model(i)” and
“hypothesis(i)” may be perceived to be synonymous.
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needs to integrate to 1) over a larger number of dimensions in parameter space than statistical
models with a smaller number of parameters. A larger number of dimensions of parameter space
amounts to a larger hyper-volume to be covered by the prior joint probability density. In this
respect, statistical models with a higher number of parameters automatically get penalised by the
present procedure. Only if there is a sufficient amount of supporting evidence in the empirical data
for the presence of additional parameters (which will factor into the procedure via the total-data
likelihood function) can the penalty for a dimension-inflated hyper-volume be compensated.
Bayes factors can be calculated analytically for all the single-parameter estimation examples
with exact solutions for the parameter’s posterior probability distribution that were discussed
in Ch. 4. The reason is that in those cases only the prior probability distribution can be varied
between competing models, while their total-data likelihood functions are identical.3 Here we
present the explicit Bayes factor solution for the Beta–binomial model of Subsec. 4.1.2. Suppose
given empirical data {y, n}, and introduce a “model(1)” and a “model(2)” as competing to explain
the underlying data-generating process. The binomial total-data likelihood function has the same
structure for both cases; only the parameter values of the two Beta prior probability distributions,
{α1, β1} and {α2, β2}, will be different. Then the ratio of posterior model odds and prior model
odds amounts to
B12 =
Be(α1 + y, β1 + n− y)
Be(α2 + y, β2 + n− y)
Be(α1, β1)
Be(α2, β2)
=
Be(α1 + y, β1 + n− y)
Be(α2 + y, β2 + n− y) ×
Be(α2, β2)
Be(α1, β1)
. (7.5)
Jeffreys (1939) [50, App. B] devised a heuristic scale for interpreting the values of Bayes factors
when only two competing statistical models are considered. According to this scale, one classifies
the explanatory power of the two models under investigation as
Jeffreys’ scale for comparison of two competing models:
B12 > 1: model(1) supported
1 > B12 > 10
−1/2: weak evidence against model(1)
10−1/2 > B12 > 10
−1: substantial evidence against model(1)
10−1 > B12 > 10
−3/2: strong evidence against model(1)
10−3/2 > B12 > 10
−2: very strong evidence against model(1)
10−2 > B12: decisive evidence against model(1);
see also Gill (2015) [39, p 217]. Kass and Raftery (1995) [54, p 777], and Jaynes (2003) [48, p 91],
transform Jeffreys’ scale to an orders-of-magnitude emphasising, base-10 logarithmic scale, which
appears closer to intuition. In this case it holds that
log10(B12) = log10
(
P (model(1)|data, I)
P (model(2)|data, I)
)
− log10
(
P (model(1)|I)
P (model(2)|I)
)
, (7.6)
which gives the difference between the posterior decadic log-odds and the prior decadic log-odds;
see also Greenberg (2013) [41, p 36].
3For once, they have noX-data for independent variables blended in via an inverse link function like GLMs.
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We draw the reader’s attention to the lively review by Jefferys and Berger (1992) [49] on the
concept of Bayes factors. For illustrative purposes they relate their discussion to the prominent
historical example from the early 20th Century of the two competing theories of gravitational
interactions that were trying to explain the phenomenon of the advance of the perihelion of planet
Mercury on its orbit around the Sun. This observation had been puzzling astronomers ever since the
French astronomer and mathematician Urbain Jean Joseph Le Verrier (1811–1877) had reported
on this problem for gravitational theory to the French Academy of Sciences on September 12,
1859.
The present exposition ofmodel comparison elucidates that for hypothesis testing in the Bayes–
Laplace approach one requires at least one proper, testable alternative hypothesis to a given
“hypothesis(1),” where the former, too, can be assigned a well-defined total-data likelihood func-
tion so that decision-making as to the data-favoured hypothesis becomes possible. Simply making
the choice
hypothesis(2) := hypothesis(1)
will lead into a non-constructive dead end. There is no way to devise a meaningful total-data
likelihood function P (data|hypothesis(1), I); see Sivia and Skilling (2006) [92, p 84], and Trotta
(2008) [102, Sec. 4.1].
A computational challenge that had long plagued researchers was the evaluation of the average
likelihood for multi-parameter models, when domain integrations have to be performed in high-
dimensional parameter spaces. Some of the first algorithms that obtain this information by means
of numerical simulation were given by Chib (1995) [11] and by Carlin and Chib (1995) [10]; see
also Greenberg (2013) [41, Subsec. 7.1.2]. Specific routines for facilitating the practical task of
computingBayes factors have been made available withinR in the MCMCpack package byMartin
et al (2011) [67]
R: BayesFactor(MCMCpack output) (MCMCpack package),
and in the BayesFactor package by Morey and Rouder (2018) [73]. Further information on
conceptual aspects of model comparison withBayes factors is given in the helpful practical tutorial
by Lodewyckx et al (2011) [65], and in Gelman et al (2014) [35, Sec. 7.4], Gill (2015) [39, Ch. 7],
or in Kruschke (2015) [58, Ch. 10].
For astrophysical and cosmological problems with only a small amount of available observational
information, Trotta (2008) [102, Sec. 4.7] advocates the Bayes factor method formodel compar-
isons.4 Gelman and Rubin (1995) [34] and Gelman et al (2014) [35, Sec. 7.4], on the other hand,
generally advise against the use of Bayes factors as a selection criterion for statistical models due
to their inherent sensitivity to the choice of prior probability distributions.
7.2 Information criteria and posterior predictive accuracy
Shannon’s information entropy, as defined in Eq. (3.8) for discrete cases and in Eq. (3.17) for
continuous cases, is the universally approved unique measure of the amount of uncertainty rep-
4Presumably because the DIC-measure of Subsec. 7.2.1 that he also takes into consideration requires a relation of
sample size to number of parameters of n≫ k + 1.
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resented by a given probability distribution. Qualitatively speaking, information entropy is
growing, the more probability (which sums to 1) is spread out across viable possibilities. In this
respect, the number of dimensions of the space in which probability is distributed plays a partic-
ularly important role. Information entropy is also the central pillar of the currently most widely
applied techniques for model comparison, for which relative posterior predictive accuracy is
the criterion for evaluating the performance of competing statistical models. We will describe the
details in this section.
The non-symmetric, directed Kullback–Leibler divergence, defined in terms of the information
entropy in the discrete case of Eq. (3.8) by5
DKL(P,Q) := S(P,Q)− S(P ) =
k∑
i=1
pi ln
(
pi
qi
)
, (7.7)
measures the additional information entropy generated when approximating one discrete proba-
bility distribution, P = {pi}i=1,...,k, by a second discrete probability distribution,Q = {qi}i=1,...,k;
see Kullback and Leibler (1951) [61]. Note that, by construction, it holds that DKL(P, P ) ≡ 0.
Suppose given two candidate probability distributions,Q(1) andQ(2), that are competing to approx-
imate an unknown target probability distribution, P . Then, when measured with the Kullback–
Leibler divergence, the relative distance of Q(1) and Q(2) from the unknown target P amounts
to
DKL(P,Q
(1))−DKL(P,Q(2)) =
[
S(P,Q(1))− S(P ) ]− [S(P,Q(2))− S(P ) ]
= S(P,Q(1))− S(P,Q(2)) = −
k∑
i=1
pi ln
(
q
(1)
i
q
(2)
i
)
= −
k∑
i=1
pi
[
ln
(
q
(1)
i
)
− ln
(
q
(2)
i
) ]
; (7.8)
this is just the P -average of the difference in log-probability between Q(1) and Q(2). When this
difference come out negative, Q(1) is closer to the unknown target P than Q(2), and vice versa
when the difference comes out positive. The snag is that the P -measure used for the averaging is
not known, and so, to continue the comparison of Q(1) and Q(2), one needs to resort to a reliable
estimation procedure. A tried and tested estimation procedure that has become commonplace
employs the deviance of a probability distributionQ, defined by
D(Q) := −2
n∑
i=1
ln(qi) . (7.9)
In terms of the deviance, the difference of Kullback–Leibler divergences in Eq. (7.8) can now
5Here we assume a uniform Lebesgue measure mi. In the continuous case, the Kullback–Leibler divergence
becomesDKL(P,Q) =
∫ +∞
−∞
p(y) ln
(
p(y)
q(y)
)
dy.
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be estimated by
DKL(P,Q
(1))−DKL(P,Q(2)) ≈ D(Q(1))−D(Q(2))
= −2
k∑
i=1
[
ln
(
q
(1)
i
)
− ln
(
q
(2)
i
) ]
. (7.10)
All of these considerations provide the foundation for a strategy that seeks to guard against
over-fitting when approximating unknown posterior joint probability distributions by means
of MCMC simulations. The objective of the model-building process is to compare competing sta-
tistical models on the basis of an estimation of their anticipated posterior predictive accuracy,
or, in more technical terms, their expected out-of-sample deviance. We will now introduce the
two most widely accepted estimators of a model’s expected out-of-sample deviance, so-called in-
formation criteria that take different aspects of the posterior average (or posterior expectation)
of the natural logarithm of a model’s likelihood function as major building-blocks for valuing
posterior predictive accuracy.
7.2.1 Deviance information criterion
Spiegelhalter et al (2002) [93] proposed the deviance information criterion (DIC) as a quantita-
tive tool for estimating expected out-of-sample deviance. Its applicability is restricted in that it
assumes a multivariate Gauß posterior joint probability distribution for the model parameters, and
that the number of available observations is much larger than number of model parameters, i.e.,
n≫ k + 1.
Spiegelhalter et al (2002) [93, Eq. (10)] start by defining a Bayesian deviance as capturing model
performance in the fitting process by6
DBayes(θ) := −2 ln[P (y|θ, I) ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
log-total-data-likelihood
+2 ln[ f(y|I) ] ; (7.11)
the first term amounts to minus two times the natural logarithm of the total-data-likelihood func-
tion, and f(y|I) is a standardising term that depends on the data only and so can be considered
constant. Spiegelhalter et al (2002) [93, Eq. (36)] then continue to construct the DIC-measure as
an additive combination of the posterior average of the Bayesian deviance as a measure of model
fit, and an effective number of parameters pDIC that acts as a penalty term to account for model
complexity. This yields
DIC := Epost (DBayes(θ) )︸ ︷︷ ︸
measure of model fit
+ pDIC︸︷︷︸
complexity penalty
, (7.12)
pDIC := Epost (DBayes(θ) )−DBayes ( Epost(θ) ) ; (7.13)
see also Trotta (2008) [102, Sec. 4.7], Gelman et al (2014) [35, Sec. 7.2], Gill (2015) [39, Sec. 7.5],
and McElreath (2016) [68, Sec. 6.4]. Models with smaller DIC values are generally preferred, as,
6Here we have θ ∈ R(k+1)×1 and y ∈ Rn×1. Moreover, throughout we suppress conditioning on the data for
potential independent variables, to keep notation reasonably simple.
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by definition, they are closer to the unknown target. However, less well performing models should
not be completely discarded from the outset, as they often contain valuable information.
The calculation in R of a model’s DIC score from MCMC simulations with JAGS has been made
easy through Plummer’s (2016) [83] rjags package. This contains the taylor-made function
R: dic.samples(modelJAGS, n.iter = number of iterations) (rjags package).
7.2.2 Watanabe–Akaike information criterion
The Watanabe–Akaike information criterion (WAIC), suggested by Watanabe (2010) [107,
Eq. (6)], offers a more refined, cumulative pointwise estimate of a model’s expected out-of-sample
deviance, with much less restrictive prerequistes than the DIC-measure. Specifically it can be ap-
plied for assessing posterior predictive performance of highly skewed posterior joint probability
distributions for model parameters, i.e., it does not assume that they be multivariate Gauß distri-
butions. It also allows for arbitrary prior probability distributions.
Like the DIC-measure, WAIC is built from two additive components. This is on the one-hand
side the sum of the natural logarithms of the posterior-averaged single-datum likelihood functions
for every observation, yi, — this is referred to as the log-pointwise posterior predictive density
(lppd) and is given by
lppd :=
n∑
i=1
ln ( Epost[P (yi|θ, I)] )︸ ︷︷ ︸
log-posterior-average-single-datum-likelihood
; (7.14)
on the other hand there is again a term representing an effective number of parameters that
penalises model complexity, viz.,
pWAIC := −2
n∑
i=1
Epost ( ln[P (yi|θ, I) ] ) + 2
n∑
i=1
ln ( Epost[P (yi|θ, I)] ) . (7.15)
Altogether, the cumulative pointwise WAIC-estimate for a model’s expected out-of-sample de-
viance is thus given by
WAIC := −2lppd︸ ︷︷ ︸
measure of model fit
+ 2pWAIC︸ ︷︷ ︸
complexity penalty
, (7.16)
where the particular re-scaling proposed by Gelman et al (2014) [35, p 174] in order to comply with
the usual deviance-based structure of other information criteria is employed; see also McElreath
(2016) [68, Sec. 6.4]. Again, models with smaller WAIC values are generally preferred, but it is
advisable to retain weaker-performing competing models for further consideration. In recent years,
the WAIC-measure has acquired in the pertinent research literature the status of the prime tool for
comparing competing statistical models with respect to properties of over-fitting and posterior
predictive accuracy.
The calculation in R of a model’s WAIC score from MCMC simulation output has been made
possible via the loo package by Vehtari et al (2017) [105]. This contains the function
R: waic(model) (loo package).
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We refer to reader to the corresponding user manual for further practical coding instructions.
Now we turn to put into perspective in the next chapter various possibilities of increasing the flex-
ibility of a statistical model by adapting it to a researcher’s state of knowledge when this exhibits
a more complex structure than what was assumed in the examples of Ch. 6.
Chapter 8
Hierarchical modelling
The simple types of techniques of regression analysiswe discussed in Ch. 6 in the context of gen-
eralised linear models confined their methodological considerations to constructing fixed-effects
models. That is to say, the different families of statistical models that were presented are built
on the implicit assumption that supposes effects to be the same for all sample units in the target
population of the researcher’s investigation. In practice, however, one often possesses informa-
tion on some kind of existing substructure within the target population, such as sample units
being members of exclusive groups or clusters, with the possibility of sample units belonging
to the same group appearing more similar to one another on the characteristic features of the re-
searcher’s interest than across groups. If this kind of information is available, one might as well
make use of it in the model-building process by integrating it into the calculation resp. simula-
tion of posterior joint probability distributions for model parameters. Hierarchical models, as
they are known within the Bayes–Laplace approach to data analysis and statistical inference,
constitute the present state-of-the art in Applied Statistics for devising flexible frameworks that
can handle empirical data obtained from performing measurements on complex systems or/and
dynamical processes. Some authors refer to hierarchical models as multi-level models, or as
varying-effects models.
Technically speaking, varying-effects models are obtained by introducing for some model param-
eters adaptive prior probability distributions as opposed to the fixed ones that were employed
in Ch. 6. The rationale behind this procedure is the view that the specific properties of some
model parameters are captured more effectively when one describes them as arising from an en-
tire distribution of possibilities across groups which have fixed prior probability distributions
within groups. Such an approach has the consequence that information on the values of these
parameters obtained from analysing empirical data is partially shared between groups— known as
partial pooling of information — which leads via adaptive regularisation to more robust statisti-
cal models that are less vulnerable to the threat of over-fitting. This in turn will generally improve
a model’s overall posterior predictive accuracy: while within-group model-fits and predictions
will get worse due to partial pooling, out-of-sample predictions will become more reliable; see,
e.g., Gelman et al (2014) [35, Ch. 5], Gill (2015) [39, Ch. 12], Kruschke (2015) [58, Ch. 9], or
McElreath (2016) [68, Ch. 12]. With partial pooling of information is associated the regularising
phenomenon of shrinkage of estimates, these becoming less susceptible to the influence of out-
liers in the data. Because of learning from the exchanged information, parameter estimates on the
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level of the individual group samples will “shrink” towards the total sample mean. The size of the
shrinking effect is influenced by the amount of data within the groups and the amount of variation
between the groups. In the empirical sciences this statistical phenomenon has long been known as
regression towards the mean. It was made popular through the work of the English empiricist
Sir Francis Galton FRS (1822–1911), who discovered it following years of intense research during
the late 19th Century; see Galton (1886) [29], and also Kahneman (2011) [51, Ch. 17].
There are basically two kinds of varying-effects extensions of the fixed-effects generalised linear
models specified in Ch. 6 one may consider: the reasonably straightforward varying-intercept
models that suppose variation across groups of the β0-regression coefficient, which we will in-
troduce in this chapter, and the technically more demanding varying-slopes models that require
in particular the modelling of prior correlations amongst the full β-regression coefficients. The
second option leads naturally to a significant increase in a model’s complexity, though not in the
overall logic of making inferences in the Bayes–Laplace approach. This option is beyond the
present scope of these lecture notes.
We now turn to take a look at fitting to adequate empirical data specific MCMC simulated varying-
intercept extensions of the four classes of generalised linear models we presented in Secs. 6.4
to 6.7, using JAGS in R for their implementation. Again, the models so obtained need to be
subjected to dedicated sensitivity analyses as to meaningful choices of prior probability distri-
butions, and to critical posterior predictive checks.
8.1 Hierarchical linear regression
For the varying-intercept linear regression model, we here select a non-central t–distribution
according to Eq. (2.26) as the single-datum likelihood function, to provide the flexibility needed
for adapting to potential outliers in the data for the dependent metrically scaled variable Y . We
choose an exponential prior probability distribution according to Eq. (2.33) for the t–distribution’s
degrees-of-freedom parameter ν. We take ν > 2, so that by Eqs. (2.29) and (2.30) its expec-
tation value and variance will be well-defined. A Gauß adaptive prior probability distribution is
introduced for the group-level intercept parameter. We maintain the assumption of homogeneous
variances. The resultant model is then described by
likelihood: y|X,β, σ2, ν, [gp], I ind∼ t (µ, σ2, ν) (8.1)
inverse link function: µ = β0[gp] + β1X1 + . . .+ βkXk (8.2)
adaptive prior: β0[gp] ∼ N
(
ζ, ω2
)
(8.3)
fixed priors: ζ ∼ N (0, s20) (8.4)
ω2 ∼ IG (ψ0, χ0) (8.5)
β1, . . . , βk ∼ N
(
0, τ 20
)
(8.6)
σ2 ∼ IG (α0, δ0) (8.7)
ν − 2 ∼ exp (θ0) , (8.8)
where s20, ψ0, χ0, τ
2
0 , α0, δ0 and θ0 denote fixed hyperparameters of the various prior probability
distributions. Examples of applications, in part with a Gauß single-datum likelihood function,
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can be found in Gill (2015) [39, Sec. 12.7] and in Kruschke (2015) [58, Sec. 17.3]. Andreon and
Weaver (2015) [4, Secs. 8.4] employ logarithmic variables for modelling a simple linear regression
relationship between galaxies’ velocity dispersions on the one hand, and the masses of their central
black holes on the other, wherein the variables are subject to measurement error and object-specific
intrinsic scatter.
We now give the code for the specification in JAGS of a varying-intercept linear regression
model. Herein we suppressed the standardisation of the dependent and independent data, and the
de-standardisation of the model parameters, both given already in Sec.6.4. No changes arise in this
respect.
Listing 8.1: Gibbs sampling with JAGS in R: model specification for varying-intercept linear
regression with non-central t–single-datum likelihood function.
# JAGS model: all of the following code needs to be embedded in a
# modelString = "..." command in R
model {
# likelihood: t-distribution w/ homoscedasticity assumption
for ( i in 1:nSample ) {
zy[i] ˜ dt( zmu[i] , zprec , nu )
# inverse link function
zmu[i] <- zb0[gp[i]] + sum( zb[1:nIndVars] * zX[i,1:nIndVars] )
}
# adaptive prior
# (i) varying intercept
for ( j in 1:nGroups ) {
zb0[j] ˜ dnorm( zeta , precIntc )
}
# fixed priors
zeta ˜ dnorm( 0 , 1/<s0>ˆ2 )
precIntc ˜ dgamma( <psi0> , <chi0> )
omega <- sqrt( 1 / precIntc )
# (ii) slopes
for ( j in 1:nIndVars ) {
zb[j] ˜ dnorm( 0 , 1/1ˆ2 ) # regularising
}
# (iii) precision for t-likelihood
zprec ˜ dgamma( <alpha0> , <delta0> )
zsigma <- sqrt( 1 / zprec * nu / (nu-2) ) # stdev
# (iv) degrees of freedom for t-likelihood
nu <- 2 + nuTilde # nu > 2: existence of mean and variance
nuTilde ˜ dexp( <theta0> )
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}
The corresponding code for the specification of a varying-intercept linear regression model in Stan
when intending to perform HMC sampling is given in App. B.1.
8.2 Hierarchical ANOVA-like regression
We also choose a non-central t–distribution according to Eq. (2.26) as the single-datum likeli-
hood function in hierarchical ANOVA-like regression. In the present case the specific multi-level
feature follows from abandoning the assumption of homogeneous variances. We express this posi-
tion by choosing an inverse Gamma adaptive prior probability distribution for the group-level scale
parameter. For the degrees-of-freedom parameter, again an exponential prior probability distribu-
tion according to Eq. (2.33) is picked, imposing the condition ν > 2 so that its expectation value
and variance will be well-defined. The resultant model is then given by
likelihood: y| g, µ0, µg, σ2g , ν, I ind∼ t
(
µ0 + µg, σ
2
g , ν
)
(8.9)
adaptive priors: µg ∼ N
(
0, τ 2
)
(8.10)
σ2g ∼ IG (α, β) (8.11)
fixed priors: µ0 ∼ N
(
y¯, s2
)
(8.12)
τ 2 ∼ IG (α0, β0) (8.13)
α, β ∼ Ga (γ0, δ0) (8.14)
ν − 2 ∼ exp (θ0) , (8.15)
where y¯ and s2 are the sample mean resp. sample variance of the y-data, and α0, β0, γ0, δ0 and θ0
denote fixed hyperparameters of the prior probability distributions. Examples of applications are
presented in Gelman et al (2014) [35, Sec. 5.3] and in Kruschke (2015) [58, Sec. 19.5].
The code for the specification in JAGS of a hierarchical ANOVA-like regression model reads:
Listing 8.2: Gibbs sampling with JAGS in R: model specification for ANOVA-like regression with
non-central t–single-datum likelihood function and heterogeneous variances.
# JAGS model: the following code needs to be embedded in a
# modelString = "..." command in R
model {
# likelihood (t-likelihood w/ heteroscedasticity assumption)
for ( i in 1:nSample ) {
y[i] ˜ dt( mu0 + mu[gp[i]] , prec[gp[i]] , nu )
}
# adaptive priors
for ( j in 1:nGroups ) {
mu[j] ˜ dnorm( 0 , 1/tauˆ2 ) # vage!
prec[j] ˜ dgamma( alpha , beta )
}
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# fixed priors
mu0 ˜ dnorm( <mean y> , <stdev y> )
tau ˜ dgamma( <alpha0> , <beta0> )
alpha ˜ dgamma( <gamma0> , <delta0> )
beta ˜ dgamma( <gamma0> , <delta0> )
sigma <- sqrt( 1 / prec * nu / (nu-2) ) # stdev
nu <- nuMinusTwo + 2 # nu > 2: existence of mean and variance
nuMinusTwo ˜ dexp( <theta0> )
# convert mu0 and mu[i] to total mean and deviations
for ( j in 1:nGroups ) { proxy[j] <- mu0 + mu[j] }
a0 <- mean( proxy[1:nGroups] )
for ( j in 1:nGroups ) { a[j] <- proxy[j] - a0 }
}
The corresponding code for the specification of an adaptive ANOVA-like regression model in Stan
when intending to perform HMC sampling is given in App. B.2.
8.3 Hierarchical logistic regression
The extension to the varying-intercept level of the next two classes of generalised linear models
entails no further complication. The varying-intercept logistic regression model has at its core a
binomial total-data likelihood function according to Eq. (2.9). A Gauß adaptive prior probability
distribution is selected for the group-level intercept parameter. The model is described by
likelihood: y|X,β, [gp], I ind∼ Bin (θ) (8.16)
inverse link function: θ = logistic (β0[gp] + β1X1 + . . .+ βkXk) (8.17)
adaptive prior: β0[gp] ∼ N
(
ζ, ω2
)
(8.18)
fixed priors: ζ ∼ N (0, σ20) (8.19)
ω2 ∼ IG (α0, β0) (8.20)
β1, . . . , βk ∼ N
(
0, τ 20
)
, (8.21)
where σ20 , α0, β0 and τ
2
0 denote fixed hyperparameters of the different prior probability distribu-
tions. Illustrative examples are discussed in Gelman et al (2014) [35, Sec. 5.3], Gill (2015) [39,
Sec. 12.8], Kruschke (2015) [58, Sec. 21.4], and McElreath (2016) [68, Sec. 12.1.].
We now give the code for the specification in JAGS of a varying-intercept logistic regression
model. We suppressed the standardisation of the independent data, and the de-standardisation of
the model parameters, which were both given in Sec. 6.6. No modifications are required in this
part.
Listing 8.3: Gibbs sampling with JAGS in R: model specification for varying-intercept logistic
regression with a binomial total-datum likelihood function.
# JAGS model: all of the following code needs to be embedded in a
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# modelString = "..." command in R
model {
# likelihood: binomial total-datum
for ( i in 1:nSample ) {
y[i] ˜ dbin( theta[i] , nTrials[i] )
# inverse link function
theta[i] <- ilogit( zb0[gp[i]]
+ sum( zb[1:nIndVars] * zX[i,1:nIndVars] ) )
# take care of linebreak!
}
# adaptive prior
# (i) varying intercept
for ( j in 1:nGroups ) {
zb0[j] ˜ dnorm( zeta , precIntc )
}
# fixed priors
zeta ˜ dnorm( 0 , 1/(<sigma0>)ˆ2 )
precIntc ˜ dgamma( <alpha0> , <beta0> )
omega <- sqrt( 1 / precIntc )
# (ii) slopes
for ( j in 1:nIndVars ) {
zb[j] ˜ dnorm( 0 , 1/1ˆ2 ) # regularising
}
}
The corresponding code for the specification of a varying-intercept logistic regression model in
Stan when intending to perform HMC sampling is given in App. B.3.
8.4 Hierarchical Poisson regression
Lastly, we delineate the structure of a varying-intercept Poisson regression model. As before,
the single-datum likelihood function is given by a Poisson distribution according to Eq. (2.15).
A Gauß adaptive prior probability distribution is selected for the group-level intercept parameter.
The model is given by
likelihood: θ|X,β, [gp], I ind∼ Pois (θ) (8.22)
inverse link function: θ = exp (βc + β0[gp] + β1X1 + . . .+ βkXk) (8.23)
adaptive prior: β0[gp] ∼ N
(
0, ω2
)
(8.24)
fixed priors: βc ∼ N
(
0, σ20
)
(8.25)
ω2 ∼ IG (α0, β0) (8.26)
β1, . . . , βk ∼ N
(
0, τ 20
)
, (8.27)
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where σ20 , α0, β0 and τ
2
0 denote fixed hyperparameters of the different prior probability distribu-
tions. Interesting applications of these models are outlined in Gelman et al (2014) [35, Sec. 16.4],
Gill (2015) [39, Sec. 12.5], Kruschke (2015) [58, Sec. 21.4], andMcElreath (2016) [68, Sec. 12.4.].
Examples at an advanced level of hierarchical modelling with Poisson or binomial single-datum
likelihood functions, or mixtures thereof, in an astrophysical context, can be found in Andreon and
Weaver (2015) [4, Secs. 8.5 and 8.12].
The code for the specification in JAGS of a varying-intercept Poisson regression model fol-
lows. Therein we suppressed the standardisation of the independent data, as well as the de-
standardisation of the model parameters. Both can be obtained from the respective code for the
fixed priors case given in Sec.6.7.
Listing 8.4: Gibbs sampling with JAGS in R: model specification for varying-intercept Poisson
regression.
# JAGS model: all of the following code needs to be embedded in a
# modelString = "..." command in R
model {
# likelihood: Poisson
for ( i in 1:nSample ) {
y[i] ˜ dpois( theta[i] )
# inverse link function
theta[i] <- exp( zbconst + zb0[gp[i]]
+ sum( zb[1:nIndVars] * zX[i,1:nIndVars] ) ) # linebreak!
}
# adaptive prior
# (i) varying intercept
for ( j in 1:nGroups ) {
zb0[j] ˜ dnorm( 0 , precIntc )
}
# fixed priors
zbconst ˜ dnorm( 0 , 1/(<sigma0>)ˆ2 )
precIntc ˜ dgamma( <alpha0> , <beta0> )
omega <- sqrt( 1 / precIntc )
# (ii) slope
for ( j in 1:nIndVars ) {
zb[j] ˜ dnorm( 0 , 1/1ˆ2 ) # regularising
}
}
The corresponding code for the specification of a varying-intercept Poisson regression model in
Stan when intending to perform HMC sampling is given in App. B.4.
This concludes the present chapter. As indicated above, the next step towards enlargement of the
technical capabilities of the hierarchical models depicted here would be to take varying-slopes
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effects due to prior correlations amongst the regression coefficients into consideration. Of direct
practical interest is also the systematic handling ofmulti-collinearity and ofmeasurement error
within the data for the independent variables.
In the final chapter, we want to sketch elementary principles of an important field of application
of probability theory, viz. the theory of decision under conditions of uncertainty, which forms a
conceptual cornerstone of the frameworks of Economics, Political Science and the Organisational
Sciences.
Chapter 9
Decision-making in the state space picture
Decision-making is a recurrent activity everyone is confronted with virtually on a daily basis.
Economic theory in particular has long had a vested interest in a systematic formalisation of the
principles underlying basic decision processes. A set-theoretical state space framework of descrip-
tive character, developed in the middle of the 20th Century, has laid the foundation for a theory
of decision under conditions of uncertainty. It continues to be upgraded by integrating insights
gained from experimentation, and by adapting to pertinent new conceptual ideas. In this chapter,
we want to review the standard model of decision theory for the case of static one-shot choice
problems for a single decision-maker in the behavioural subjective expected utility (SEU) rep-
resentation due to Savage (1954) [89] and Anscombe and Aumann (1963) [5], and outline its link
to the Bayes–Laplace approach to inductive statistical inference. We will also briefly relate to
a specific area of ongoing research. Full discussions of the principles of decision theory are given
in the textbooks by Gilboa (2009) [37] and Peterson (2017) [82] at an introductory level, and in the
monographs by Wald (1950) [106], Savage (1954) [89] and Berger (1985) [7] at a highly advanced
technical level. Some pedagogical examples are provided in Gelman (1998) [32].
The simplest decision-theoretical models are built on the premiss of the rational-agent paradigm
of Economics. Amongst other items, this entails the assumption of the existence of some form of
reasoning ability on the part of the decision-maker, so that she/he can give justifications for the
choices they made. The general set-up is as follows. A rational decision-maker faces a specific
choice problem. She/he finds herself/himself in a certain individual prior state of knowledge
on the matter to be decided. In particular, she/he takes into consideration which external states
of Nature (or boundary conditions) could potentially take an influence on the consequences of
the specific act the decision-maker eventually opts for, and what outcomes the decision could
possibly lead to. At the end of the decision process, all uncertainty as to the actually realised
momentary state of Nature and the consequences of the act preferred by the decision-maker will
be resolved. Given this new empirical information, a basis for learning has opened on which
the decision-maker attains a posterior state of knowledge. It is a central objective of decision
theory to cast the scenario just depicted into formal language. This aims at capturing within an
axiomatic framework a rational decision-maker’s state of knowledge concerning decision-relevant
external states of Nature, the decision-makers choice behaviour under conditions of uncertainty,
and resultant prospects for herself/himself. We will now turn to describe the main elements of this
formal language, and the choice-specific operations defined therein.
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9.1 Primitives
The description of static one-shot choice problems for a single decision-maker in the set-theoretical
state space formulation of Anscombe and Aumann (1963) [5] takes the following set of primitives
as building blocks. There exist:
• a finite set of n ∈ Nmutually exclusive and exhaustive consequence-relevant external states
of NatureΩ that are unobservable; different kinds of decision-relevant events can be repre-
sented by arbitrary subsets A ⊆ Ω,
• a finite set of outcomesX that are observable,
• consequences given in the form of a set of “lotteries” (viz., discrete probability distribu-
tions), ∆(X|I), over the set of outcomes X; on this set of “lotteries” there is defined a
mixing operation such that for every two distributions p, q ∈ ∆(X|I), every weight factor
α ∈ (0, 1), and every outcome x ∈X it holds that [αp+(1−α)q](x) = αp(x)+(1−α)q(x),
• the decision-makers objects of choice are elements from a finite set of k ∈ N alternative acts
F := {f |f : Ω→ ∆(X|I)} ; (9.1)
acts are formally understood as maps of consequence-relevant states of Nature inΩ into the
space of “lotteries” over outcomes,∆(X|I),
• an ordinal binary preference relation on F and, by extension, on∆(X|I), that is observ-
able.1
In some formulations of choice problems, the space of consequence-relevant external states of
Nature is given a logic-based fine-structure; see, e.g., Gilboa (2009) [37]:
• canonical states of Nature arise as truth assignments {0 : false, 1 : true} to a set of l ∈ N
elementary propositions,
• the size of the resultant canonical state space is given by card(Ω) = 2l,
• in this picture, the number of distinguishable events amounts to 22
l
; this number can easily
grow very large as the number of elementary propositions taken into account increases.
9.2 Decision matrix
The primitives of static one-shot choice problems for a single decision-maker may be visualised by
means of a decision matrix, a formal concept effectively anticipated by the French mathematician,
physicist, inventor, writer and Catholic philosopher Blaise Pascal (16231662) in his famous rea-
soning that has come to be known as Pascal’s wager; see, e.g., Gilboa (2009) [37, Sec. 5.2]. Fig-
ure 9.1 outlines the structure of the decision matrix in the behavioural subjective expected utility
1The ordinal binary preference relation  is to be read as “preferred at least as.”
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representation of Savage (1954) [89] and Anscombe and Aumann (1963) [5]. This representa-
tion makes the rather unrealistic assumptions that the decision-maker (and the decision-theoretical
modeller) has complete knowledge of (i) the entire setΩ of consequence-relevant states of Nature,
to which she/he assigns a personal discrete prior probability distribution P ∈ ∆(Ω|I) on the
basis of available background information I — this represents her/his subjective degrees-of-belief
of the plausibility of the different states, and of (ii) all possible outcomes x ∈X that are contingent
on these states.
prior distribution P ∈∆(Ω|I) P (ω1|I) P (ω2|I) . . . P (ωn|I)
∑n
i=1 P (ωi|I) = 1
acts fj ∈ F \ states ωi ∈ Ω ω1 ω2 . . . ωn k, n ∈ N
f1 p11 p12 . . . p1n consequences:
f2 p21 p22 . . . p2n “lotteries”
...
...
...
. . .
... pij ∈ ∆(X|I)
fk pk1 pk2 . . . pkn over outcomes x ∈X
f : Ω→ ∆(X|I) ∑x∈X pij = 1
Figure 9.1: Static one-shot decision matrix of subjective expected utility theory for a single
decision-maker.
By learning from observation of the consequences of decisions made, and of the actual realisations
of specific states of Nature, the decision-maker forms a personal discrete posterior probability
distribution for states of Nature that can be an informative starting point for subsequent decision
problems.
9.3 Axiomatisation
The next step in the formal construction of the behavioural subjective expected utility repre-
sentation according to Savage (1954) [89] and Anscombe and Aumann (1963) [5], with earlier
contributions by von Neumann2 and Morgenstern (1944) [75], is the axiomatisation of a rational
decision-maker’s choice behaviour. This leads to the (cf. Gilboa (2009) [37, p 143])
Representation theorem: There exist a unique discrete prior probability distribution P ∈
∆(Ω|I) (synonymous with a decision-makers “beliefs”) and an interval-scaled von Neumann–
Morgenstern utility function U : X → R for outcomes in X (the “moral value” of outcomes
according to Bernoulli (1738) [8]),3 provided that the ordinal binary preference relation  on the
set of alternative acts F satisfies a minimal set of five axioms of rational choice:
2This is the same von Neumann we already encountered in Sec. 6.2 in the context of Monte Carlo simulations.
3In place of a utility function, many authors, in a decision-theoretical context, employ an equivalent loss function
instead; see, e.g., Jaynes (2003) [48, Sec. 14.3], Lee (2012) [63, Sec. 7.5], or Gill (2015) [39, Sec. 8.1]. Kahneman
and Tversky operate with a psychological value function; see Kahneman and Tversky (1979) [53] and Kahneman
(2011) [51, p 282].
108 CHAPTER 9. DECISION-MAKING IN THE STATE SPACE PICTURE
1. weak order: the ordinal binary preference relation  on the set of alternative acts F is
complete and transitive,
2. continuity: for every three acts f, g, h ∈ F , if the strong preference order f ≻ g ≻ h
applies, there exist weight factors α, β ∈ (0, 1) such that the strong preference order αf +
(1− α)h ≻ g ≻ βf + (1− β)h follows,
3. independence: for every three acts f, g, h ∈ F and weight factor α ∈ (0, 1), the weak
preference order f  g obtains iff the weak preference order αf+(1−α)h  αg+(1−α)h
obtains,
4. monotonicity: for every two acts f, g ∈ F , the weak preference order f(ω)  g(ω) for all
states ω ∈ Ω implies the general weak preference order f  g,
5. non-triviality: there exist at least two acts f, g ∈ F such that the strong preference order
f ≻ g is true.
9.4 Subjective expected utility model
Lastly, the subjective expected utility model for describing a rational decision-maker’s choice
behaviour in the context of static one-shot choice problems is embodied by the (Anscombe and
Aumann (1963) [5], Gilboa (2009) [37, p 144])
Anscombe–Aumann theorem: The ordinal binary preference relation  on the set of alterna-
tive acts F satisfies the set of five axioms of rational choice if and only if there exists a unique
discrete prior probability distribution P ∈ ∆(Ω|I) for the state space Ω and a non-constant
interval-scaled von Neumann–Morgenstern utility function U :X → R for outcomes inX such
that, for every two acts f, g ∈ F , the weak preference order
f  g (9.2)
is true iff for the expected utility of these two acts the condition
∑
ω∈Ω
(∑
x∈X
U(x)f(ω)(x)
)
P (ω|I) ≥
∑
ω∈Ω
(∑
x∈X
U(x)g(ω)(x)
)
P (ω|I) (9.3)
is satisfied.
This states that a rational decision-maker’s choice behaviour can be interpreted as if they apply
a personal prior probability distribution to express their uncertainty as to ensuing consequence-
relevant states of Nature, and as if they always maximise subjective expected utility. The concept
of an expected utility of an outcome was introduced into economic theory by the Swiss mathe-
matician and physicist Daniel Bernoulli FRS (17001782); cf. Bernoulli (1738) [8].
Savage (1954) [89] posits the possibility of reconstructing, via the axiomatic formulation, both
a decision-maker’s prior probability distribution and their utility function when a sufficient
amount of empirical data on her/his choice behaviour, and the preferences so revealed, becomes
available.
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9.5 Caveats of the SEU model
A number of conceptual inconsistencies have been spotted over the years by various authors
within the subjective expected utility model for a rational decision-maker’s choice behaviour,
when confronted with experimental data. Particularly well-known in this respect are the following
caveats:
• Allais (1953) [3] paradox: the violation of some axioms of rational choice by decision-
makers in empirical tests of the SEU model, providing strong indication for a so-called
certainty effect; see also Kahneman (2011) [51, pp 312–314],
• Ellsbergs (1961) [21] paradox: his experiments revealed that in simple specific choice situa-
tions decision-makers often prefer known probability distributions over unknown ones, even
when the latter promise the possibility of larger ensuing pay-offs; this effect has been termed
uncertainty aversion,
• Kahneman and Tversky (1979) [53] emphatically criticised the lack in the SEU framework
of a reference point for a decision-maker’s individual utility function for outcomes; in their
own work they had gathered compelling empirical evidence that vividly suggested that out-
comes acquire a different psychological value for a decision-maker, depending on whether
she/he perceives the outcome as a gain or as a loss; they referred to this (in their view)
omission as “Bernoulli’s error,”
• Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini’s (1998) [16] impossibility results: in theoretical work these
authors demonstrated that the standard state space formulation precludes non-trivial forms
of unawareness of a decision-maker within an SEU model; a standard state space model is
incapable of consistently incorporating the dimension of a decision-makers unawareness of
future contingencies. In this respect, SEU model cannot adequately capture the concept of
surprises.
All in all, the works listed, as well as other less prominent publications, hinted at the possibility
that decision-makers do not necessarily act as though they were following the premiss of max-
imising their subjective expected utility on all occasions. In contrast, decision-makers do regularly
exhibit bounded rationality. One particular line of investigation started undertaking a revision
of the rational-agent paradigm in theories of human decision-making by integrating in a com-
prehensible fashion the complex dimension of a decision-maker’s psychological variability. This
lead to the initiation of the field of Behavioural Economics, which is strongly associated with the
names of the IsraeliUS-American experimental psychologists Daniel Kahneman (born 1934) and
Amos Tversky (19371996), and the US-American economist Richard H Thaler (born 1945); see
Kahneman (2011) [51, p 282f], Thaler and Sunstein (2008) [101], and also Taleb (2007) [100].
For their ground-breaking work, both Kahneman in 2002 and Thaler in 2017 were awarded the
Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel.
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9.6 Representations of non-knowledge
During the last 20 years or so, researchers in economic theory have become strongly inter-
ested again in finding coherent ways of including in a consistent formalisation of a decision-
maker’s choice behaviour in the light of uncertainty the decision-maker’s non-knowledge of
consequence-relevant states of Nature, and of unknown outcomes to acts she/he is going to pursue.
Presumably unintended, this topic was brought spectacularly to the attention of an international
public audience by Donald Rumsfeld, the former U.S. Secretary of Defense, on Feb 12, 2002,
when responding to a journalist’s question at a U.S. Department of Defense news briefing [87]
with the following explanation:
“Reports that say that something hasn’t happened are always interesting to me, because
as we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also
know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do
not know. But there are also unknown unknowns – the ones we don’t know we don’t
know. And if one looks throughout the history of our country and other free countries,
it is the latter category that tend to be the difficult ones.”
The inclusion of representations of different forms of a decision-maker’s non-knowledge in a
comprehensive conceptual framework proves to be a challenging theoretical task. Starting from
the decision matrix of static one-shot choice problems for a single decision-maker displayed in
Fig. 9.1, the immediate points for potential modification and extension are (i) the decision-maker’s
individual prior probability distribution for expressing degrees-of-belief for the plausibility of dif-
ferent states of Nature, and (ii) the issue of the completeness of the space of states of Nature itself.
Some approaches that follow one or the other of these two lines of investigation have been reviewed
by Svetlova and van Elst (2012, 2014) [98, 99]. Further interesting discussions on potential ways
of advancing this intriguing topic have been collected in the “Handbook of Ignorance Studies”
edited by Gross and McGoey (2015) [42].
Our introductory journey through the foundations of inductive statistical inference as practised
within the Bayes–Laplace approach to data analysis and statiatical inference has now come to
an end. We hope the reader could sense a glimpse of the fascination induced by the simplicity and
elegance of this framework, but, even more so, picked up some very useful and efficient practical
tools for building scientifically sound statistical models, and for providing adequate interpretations
and predictions.
Concluding remarks
Undoubtedly, an era of incomprehensibly huge big-data reservoirs has become a reality in present-
day human societies as an immediate consequence of the changes and innovations brought about
by the all-pervasive digital transformation. The question is what meaningful social purpose can all
the information thereby generated and collected be delivered to?
I think this provides us with a great opportunity for making sustainable progress on practical as well
as intellectual issues, though these two areas do not necessarily constitute orthogonal dimensions.
There exists a multitude of intriguing and awe-inspiring phenomena, based, located, and rooted in
both the natural and the social domains of human experience, that are accessible to observation and
measurement. Equipped with naturally inherited curiosity that gets passed on from one generation
to the next, and sticking to the guidelines of the scientific method, when given access to relevant
empirical data, we can use analytical skills to try to read the plot behind the different kinds of
natural and social interactions and interconnections that continue to pose complex and confusing
puzzles to our everyday-life situations. The prospect of success for creating new common values
should experience a boost when humility, courage, independent and unconstrained thinking, a
diversity of ideas, taking care of one another, and an attitude of openness towards surprises are
to be found in the portfolio of tools for investigation. Plausible reasoning leaves no room for
“alternative facts.” Pseudo-argumentations based on the latter have a rather poor track record
concerning their yield of tangible communal benefits. The US-American theoretical physicist
Richard Phillips Feynman (1918–1988) has long been an outspoken critical voice against populist
approaches towards tackling real problems in any kind of field of societal interest; cf. his thought-
stimulating essay “Cargo Cult Science” published in Ref. [25, [pp 308–317]. And there certainly
are some really pressing issues these days that need to be addressed by the human community; see,
e.g., Helbing (2013) [46].
The human community anticipates in about 4 to 5 billion years a transition of the Sun from its
present nuclear hydrogen-burning state to a then nuclear helium-buring state, in the process of
which it will drastically inflate its volume to become a red giant, so the fate of the three inner-
most planets of the Solar System is practically known already today; see, e.g., Lesch and Mu¨ller
(2003) [64, p 405]. Nevertheless, we have potentially much more time ahead of us for realising
our potentials for creativity and sharing knowledge and understanding when compared to the pe-
riod that is factually on record as regards the past history of the human species. Up to now, quite
an impressive legacy of common goals, cultural values and oustanding intellectual triumphs has
accumulated: in music, the visual and the performing arts, in drama, poetry and novel-writing, in
sports, the different languages, and, of course, in view of the great scientific achievements of a
very diverse spectrum of human minds. There are many prominent examples of seminal advances
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in the human understanding of different kinds of dynamical processes that have a direct bearing on
human existence, among them
• the natural evolution of organic creatures according to the English naturalist, geolo-
gist and biologist Charles Robert Darwin, FRS FRGS FLS FZS (1809–1882) (see Darwin
(1859) [15]),
• the nature of gravitational interactions as explained by Albert Einstein (1871–1955) (see
Einstein (1915) [20], Hawking and Ellis (1973) [45], Misner et al (1973) [72], Abbott et
al (2016) [1]; and also Ref. [24]), or
• the genetic coding mechanism underlying the reproduction of any living organism
as deciphered by the British molecular biologist, biophysicist, and neuroscientist
Francis Harry Compton Crick OM FRS (1916–2004), the US-American molecular biolo-
gist, geneticist and zoologist James Dewey Watson (born 1928), and the New Zealand physi-
cist and molecular biologist Maurice Hugh Frederick Wilkins CBE FRS (1916–2004) (see
Watson and Crick (1953) [108] and Wilkins et al (1953) [109]).
The face of planet Earth has been radically changed by the influence on Nature taken by humans
over a period of only a few hundred, possibly a few thousand years — a far cry compared to
the minimum 10 billion years it took to forge all the different kinds of natural resources, now
available to the human community, in various kinds of astrophysical furnaces. This leaves at best a
large two-digit figure of generations that have since been involved in exploiting these resources for
generating and sharing material as well as immaterial goods, in the large majority for very sensible
and helpful, but regrettably also for less sensible courses. If we manage to keep an eye on the
upper limits presented to these resources, develop a common sense for the principle of reciprocity
binding wo/man-kind to Nature, foster a related emotional connectivity, and ultimately safeguard
the habitability of planet Earth for many generations to come, we might stand a real chance of
being perceived by fellow beings in the vast stretches of the spacetime continuum as respectable
citizens of the Universe.
Acknowledgements: I am grateful to Ariane, Vincent and Audrey for their enduring patience with
my continuing absent-mindedness during the intense writing-up process of these lecture notes.
Appendix A
Essential commands in R
An official R reference card can be obtained from the URL (cited on July 10, 2018): https://cran.r-
project.org/doc/contrib/Short-refcard.pdf
A
anova(model): outputing an ANOVA table for a linear model
autocorr.diag(model): autocorrelation diagnostic for a Markov chain Monte Carlo simu-
lation (coda package)
autocorr.plot(model): autocorrelation plot for a Markov chain Monte Carlo simulation
(coda package)
B
boxplot(variable ~ group variable, data = data frame): compiling a box
plot for comparing metrically scaled univariate data between groups
C
cbind(object 1, object 2): combining matching objects (vectors, matrices, data
frames) by columns
colMeans(data frame): computing means of column entries of data frame or matrix
colnames(data frame): listing column names of data frame or matrix
cor(data frame): obtains bivariate correlation matrix for for metrically scaled data from a
data frame
D
data("data set"): loading a data set
data.frame(y=variable 1, X1=variable 2, ..., Xk+1=variable k+1):
creating a data frame from the data of the specified variables
density(data): computes density estimates for given data; combination with plot(..)
yields density plots
densplot(modCsim[,column specifications], xlim = c(lower limit,
upper limit)): plotting the posterior densities for variables estimated in a Markov chain
Monte Carlo simulation (coda package)
dic.samples(model, n.iter=number): computing the value of the deviance informa-
tion criterion (DIC) for a Markov chain Monte Carlo simulation (rjags package)
dim(data frame): dimension of a data frame
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E
effectiveSize(model): effective sample size of a Markov chain Monte Carlo simulation
G
gelman.diag(model): Gelman–Rubin diagnostic for a Markov chainMonte Carlo simulation
(coda package)
gelman.plot(model): plotting the development of Gelman–Rubin diagnostic with number
of MCMC iterations (coda package)
H
head(data frame): scanning the first few rows of a data frame
HPDinterval(model): computing intervals of highest posterior density for model parameters
(coda package)
hist(data frame$variable, freq = FALSE): plotting a histogram of relative fre-
quencies for metrically scaled univariate data
I
install.packages("package"): installing a specific package
is.na(data frame): checking for missing values (“NA”) in a data frame
L
length(variable): sample size of data for a specific variable
library("package"): loading a specific package
lm(variable1 ~ variable2, data = data frame): compiling a linear model for
bivariate data
M
mean(variable): computing the sample mean for metrically scaled univariate data
median(variable): computing the sample median for metrically scaled univariate data
N
na.omit(data frame): removing cases with missing values (“NA”) from a data frame
ncol(data frame): number of columns of a data frame
nrow(data frame): number of rows of a data frame
numeric(m): initialising anm-component (zero) vector
P
pairs(data frame): generating a matrix of pairwise scatter plots for metrically scaled data
from a data frame
plot(variable1 ~ variable2, data = data frame): compiling a scatter plot for
metrically scaled bivariate data
Q
quantile(variable, α): computing the α–quantile for metrically scaled univariate data
R
raftery.diag(model): Raftery–Lewis autocorrelation diagnostic for a Markov chain Monte
Carlo simulation (coda package)
rbind(object 1, object 2): combining matching objects (vectors, matrices, data
frames) by rows
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rowMeans(data frame): computing means of row entries of data frame or matrix
rep(x, times): replicate “x” as often as indicated by “times”
rownames(data frame): listing row names of data frame or matrix
S
sample(elements, prob = posterior, size = <number of samples>,
replace = TRUE): sampling elements with repetition from a simulated posterior distribution
scale(variable, center = TRUE, scale = TRUE): standardisation of metrically
scaled univariate data
sd(variable): computing the sample standard deviation for metrically scaled univariate data
[(n− 1)-convention]
set.seed(integer): initialising the random number generator to a specific integer
str(data frame): scanning the structure of a data set
summary(model): outputing values of key statistical measures of a model
T
t(matrix): transposition of a matrix
table(variable): generating a table of absolute frequencies for univariate data
tail(data frame): scanning the last few rows of a data frame
traceplot(as.mcmc(data set$variable)): trace plot for a Markov chain Monte
Carlo simulation for a specfic variable (coda package)
V
var(variable): computing the sample variance for metrically scaled univariate data [(n− 1)-
convention]
W
waic(model) (loo package)
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Appendix B
Stan codes for HMC simulations
In this appendix we give the main elements of HMC simulations of posterior probability distribu-
tions with Stan, assuming a complete data set with no missing values is available. Some remarks
on reading data sets in a file format other than *.csv into R were made in Subsec. 6.3.1. Comment
lines in Stan code are to be preceeded by a double slash “//.” Please refer to the Stan user man-
ual [94, Sec. 8] and the publication [95] by the Stan Development Team for further information on
running Stan from R.
To maintain generality, the data input formulation below is given for non-standardised metrically
scaled data in the design matrixX .
Listing B.1: HMC sampling with Stan in R: general structure of code.
# Load R package rstan
library("rstan")
# Load a specific data set from a *.csv file, creating a R data.frame
dataSet = read.csv( "<filename.csv>" , header = TRUE )
# Identify dependent and independent variables, sample size,
# number of independent variables, number of groups
y = dataSet[,"yVarName"]
xIn = as.matrix( dataSet[,c("xVarName1", ..., "xVarNamek")] , ncol = k )
X = cbind( c(rep(1, nrow(xIn))) , xIn ) # design matrix: capital X!
nSample = length(y)
nIndVars = ncol(xIn)
gp = as.numeric(dataSet[,"groupVarName"]) # if relevant
nGroups = length( unique(gp) ) # if relevant
# Specify data list for Stan simulation
dataList = list(
nSample = nSample ,
nIndVars = nIndVars ,
nGroups = nGroups , # if relevant
y = y ,
X = X , # design matrix
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gp = gp # if relevant
)
# Stan model, specified via a string command in R
modelString = "<model specification, etc. to be inserted here>"
# Generate dynamic shared object (DSO) in C++
stanDSO = stan_model( model_code = modelString )
# Execution of Stan simulation: saving simulated posterior samples
modSimStan = sampling(
object = stanDSO ,
data = dataList ,
chains = <number of HMC chains to be generated> ,
cores = <number of cores used for parallel computing (max: 3)> ,
iter = <total number of iterations> ,
warmup = <number of warmup iterations> ,
thin = 1 ,
init = ’random’
)
# Trace plots of HMC chains
plot( modSimStan )
# Summary of simulated posterior marginal for each parameter
summary( modSimStan )
B.1 Linear regression
B.1.1 Fixed priors
We specify a linear regression model with a Gauß single-datum likelihood function according to
Eq. (2.21), with homogeneous variance. Contrary to Sec. 6.4, we here employ a half-Cauchy prior
probability distribution for the scale parameter σ2 as described in Subsec. 3.5.1. The regression
coefficients β are given regularising Gauß prior probability distributions. The following code
assumes standardised data for the dependent and independent variables. It activates the calculation
of the WAIC-estimate for a model’s out-of-sample deviance.
Listing B.2: HMC sampling with Stan in R: model specification for linear regression.
# Stan model: all of the following code needs to be embedded in a
# modelString = "..." command in R
data{
int<lower=1> N;
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real zy[N]; // standardised variables!
real zX0[N];
real zX1[N];
...;
real zXk[N];
}
parameters{
real<lower=0> zsigma; // standardised parameters!
real zb0;
real zb1;
...;
real zbk;
}
model{
vector[N] zmu;
zsigma ˜ cauchy( 0 , 2 ); // half-Cauchy prior
zbk ˜ normal( 0 , 1 ); // regularising zero-centred Gauss priors
...;
zb1 ˜ normal( 0 , 1 );
zb0 ˜ normal( 0 , 1 );
for ( i in 1:N ) {
zmu[i] = zb0 * zX0[i] + zb1 * zX1[i] + ... + zbk * zXk[i];
}
zy ˜ normal( zmu , zsigma );
}
generated quantities{
vector[N] zmu;
real dev;
dev = 0;
for ( i in 1:N ) {
zmu[i] = zb0 * zX0[i] + zb1 * zX1[i] + ... + zbk * zXk[i];
}
dev = dev + (-2)*normal_lpdf( zy | zmu , zsigma );
}
B.1.2 Adaptive priors
We give the code for a varying-intercepts linear regression model with a non-central t–single-
datum likelihood function according to eq. (2.26), and a Gauß adaptive prior for the group-level
intercept parameter. Half-Cauchy priors are chosen for the scale parameters. The code assumes
standardised data for the dependent and independent variables. It activates the calculation of the
WAIC-estimate for a model’s out-of-sample deviance.
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Listing B.3: HMC sampling with Stan in R: model specification for varying-intercept linear re-
gression with non-central t–single-datum likelihood function.
# Stan model: all of the following code needs to be embedded in a
# modelString = "..." command in R
data{
int<lower=1> N;
int<lower=1> N_gp; // number of groups
real zy[N]; // standardised variables!
real zX0[N];
real zX1[N];
...;
real zXk[N];
int gp[N]; // group variable
}
parameters{
real<lower=2> nu // nu > 2: existence of mean and variance
real<lower=0> zsigmaIntc; // standardised parameters!
real<lower=0> zsigma;
vector[N_gp] zb0;
real zeta;
real zb1;
...;
real zbk;
}
model{
vector[N] zmu;
nu ˜ exponential( <theta0> ); // exponential prior
zsigma ˜ cauchy( 0 , 2 ); // half-Cauchy prior
zbk ˜ normal( 0 , 1 ); // regularising zero-centred Gauss priors
...;
zb1 ˜ normal( 0 , 1 );
zsigmaIntc ˜ cauchy( 0 , 2 ); // half-Cauchy prior
zeta ˜ normal( 0 , <s0> ); // zero-centred Gauss prior
zb0 ˜ normal( zeta , zsigmaIntc ); // Gauss adaptive prior
for ( i in 1:N ) {
zmu[i] = zb0[gp[i]] * zX0[i] + zb1 * zX1[i] + ... + zbk * zXk[i];
}
zy ˜ student_t( nu , zmu , zsigma ); // t-likelihood
}
generated quantities{
vector[N] zmu;
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real dev;
dev = 0;
for ( i in 1:N ) {
zmu[i] = zb0[gp[i]] * zX0[i] + zb1 * zX1[i] + ... + zbk * zXk[i];
}
dev = dev + (-2)*student_t_lpdf( zy | nu , zmu , zsigma );
}
B.2 ANOVA-like regression
B.2.1 Fixed priors
We give an ANOVA-like regression model with a Gauß single-datum likelihood function according
to Eq. (2.21), with homogeneous variance. Contrary to Sec. 6.5, we employ a half-Cauchy prior
probability distribution for the scale parameter σ2 as described in Subsec. 3.5.1. The location
parameters µg are given Gauß prior probability distributions. It activates the calculation of the
WAIC-estimate for a model’s out-of-sample deviance.
Listing B.4: HMC sampling with Stan in R: model specification for homoscedastic ANOVA-like
regression.
# Stan model: all of the following code needs to be embedded in a
# modelString = "..." command in R
data{
int<lower=1> N;
int<lower=1> N_gp; // number of groups
real y[N];
int gp[N]; // group variable
}
parameters{
real<lower=0> sigma;
real a;
vector[N_gp] a_gp;
}
model{
vector[N] mu;
sigma ˜ cauchy( 0 , 2 ); // half-Cauchy prior
a_gp ˜ normal( 0 , 1 );
a ˜ normal( <mean y> , <stdev y> );
for ( i in 1:N ) {
mu[i] = a + a_gp[gp[i]];
}
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y ˜ normal( mu , sigma );
}
generated quantities{
vector[N] mu;
real dev;
dev = 0;
for ( i in 1:N ) {
mu[i] = a + a_gp[gp[i]];
}
dev = dev + (-2)*normal_lpdf( y | mu , sigma );
}
B.2.2 Adaptive priors
We give the code for a hierarchical ANOVA-like regression model with a non-central t–single-
datum likelihood function according to Eq. (2.26). A half-Cauchy adaptive prior is chosen for the
group-level scale parameter. The code activates the calculation of the WAIC-estimate for a model’s
out-of-sample deviance.
Listing B.5: HMC sampling with Stan in R: model specification for heteroscedastic ANOVA-like
regression with non-central t–single-datum likelihood function.
# Stan model: all of the following code needs to be embedded in a
# modelString = "..." command in R
data{
int<lower=1> N;
int<lower=1> N_gp; // number of groups
real y[N];
int gp[N]; // group variable
}
parameters{
real<lower=2> nu // nu > 2: existence of mean and variance
real<lower=0> tau;
vector<lower=0>[N_gp] sigma_gp;
real<lower=0> gamma;
vector[N_gp] a_gp;
real a;
}
model{
vector[N] sigma;
vector[N] mu;
nu ˜ exponential( <theta0> ); // exponential prior
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gamma ˜ exponential( <lambda0> );
tau ˜ cauchy( 0 , <alpha0> );
a ˜ normal( <mean y> , <stdev y> );
for ( j in 1:N_gp ) sigma_gp[j] ˜ cauchy( 0 , gamma );
// half-Cauchy adaptive prior
a_gp ˜ normal( 0 , tau ); // zero-centred Gauss adaptive prior
for ( i in 1:N ) {
sigma[i] = sigma_gp[gp[i]];
}
for ( i in 1:N ) {
mu[i] = a + a_gp[gp[i]];
}
y ˜ student_t( nu , mu , sigma ); // t-likelihood
}
generated quantities{
vector[N] sigma;
vector[N] mu;
real dev;
dev = 0;
for ( i in 1:N ) {
sigma[i] = sigma_gp[gp[i]];
}
for ( i in 1:N ) {
mu[i] = a + a_gp[gp[i]];
}
dev = dev + (-2)*student_t_lpdf( y | nu , mu , sigma );
}
B.3 Logistic regression
B.3.1 Fixed priors
We specify a logistic regression model with a Bernoulli single-datum likelihood function accord-
ing to Eq. (2.4), and regularising zero-centred Gauß prior probability distributions for the unknown
regression coefficients β. The following code assumes standardised data for the independent vari-
ables. It activates the calculation of the WAIC-estimate for a model’s out-of-sample deviance.
Listing B.6: HMC sampling with Stan in R: model specification for logistic regression.
# Stan model: all of the following code needs to be embedded in a
# modelString = "..." command in R
data{
int<lower=1> N;
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int y[N];
real zX0[N];
real zX1[N]; // standardised independent variables!
...;
real zXk[N];
}
parameters{
real zb0; // standardised parameters!
real zb1;
...;
real zbk;
}
model{
vector[N] theta;
zbk ˜ normal( 0 , 1 ); // regularising zero-centred Gauss priors
...;
zb1 ˜ normal( 0 , 1 );
zb0 ˜ normal( 0 , 1 );
for ( i in 1:N ) {
theta[i] = zb0 * zX0[i] + zb1 * zX1[i] + ... + zbk * zXk[i];
}
y ˜ binomial_logit( 1 , theta ); // logit link function
}
generated quantities{
vector[N] theta;
real dev;
dev = 0;
for ( i in 1:N ) {
theta[i] = zb0 * zX0[i] + zb1 * zX1[i] + ... + zbk * zXk[i];
}
dev = dev + (-2)*binomial_logit_lpmf( y | 1 , theta );
}
B.3.2 Adaptive priors
We specify a varying-intercept logistic regressionmodel with a binomial total-data likelihood func-
tion according to Eq. (2.9). A Gauß adaptive prior probability distribution is introduced for the
group-level intercept parameter. The following code assumes standardised data for the independent
variables. It activates the calculation of the WAIC-estimate for a model’s out-of-sample deviance.
Listing B.7: HMC sampling with Stan in R: model specification for varying-intercept logistic
regression with binomial total-data likelihood function.
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# Stan model: all of the following code needs to be embedded in a
# modelString = "..." command in R
data{
int<lower=1> N;
int<lower=1> N_gp; // number of groups
int y[N]; // number of successes
int n[N]; // number of trials
int gp[N]; // group variable
real zX0[N];
real zX1[N]; // standardised independent variables!
...;
real zXk[N];
}
parameters{
vector[N_gp] zb0;
real gpMu;
real zb1; // standardised parameters!
...;
real zbk;
real<lower=0> gpSigma;
}
model{
vector[N] theta;
gpSigma ˜ cauchy( 0 , 2 ); // half-Cauchy prior
zbk ˜ normal( 0 , 1 ); // regularising zero-centred Gauss priors
...;
zb1 ˜ normal( 0 , 1 );
gpMu ˜ normal( 0 , 10 );
zb0 ˜ normal( gpMu , gpSigma ); // Gauss adaptive prior
for ( i in 1:N ) {
theta[i] = zb0[gp[i]] * zX0[i] + zb1 * zX1[i] + ... + zbk * zXk[i];
}
y ˜ binomial_logit( n , theta ); // logit link function
}
generated quantities{
vector[N] theta;
real dev;
dev = 0;
for ( i in 1:N ) {
theta[i] = zb0[gp[i]] * zX0[i] + zb1 * zX1[i] + ... + zbk * zXk[i];
}
dev = dev + (-2)*binomial_logit_lpmf( y | n , theta );
}
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B.4 Poisson regression
B.4.1 Fixed priors
A Poisson regression model, with a Poisson single-datum likelihood function according to
Eq. (2.15), and regularising zero-centred Gauß prior probability distributions for the unknown
regression coefficients β, is coded below. Herein standardised data is assumed for the independent
variables. Note that we have included (but currently commented out) the alternative model spec-
ification for operating with exposures τ and a rate parameter λ. It activates the calculation of the
WAIC-estimate for a model’s out-of-sample deviance.
Listing B.8: HMC sampling with Stan in R: model specification for Poisson regression.
# Stan model: all of the following code needs to be embedded in a
# modelString = "..." command in R
data{
int<lower=1> N;
int y[N];
real zX0[N];
real zX1[N]; // standardised independent variables!
...;
real zXk[N];
}
parameters{
real zb0; // standardised parameters!
real zb1;
...;
real zbk;
}
model{
vector[N] theta;
zbk ˜ normal( 0 , 1 ); // regularising zero-centred Gauss priors
...;
zb0 ˜ normal( 0 , 1 );
for ( i in 1:N ) {
theta[i] = exp(zb0 * zX0[i] + zb1 * zX1[i] + ... + zbk * zXk[i]);
//lambda[i] = (1/tau[i]) * exp(zb0 * zX0[i] + zb1 * zX1[i]
//+ ... + zbk * zXk[i]);
}
y ˜ poisson( theta );
//y ˜ poisson( lambda );
}
generated quantities{
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vector[N] theta;
real dev;
dev = 0;
for ( i in 1:N ) {
theta[i] = exp(zb0 * zX0[i] + zb1 * zX1[i] + ... + zb2 * zXk[i]);
//lambda[i] = (1/tau[i]) * exp(zb0 * zX0[i] + zb1 * zX1[i]
//+ ... + zbk * zXk[i]);
}
dev = dev + (-2)*poisson_lpmf( y | theta );
//dev = dev + (-2)*poisson_lpmf( y | lambda );
}
B.4.2 Adaptive priors
We here give the code for a varying-intercept Poisson regression model. A Gauß adaptive prior
probability distribution is used for the group-level intercept parameter. The following code as-
sumes standardised data for the independent variables. It activates the calculation of the WAIC-
estimate for a model’s out-of-sample deviance.
Listing B.9: HMC sampling with Stan in R: model specification for varying-intercept Poisson
regression.
# Stan model: all of the following code needs to be embedded in a
# modelString = "..." command in R
data{
int<lower=1> N;
int<lower=1> N_gp; // number of groups
int y[N];
int gp[N]; // group variable
real zX0[N];
real zX1[N]; // standardised independent variables!
...;
real zXk[N];
}
parameters{
vector[N_gp] zb0;
real zbconst;
real zb1; // standardised parameters!
...;
real zbk;
real<lower=0> gpSigma;
}
model{
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vector[N] theta;
gpSigma ˜ cauchy( 0 , 1 );
zbconst ˜ normal( 0 , 10 );
zbk ˜ normal( 0 , 1 ); // regularising zero-centred Gauss priors
...;
zb1 ˜ normal( 0 , 1 );
zb0 ˜ normal( 0 , gpSigma ); // zero-centred adaptive Gauss prior
for ( i in 1:N ) {
theta[i] = zbconst + zb0[gp[i]] * zX0[i] + zb1 * zX1[i]
+ ... + zbk * zXk[i]); // take care of linebreak!
//lambda[i] = -log(tau[i]) + zbconst + zb0[gp[i]] * zX0[i]
//+ zb1 * zX1[i] + ... + zbk * zXk[i]);
}
y ˜ poisson_log( theta ); // log link function
//y ˜ poisson_log( lambda );
}
generated quantities{
vector[N] theta;
real dev;
dev = 0;
for ( i in 1:N ) {
theta[i] = zbconst + zb0[gp[i]] * zX0[i]
+ zb1 * zX1[i] + ... + zb2 * zXk[i]); // linebreak!
//lambda[i] = -log(tau[i]) + zbconst + zb0[gp[i]] * zX0[i]
//+ zb1 * zX1[i] + ... + zbk * zXk[i]);
}
dev = dev + (-2)*poisson_log_lpmf( y | theta );
//dev = dev + (-2)*poisson_log_lpmf( y | lambda );
}
Appendix C
Glossary of technical terms (GB – D)
A
act: Handlung
algorithm: Algorithmus, Rechenregel
ANOVA (analysis of variance): Varianzanalyse
autocorrelation: Autokorrelation
B
Bayes’ theorem: Satz von Bayes
behaviour: Verhalten
binomial coefficient: Binomialkoeffizient
bivariate: bivariat, zwei variable Gro¨ßen betreffend
bounded rationality: begrenzte Rationalita¨t, begrenzte Vernunft
C
choice: Wahl, Auswahl
cluster: Klumpen, Anha¨ufung
common sense: gesunder Menschenverstand
complete ignorance: ga¨nzliche Unkenntnis
conditional probability: bedingte Wahrscheinlichkeit
conjunction: Konjunktion, Mengenschnitt
consequence: Konsequenz, Auswirkung
contingency table: Kontingenztafel
convenience sample: Gelegenheitsstichprobe
covariance matrix: Kovarianzmatrix
D
data: Daten
data-generating process: Daten generierender Prozess
data matrix: Datenmatrix
decision: Entscheidung
degree-of-belief: Glaubwu¨rdigkeitsgrad, Plausibilita¨t
degrees of freedom: Freiheitsgrade
degree of plausibility: Plausibilita¨tsgrad
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dependent variable: abha¨ngige Variable
design matrix: Regressormatrix, Modellmatrix
deviance: abweichendes Verhalten
deviation: Abweichung
disjunction: Disjunktion, Mengenvereinigung
dispersion: Streuung
distribution: Verteilung
divergence: Divergenz, Auseinanderstreben
E
estimation: Scha¨tzung
evidence: Anzeichen, Hinweis, Anhaltspunkt, Indiz
exchangeability: Austauschbarkeit
expectation value: Erwartungswert
exposure: Ausgesetztsein
F
fact-based reasoning: Fakten basiertes Argumentieren
fallacy: Trugschluss, Fehlschluss, Ta¨uschung
G
group: Gruppe
H
heteroscedasticity: Heteroskedastizita¨t, inhomogene Varianz
homoscedasticity: Homoskedastizita¨t, homogene Varianz
hypothesis: Hypothese, Behauptung, Vermutung
I
ignorance: Unkenntnis
incomplete information: unvollsta¨ndige Information
independent variable: unabha¨ngige Variable
indicator variable: bina¨re Indikatorvariable
inductive method: induktive Methode
information: Information
information criterion: Informationskriterium
information entropy: Informationsentropie
interaction: Wechselwirkung
interaction effect: Wechselwirkungseffekt
intercept: Achsenabschnitt
J
joint distribution: gemeinsame Verteilung
K
knowledge: Wissen, Kenntnis, Erkenntnis, Wissensstand
L
Lagrange function: Lagrange-Funktion
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Lagrange multiplier: Lagrange-Multiplikator, integrierender Faktor
linear regression analysis: lineare Regressionsanalyse
link function: Verknu¨pfungsfunktion
location parameter: Lokationsparameter
logical complement: logisches Gegenteil
loss function: Verlustfunktion
M
main effect: Haupteffekt
marginal distribution: Randverteilung
marginal frequencies: Randha¨ufigkeiten
marginalisation: Marginalisierung(smethode)
maximum entropy distribution: Verteilung maximaler Entropie
measurement: Messung, Datenaufnahme
model comparison: Modellvergleich
multi-collinearity: Multikollinearita¨t
N
non-knowledge: Nichtwissen
normalisation condition: Normierungsbedingung
O
observable: beobachtbar, messbar
observation: Beobachtung
odds: Wettchancen
operationalisation: Operationalisieren, latente Variable messbar gestalten
outlier: Ausreißer
over-fitting: u¨bergenaues Anpassen
P
parameter: Parameter, wa¨hlbare Stellgro¨ße
parsimony: Sparsamkeit
pooling: Zusammenlegen, gemeinsames Nutzen
population: Grundgesamtheit
precision: Pra¨zisionsparameter
prediction: Vorhersage
predictor: erkla¨rende Variable
premiss: Voraussetzung, Pra¨misse
primitive: Grundbaustein
probability: Wahrscheinlichkeit
probability density function (pdf): Wahrscheinlichkeitsdichte
probability function: Wahrscheinlichkeitsfunktion
proposition: Vorschlag, Antrag, Aussage, Behauptung, Pra¨misse
psychological value: psychologischer Wert
R
rare event: seltenes Ereignis
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rate parameter: Ratenparameter
regression analysis: Regressionsanalyse
regression coefficient: Regressionskoeffizient
regression model: Regressionsmodell
regression toward the mean: Regression zur Mitte
re-scaling: Reskalierung, Gro¨ßenordnungsa¨nderung
retrodiction: Nachersage, Rekonstruktion (von Daten)
risk: Risiko (berechenbar)
rule of succession: Regel des nachfolgenden Wertes
S
sample: Stichprobe
sample mean: Stichprobenmittelwert
sample size: Stichprobenumfang
sample variance: Stichprobenvarianz
sampling distribution: Stichprobenkenngro¨ßenverteilung
scale-invariant: skaleninvariant
scale parameter: Skalenparameter
scientific endeavour: wissenschaftliche Bemu¨hung
scientific method: Wissenschaftliche Methode
shape parameter: Formparameter
shrinkage: Schrumpfen
slope: Steigung
standardisation: Standardisierung
state of Nature: Zustand der Außenwelt
statistical (in)dependence: statistische (Un)abha¨ngigkeit
statistical model: statistisches Modell
statistical variable: Merkmal, Variable
sufficient statistic: suffizientes statistisches Maß
surprise: U¨berraschung, unerwartetes Ereignis
T
target population: Zielgruppe
transformation: Transformation, Umwandlung, Vera¨nderung
translation: Translation, Verschiebung
U
uncertainty: Unsicherheit (nicht berechenbar)
under-fitting: ungenu¨gendes Anpassen
univariate: univariat, eine einzige variable Gro¨ße betreffend
unit: (Maß-)Einheit
utility function: Nutzenfunktion
V
value: Wert
variance: Varianz
variation: Variation
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